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REVOCATION AND REVIVAL OF WILLS
W. F. Zacharias and G. Maschinot
PART III*

E

one other state,' New York has the distinction of
being a jurisdiction where issues concerning revocation and
revival have been made the basis of more extensive litigation than
is usually the case. It should be noted, however, that in all but
one instance 2 the courts of that state have had the guidance of a
statute regulating both revocation and revival3 so most of these
decisions concern themselves with the application of statutory
language or its interpretation. While that statute declares that
XCEPT FOR

* The first part of this article appeared in 25 CHIOAGO-KENT LAW REVIOW 185-215,
the second at pp. 271-323.
1 Pennsylvania possesses more reported cases on the general subject than any
other state.
2 The case of Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. Ch. 258 (N. Y., 1823), was one where
the will devised realty and bequeathed personalty. Testator adeemed the personalty
and contracted to convey the realty. The court held that these acts operated to
revoke the will even though the contract to convey was subsequently rescinded.
The court, at p. 270, then said: "If a will be once absolutely revoked, whether
directly or impliedly, it must be gone forever. It cannot be restored without due
republication." Had that language been necessary to the decision it could well be
said that the New York court anticipated the English statute of 1 Vict. c. 26 by
fourteen years and made the statute set out in the next succeeding note unnecessary.
3 N. Y. Thompson Cons. Laws 1939, Vol. 1, Decedent Estate Law. Section 34
thereof states: "No will in writing, except in the cases hereinafter mentioned, nor
any part thereof, shall be revoked, or altered, otherwise than by some other will
in writing, or some other writing of the testator, declaring such revocation or
alteration, and executed with the same formalities with which the will itself was
required by law to be executed . . .2 Revival is dealt with in Section 41 which
reads: "If, after the making of any will, the testator shall duly make and execute
a second will, the destruction, canceling or revocation of such second will, shall not
revive the first will, unless it appear by the terms of such revocation, that it was
his intention to revive and give effect to his first will; or unless . . . he shall duly
republish his first will."
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revocation may be accomplished by a later will or some "other
writing," it does not, according to Simmons v. Simmons,4 prevent
the possibility that revocation might also be produced by a later
inconsistent will, and, if such a will exists, it is not necessary that
it speak expressly on the subject for the phrase "declaring such
revocation" was there held to apply to and be designed to modify
the words "some other writing.'' 5 If the revocation is to be
produced by some "other writing," however, that writing must
measure up to statutory requirements concerning its execution and
attestation. Thus, in the case of In re Aker's Will,6 a holographic
will bore a signed notation in the margin that the will was revoked.
The notation was held to be ineffective for lack of attestation and
failed to serve as a cancellation since no part of the notation
touched the provisions of the will.
Admittedly, a properly executed subsequent will expressly
declaring the revocation of prior wills should produce that effect,
but most of the difficulty in the New York cases involving revocation alone has been over the point of establishing that there was,
at least at one time, such a revoking will. Failure on the part of
the contestants, in Nelson v. McGiffert,7 to prove that the alleged
revoking will contained an express clause or to show that its
provisions were inconsistent with the earlier will led to the probate
of the earlier instrument. One competent witness would be suffis
cient for that purpose, according to the case of In re Wear's Will
for the court there distinguished between establishment of the
contents of the subsequent will for purpose of revocation and the
necessity of having two witnesses to insure its probate as a lost
will. 9 Whether testator's attorney, hired to attend to the execu426 Barb. 68 (N. Y., 1857).
5

As to the grammatical construction of statutes like the one involved, see 25

CHIOAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 201-2.
674
App. Div. 461, 77 N. Y. S. 643 (1902), affirmed in 173 N. Y. 620, 66 N. E. 1103
(1903).
73 Barb. Ch. 158 (N. Y., 1848).
8 131 App. Div. 875, 116 N. Y. S. 304 (1909).
9The
court in the case of In re Palmer's Will, 122 Misc. 177, 203 N. Y. S. 487
(1923), pointed out what it considered to be "a legislative oversight" in requiring
proof by two witnesses to the fact of destruction of a will if done in the presence
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tion of the revoking will, is competent to serve as a witness to its
contents has been the matter of some debate. The case of In re
Cunnion's Will 1° would indicate that the common-law rule which
forbade the attorney from revealing the client's confidence during
the client's lifetime but permitted disclosure after the testator's
death has been reversed by a statute in that state and, as a consequence, the testimony of the drafting attorney was inadmissible
to prove the contents of the later, but presumably destroyed, will.
If the attorney has served as an attesting witness, however, the
statute recognizes this fact as a waiver of any confidential communication so, under the holding in In re Ford's Will," he then
becomes competent to testify as to the contents of the alleged
revoking will,' 2 even though that may lead to the result that the
client is declared to have died intestate.
The circumstances under which a will may be revoked having
been established, it is now possible to turn to the New York cases
dealing with revival. The tenor of the decisions regarding revocation would indicate that an effective revocatory instrument would
operate immediately upon execution, whether expressly so declaring' 3 or merely impliedly achieving that result, 1 4 regardless of its
ultimate fate. That being so, an act of some sort on the part of
the testator would be essential to renew the life of the revoked
will. The revival provision declares that the destruction, cancellation or revocation of the subsequent will shall not, ipso facto,
produce a revival and that statute has been given a literal reading
of the testator by another person, but leaving the door open to proof by only one
witness if the alleged revocation took the form of a subsequent revoking will which
could no longer be produced because lost or presumably destroyed. It said such
practice "leaves the door open to some of the same kind of abuse or fraud as it was
designed to prevent." The court did not refuse to follow the rule but did scrutinize
the testimony of the single witness carefully, refused to believe it, and admitted
the earlier will to probate.
10 201 N. Y. 123, 94 N. E. 648 (1911).
11 135 Misc. 630, 239 N. Y. S. 252 (1930). Dicta in Mead v. Herdman, 161 App.
Div. 177, 146 N. Y. S. 353 (1914), to the effect that any such waiver is annulled
when the testator destroys the revoking will, was there repudiated.
12 Accord: In re Hedge's Will, 136 Misc. 230, 242 N. Y. S. 415 (1930).
is In re Ford's Will, 135 Misc. 630, 239 N. Y. S. 252 (1930) ; In re Palmer's Will,
122 Misc. 177, 203 N. Y. S. 487 (1923).
14 Walton v. Walton, 7 Johns. Ch. 258 (N. Y., 1823).
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in several instances. 1 5 It does specify, though, that intention to
revive the former will may be evidenced "by the terms of such
revocation," and it has been necessary to interpret this phrase
particularly as to whether or not oral statements accompanying
the act of destroying the second will are sufficient to disclose the
"terms" of the revocation. In the case of In re Stickney's Will, 6
the testator, having a will dated in 1893, made another in 1895
which expressly revoked all former wills. The 1895 will was later
subjected to physical destruction by the testator who orally announced to persons then present that he wanted the first will to
be effective. It was claimed that such conduct revived the 1893
will, but the court held otherwise saying that, if the revoking
instrument was physically destroyed, the original will must be
republished. The court also indicated that the phrase "appear
by the terms of such revocation" related only to situations wherein
the subsequent instrument was nullified by some later writing of
sufficient dignity to produce that result, in which writing the intention to revive could, and should, be adequately disclosed. If the
statute required that the intention to revive should appear "by
the written terms of such revocation," such statement would be
unquestionably correct, but there seems little basis for importing
the word "written" into the statutory language in view of the
alternative methods permitted both as to revocation and revival.
Oral statements as to revival made by testatrix in the presence of
one of the attesting witnesses to the original will and uttered
simultaneously with the physical destruction of the revoking will,
were held insufficient, in the case of In re Kuntz's Will,1 7 for the
reason aforementioned plus the additional fact that republication
required attention to the formalities necessary for the execution
15 Ludlam v. Otis, 15 Hun. 410 (N. Y., 1878), destruction of a second inconsistent
will; In re Brewster's Estate, 72 App. Div. 587, 76 N. Y. S. 283 (1902), deliberate
destruction of will containing an express clause; In re Barnes' Will, 70 App. Div.
523, 75 N. Y. S. 373 (1902), In re Wear's Will, 131 App. Div. 875, 116 N. Y. S. 304
(1909), and In re Hedge's Will, 136 Misc. 230, 242 N. Y. S. 415 (1930), presumed
destruction because second will not found but last seen in testator's possession.
16161 N. Y. 42, 55 N. E. 396, 76 Am. St. Rep. 246 (1899), affirming 31 App. Div.
382, 52 N. Y. S. 929 (1898).
27 163 App. Div. 125, 148 N. Y. S. 382 (1914).
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of a will in the first instance and one witness was utterly
insufficient.
Having thus added the requirement that there must be written
evidence to establish the revival of a revoked will if the republication method is not used, the New York courts then proceeded to
go still farther, in the case of In re O'Donovan's Will,' by there
insisting that the writing be executed and attested with the full
formalities needed for the making of an original will. The testator in that case had appended a signed note to his original will,
apparently simultaneously with the act of destroying a later
revocatory will, which read: "The will dated January 24, 1921,
is my last will-a subsequent will dated January 16, 1925, was
destroyed December 19, 1933."
There being no evidence of
republication, it was argued that such written note should be
sufficient to make it "appear by the terms of such revocation"
that he intended to revive the earlier will, but the court would not
agree although the testator may well have thought this would be
enough. Similarly, a notation written on the revocatory will,
which had been so obliterated and cancelled as to be unreadable
and consequently nullified, indicative of a desire that the first will
be restored to full force and effect failed to produce the desired
result in the case of In re McCaffrey's Estate.19
At the same time that the New York courts were providing
their own gloss upon the statutory language as it related to the
use of complete wills for purpose of revocation and revival, it also
became necessary to consider the operation and effect of codicils
in the same connection. Two early cases had come to the conclusion that inasmuch as a codicil does not, in the absence of express
direction, revoke a will but merely alters the same, it follows that
the subsequent destruction of the codicil does not invoke the
application of the revival statute, particularly since there is no
reference to a codicil therein, but leaves the will to stand as it was
18 168 Misc. 362, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 456 (1938).
19 174 Misc. 162, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 178 (1940).
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originally written.2 0 In the light thereof, a codicil would seem to
possess no more than an ambulatory nature, but when the court
came to decide the case of Osburn v. Rochester Trust & Safe
Deposit Company2 ' it achieved an entirely different result by holding that a clause in a will once modified by the execution of a
codicil is not revived by the subsequent destruction of the codicil
so that the property involved must pass as intestate estate. The
case suggests a situation which does not appear to have been
within the comprehension of the framers of the varied revival
provisions but which might well merit attention, i.e. how to handle
the revival of a partially revoked will. Of course, a valid codicil
may well serve as a reviving instrument since it meets all requirements as to re-execution and republication, has always possessed
the merit of republishing the will of which it is a part, and could
satisfy any captious additional factors made necessary by judicial
interpretation of statutory language. It has, therefore, been held
in New York that an original will, although expressly revoked by
22
a subsequent will, may be revived by a suitable codicil.
Long prior to any statute, the North Carolina court was called
20 Matter of Simpson, 56 How. Prac. 125 (N. Y., 1878); Johnston's Will, 69 Hun.
157, 23 N. Y. S. 355 (1893). In the first of these cases, at p. 131, the court pointed
out that the word codicil does not appear in the revival provision but that rather
it "evidently refers to a testamentary instrument which assumes to dispose of the
testator's entire estate, and not to an instrument which is merely an addition or
supplement to a former will; and which had no legal entity independent of the
existence of the latter."
21 209 N. Y. 54, 102 N. E. 571, Ann. Cas. 1915A 101, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 983
(1913). The codicil had added an extra legacy of $1000 ahead of the residuary
clause in the original will. It was deemed to revoke the residuary clause to the
extent of $1000 which sum was not restored by the destruction of the codicil. See
also In re Kathan's Will, 141 N. Y. S. 705 (1913), where a codicil had been made
to revoke the bequest of a diamond chain, but was itself destroyed by tearing.
Testatrix told one witness that her will was in "the red bag in the closet." The
red bag contained not only the original will but also the torn codicil. Held: there
was no sufficient republication and the legacy of the chain, once revoked, was not
revived by the tearing of the codicil.
22 In re Campbell's Will, 170 N. Y. 84, 62 N. E. 1070 (1902). In that case, a will
dated 1897 was followed by one in 1899 containing an express clause of revocation.
A codicil dated 1900, reciting that it was a codicil to the 1897 will, also contained
a revocatory clause. It was held that both wills were revoked thereby but that the
other language in the codicil republished the earlier will as of the date of the
codicil. See also In re Knapp's Will, 23 N. Y. S. 282 (1893), where the same result
was attained although the codicil lacked an express clause of revocation but did
mention the first will and ratified it to the extent that it was not in conflict with
other provisions in the codicil.
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upon, in Giles's Heirs v. Giles's Executors,23 to determine whether
parol declarations were adequate to nullify a duly executed and
properly witnessed will. The testator there had left his will in
the hands of another for safekeeping. On a later occasion he
directed the custodian to burn the will but was told that the
custodian would not do so although he was willing to surrender it,
if desired, so that testator might do as he pleased. The will was
never called for, nor burned. The testator also, sometime later,
said-he had made his will and "it should stand." Upon testator's
death the will was offered for probate but was contested by the
heirs on the ground that it had been revoked by the parol direction.
Probate of the will was held proper on the ground that the testator,
by his subsequent statements, obviously did not contemplate dying
intestate and that the revocation was not intended to be complete
until destruction actually occurred. The court gratuitously added
the remark that, had the revocation been completely carried into
effect and the will cancelled, "it could not have been revived by
any subsequent declaration by parol." Thereafter a statute was
enacted which deals with revocation, permitting the same to be
produced by a written will, a codicil, a duly executed other writing
so declaring, or by a holographic will,2 4 but the act is silent as to
revival. Since the adoption of that statute, it has been determined that the existence of a later will, which does not contain
an express clause of revocation and is only partly inconsistent
with the earlier one, is not enough to produce a revocation 25 nor
will a later one giving "all my effects" to certain relatives nullify
a will devising the testator's land to his daughter, since "effects"
23 Conf. Rep. 174, 1 N. C. 290 (1801).
A note by the reporter states: "The law
as to parol revocations of written wills of real estate has since been altered by
the act of 1819 (1 Rev. St., Ch. 112, § 12)."
24 The present statute, N. C. Gen. Stats. 1943, Vol. 2, Ch. 31, § 31-5, reads: "No
will or testament in writing, or any clause thereof, shall be revocable otherwise
than by some other will or codicil in writing, or other writing declaring the same
* . . signed by him [testator] ....
and subscribed in his presence by two witnesses
at least; or unless the same be altered or revoked by some other will or codicil in
writing, or other writing of the testator, all of which shall be in the handwriting
of the testator, and his name subscribed thereto or inserted therein . . ." A recent
minor amendment of this provision did not change either the sense or the language
of the foregoing.
25 In re Venable's Will, 127 N. C. 344, 37 S. E. 465 (1900).
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is a term relating to personal property and generates no
26
inconsistency.
Neither of the two North Carolina cases touching on the question of revival come to any conclusive result from which it would
be possible to catalog that state as following either common law
or ecclesiastical lines. In Love v. Johnston27 a later will containing an express clause of revocation was held to be the only will
of the testator despite the claim that an earlier will had been
revived and was to be treated as part of the final will. It appeared,
however, that some one had torn testator's signature off the earlier
will and that, although he had re-signed the same simultaneously
with the making of the new will and had expressed the wish that
if anything happened to the later will he wanted the prior one to
stand, the earlier will was not re-witnessed. The court based its
decision on the ground that an oral republication was insufficient,
but it could also have concluded that there was no firm intention
to revive the earlier will. The case of Marsh v. Marsh25 is equally
unsatisfactory. There the testator, having a will dated 1835, made
another in 1850 which was not only inconsistent with the former
one but also contained an express clause of revocation. The 1850
will was subsequently destroyed, the testator at that time remarking that he wanted the first one to be his will. The court first gave
indication that it regarded a will as an ambulatory instrument
whether it contained an express clause of revocation or not, hence
leaned in the direction of common-law views, but then observed
that there was clear evidence of intention to revive, following
ecclesiastical doctrines, at the time of the destruction of the later
instrument. As the court expressly disavowed that it had any
intention of entering the controversy between the two sets of
26 In re Wolfe's Will, 185 N. C. 563, 117 S. E. 804 (1923). The first will contained
merely a devise of land; the second, lacking both a revocatory and a residuary
clause, disposed of "all my effects." It was held to be error to reject the former
will merely because the later one had already been probated, and that there was
no inconsistency between a will devising land and another one bequeathing personal
property.
27 34 N. C. 355 (1851).

2848 N. C. (3 Jones L.) 77, 64 Am. Dec. 598 (1855).
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principles, it can only be said that the question still remains an
open one in that jurisdiction except that, if ecclesiastical views
ultimately prevail, parol declarations showing an intent to revive
may be sufficient for that purpose.
Statutory provisions in North Dakota, as complete as those
29
found in most states, not only specify the manner of revocation
but also stipulate that two or more wills shall be probated together
if the later ones do not contain express language on the point. 30
The state has also adopted the typical provision relating to
revival.3 ' None of these sections have received judicial interpretation to date but the revival provision contains the ambiguity
already noted over the point as to how the testator is to evidence
his intention to revive "by the terms" of the revocation of the
later will. It also provides no explanation or definition of the
"due republication" which is to serve as an alternative method of
revival. For that reason, it cannot be said that the law of North
Dakota is either settled or complete.
At quite an early date it became necessary for an Ohio court
to decide whether or not it was possible for a testator, having a
valid written will disposing of his entire estate, to revoke the
same by a subsequent nuncupative will. When denying that right,
32
the-court in the case of Devisees of McCune v. House and nitch
voiced a sentiment which has been echoed in Anglo-American law
many times. It said:
There are very good reasons why an individual., he who has
29 N. D. Rev. Code 1943, Vol. 5, Ch. 56-04, § 56-041, reads: "Except as is otherwise
provided in this chapter, a written will, in whole or in part, can be revoked or
altered only: (1) By a written will or other writing of the testator, declaring such
revocation or alteration and executed with the same formalities with which a will
should be executed by such testator . . ."
30 Ibid., § 56-0405, states:
"A prior will is not revoked by a subsequent will
unless the latter contains an express revocation, or provisions wholly inconsistent
with the terms of the former will, but in other cases the prior will remains effectual
so far as consistent with the provisions of the subsequent will."
31 Ibid., § 56-0408, declares: "If, after making a will, the testator duly makes
and executes a subsequent will, the destruction, canceling or revocation of the
latter does not revive the former unless it appears by the terms of such revocation
that it was the testator's intention to revive the former will, or unless after such
destruction, canceling, or revocation he duly republishes the prior will."
32 8

Ohio 144 (1837).
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not yet executed a written will, should be permitted, under
peculiar circumstances, to make a verbal one. But when he
has already executed a written will with all the solemnities
of the law, there are equally strong reasons why the revoca3
tion of it should be attended with the same solemnities.
The force of that decision became evident when Ohio adopted its
statute, for the enactment requires that revocation take the form
of some later will or codicil or else some other writing subscribed
and attested in the manner necessary for the making of a will in
the first instance. 34 The later will apparently need not expressly
declare the revocation, but if it does not it can serve as a revoking
instrument only to the extent that inconsistency can be proven. 35
The Ohio law also includes a typical revival provision to the
effect that the destruction of a "second will" shall not, ipso facto,
operate to revive the earlier one. 36 While no case has arisen there
in which the testator made a complete revoking "will," the Ohio
courts have had occasion to pass on the effectiveness of attempts
at revival. The nisi prius court concerned in the case of In re
Will of Charlotte Murray3 7 indicated that a defective codicil which
33 8 Ohio 144 at 146.

34 Page, Ohio Gen. Code Ann., Vol. 7, Ch. 4, § 10504-47, declares: "A will shall
be revoked by the testator . . . by some other will or codicil, in writing, executed
as prescribed by this title, or by some other writing, signed, attested and subscribed,
in the manner provided by this title for the making of a will . . ."
35 In Paully v. Crooks, 41 Ohio App. 1, 179 N. E. 364 (1931), it was held error to
instruct a jury that the mere fact of making a second will, which was not produced
and was presumably destroyed, necessarily revoked the earlier one, but it was said
that it would do so if it contained an express clause or inconsistent provisions.
See also Westfall v. Notman, 18 Ohio L. A. 407 (1934), where an express clause of
revocation had been present in the subsequent will, and Hennessy v. Volz, 59 Ohio
App. 1, 16 N. E. (2d) 1019 (1938).
36 Page, Ohio Gen. Code Ann., Vol. 7, Ch. 4, § 10504-54, states: "After making a
will, if the testator duly makes and executes a second will, the destruction, cancellation or revocation of the second will, shall not revive the first will unless the
terms of such revocation show that it was his intention to revive and give effect to
his first will; or, after such destruction, cancellation or revocation, he duly republishes his first will."
3720 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 305 (1917). In that case, the testatrix had made a will
in 1905 covering her entire estate and including a residuary clause. It was claimed
that she made another in 1911 but it could not be produced and its contents were
unknown. In 1912, she was adjudged incompetent and a guardian was appointed.
Sometime in 1915, while still under guardianship, she wrote, on the back of the
1905 will, a statement reading: "It is my wish that my mother's share shall go to
my sister . . ." This legend was signed but unwitnessed. It was apparently designed to revoke a provision for a deceased legatee and to make a substitution.
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could not operate because not validly witnessed might, nevertheless,
when coupled with the preservation of the allegedly revoked will,
serve "in a certain sense" as a republication thereof. The Ohio
Supreme Court, however, in Collins v. Collins,3" following views
expressed in New York,3 9 refused to accept oral statements made
by the testator at the time he destroyed the revoking instrument,
there a codicil specifically revoking certain of the provisions in
the former will, as being sufficient to revive the revoked will. The
court indicated that where the revoking instrument is physically
destroyed there must be an act of republication. That ceremony,
the court said, would require that the testator first acknowledge
the will as his last will; that if he does so in the presence of the
original attesting witnesses nothing more is necessary; but that
if the acknowledgment is made in the presence of strangers to the
will they must sign as witnesses although no further signing by
the testator is required. 40 Such methods are admittedly desirable
safety factors but they utterly disregard the legislative direction
that the "terms of the revocation" may serve to "show that it was
his intention to revive and give effect to his first will," so that
republication becomes the only available method, instead of an
alternative method, in that state.
Statutory provisions in Oklahoma are reasonably complete
since they deal not only with revocation 4' and revocation by impli-

Testatrix was declared competent in 1916 but died shortly thereafter without taking
further action. Held: even in the 1911 will had been made and supposing it did
revoke the 1905 will, the legend written in 1915, inadequate as a codicil, revived
the 1905 will.
3s 110 Ohio St. 105, 143 N. E. 561, 38 A. L. R. 230 (1924).
39 See In re Stickney's Will, 161 N. Y. 42, 55 N. E. 396, 76 Am. St. Rep. 246
(1899).
40

See also In re Paulus, 27 Ohio Op. 283 (1943).

41 Okla. Stats. Ann. (Perm. Ed.), Tit. 84, Ch. 2, § 101, states: "Except in cases in
this article mentioned no written will, nor any part thereof, can be revoked or
altered otherwise than: (1) By a written will or other writing of the testator,
declaring such revocation or alteration, and executed with the same formalities
with which a will should be executed by such testator . . ."
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cation 42 but also with the subject of revival. 43 The law of that
state has been complicated, however, by the presence therein of
the Indian wards of the federal government whose ability to
arrange for testamentary disposition of their estates is subject
to both state and federal law. As applied to citizens, it has been
held that the statute concerning express revocation is not satisfied
if the subsequent will is defectively executed so as not be admissible to probate ;44 but that, if a valid revocatory will has been
made, the eventual fate thereof is unimportant and its mere
destruction does not revive the earlier one. 45 The case of
In re Bourassa's Estate46 also illustrates the extent to which
the inconsistency may proceed before revocation by impliThere the two wills were identical in
cation will occur.
every respect except for an omission of the name of a deceased
legatee who had been mentioned in the first but not in the second
will. It was held that the later will controlled. No elaboration
on the revival provision has, as yet, been provided so problems
growing from the ambiguous phrasing thereof must await answer
at some other time.
The principal difficulty attendant upon wills made by Indian
wards has been experienced on the point as to whether or not the
subsequent revoking will must be valid enough to warrant its
probate or can operate as a revocatory instrument if it complies
with state law even though it be deficient in federal requirements.
42 Ibid., § 105, specifies: "A prior will is not revoked by a subsequent will, unless
the latter contains an express revocation, or provisions wholly inconsistent with
the terms of the former will; but in other cases the prior will remains effectual
so far as consistent with the provisions of the subsequent will."
43 Ibid., § 106, declares: "If, after making a will, the testator duly makes and
executes a subsequent will, the destruction, canceling or revocation of the latter
does not revive the former, unless it appears by the terms of such revocation that
it was his intention to renew the former will, or unless after such destruction,
canceling or revocation, he republishes the prior will."
44 Leard v. Askew, 28 Okla. 300, 114 P. 251, Ann. Cas. 1912D 234 (1911).
45 Puckett v. Brittain, 152 Okla. 184, 3 P. (2d) 876 (1931). Contest against the
earlier will, based on fact that a later will contained an express clause of revocation, was attempted to be supported by secondary proof of the attesting witnesses
as to the contents thereof, the original not being found. It was held to be error
to exclude the proffered testimony.
46 171 Okla. 64, 41 P. (2d) 851 (1935).
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In Chestnut v. Capey,4 7 when the nephew of a Choctaw Indian
sought letters of administration on his uncle's estate, two different
wills were offered in opposition to his request. One of them, dated
in 1912, ran in favor of one March and one Woodruff. The other,
made in 1908, purported to disinherit the testator's widow and
devised the estate to one Chestnut. The widow then produced a
third document, made in 1913, entitled "Revocation of Will,"
which expressly referred to the March-Woodruff will but also
extended to "any and all other wills at any time heretofore executed by me." That document, although signed by the testator,
witnessed and even acknowledged before a notary public, did not
have the judicial approval required by federal law for the making
of a will. For that reason, it was urged the revoking instrument'
had no legal significance but the trial court held otherwise. That
action was affirmed on the ground that the federal law dealt only
with the making of a will, was silent on the subject of revocation,
left the state law free to operate, and the instrument was clearly a
''writing of the testator, declaring such revocation" executed with
all the formalities required by state law. Again, in Phillips v.
Smith,48 a will dated in 1932 and containing an express clause of
revocation was propounded for probate. One Phillips produced
an earlier will in his favor which he claimed should be admitted
because the later will purported to disinherit testator's minor son
but was lacking in the prior judicial approval made necessary for
its validity. The Phillips will was rejected as having been effectively revoked and that action was affirmed, the court expressing
the view that compliance with federal law was unnecessary insofar
as revocation was concerned. 49 A federal court has reached much
the same result, in Berry v. Brokeshoulder,50 although the specific
Okla. 754, 146 P. 589 (1915).
249 (1940). Riley, J., dissented on the ground that,
unless the second will is an effective dispositive Instrument at least in some respect, it cannot serve to revoke the earlier will for he considered it impossible to
strip the clause of revocation from the invalid will and make it stand alone.
49 The court also admitted the later will for the reason that the federal law did
not control admission to probate but might affect the validity of the devises contained in the will only so far as they related to allotted lands.
50162 F. (2d) 651 (1947).
47 45

48 186 Okla. 636, 100 P. (2d)
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issue there involved was whether judicial approval was necessary
for an Indian's will which disinherited grandchildren, the testator
not having any closer objects of his bounty and the statute merely
applying to wills disinheriting the "parent, wife, spouse or
children."
It has already been noted that Oregon is the only state in the
union which has no statute whatever on the subject of revocation5 1
although it does possess one relating to revival.5 2 One interesting
case, that in In re Engle's Estate,53 has thrown considerable light
on the meaning thereof. It appeared therein that the testator,
pursuant to an agreement to devise in return for lifetime support,
had made a will in 1921 which was offered for probate upon his
death. Contest was based on the fact that later in the same year
he had made another will, not produced but presumed destroyed,
containing an express clause of revocation. The devisee offered
to show that, in 1928, testator had duly executed a codicil referring to the first will, declaring it to be his last will and directing
that any contesting legatee should forfeit his legacy. This codicil
likewise could not be found. It was held proper to admit the first
will to probate on the ground that a will made pursuant to a valid
contract could not be affected by a subsequent revoking will or
instrument, but that if it could be, 54 the proof of the execution of
the codicil showed an intention to revive sufficient to keep the first
will alive. To the argument that the revival provision in the
statute required the re-execution of the revoked will, the court
replied that the execution of a codicil was sufficient for the purpose
51 See 25 CHICAG0-KENT LAW REvmw 199-200.
52 Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. 1940, Vol. 2, Tit. 18, Ch. 3, § 18-304, states: "If after
making any will the testator shall duly make and execute a second will, the destruction, canceling, or revocation of such second will shall not revive the first will,
unless it appears by the terms of such revocation that it was his intention to
revive and give effect to the first will, or unless he shall duly republish his first
will."
53 129 Ore. 77, 276 P. 270 (1929).
54 The court, at 129 Ore. 77 at 84, 276 P. 270 at 272, did state: "We do not hold
under the facts of this case, that such will was ever legally revoked." Italics added.
The language used might support an inference that, but for the agreement, the
court was of the opinion that the mere execution of the revoking will would have
been enough to produce an instant revocation of the former one.

REVOCATION AND REVIVAL OF WILLS

but that the statute merely required republication which was "the
act of declaring or making known to the witnesses that the testator
understands and intends the instrument subscribed by him to be
his last will and testament.' '5 The court did not clarify this statement by way of dictum nor did it elaborate on whether the "witnesses" referred to were to be the original ones who had attested
the will at the time of its execution or were merely to be persons
in whose presence the "act of declaring or making known" took
place. It must be said, therefore, that there are still doubtful
points which may provoke even more litigation.
Pennsylvania has earned the dubious honor of being the state
in which most demand has been made on the courts to supply
answers to the manifold problems connected with this subject. It
possesses two provisions on the point of revocation, one relating
to wills5 6 and the other to testaments,5 7 but has none on revival,
so not a little of the difficulty has sprung up over the later point.
There is ample evidence, however, that the courts of Pennsylvania
have not always agreed on issues of revocation and have, thereby,
added to the confusion.
The earliest Pennsylvania case, that of Lawson v. Morrison,5
would indicate that common-law principles were, at one time, acceptable in that state for the court described a will containing a
clause of revocation as being merely ambulatory until testator's
5

56

129 Ore. 77 at 84, 276 P. 270 at 272.
Purdon's Pa. Stats. Ann., Tit. 20, Ch. 2, § 271, declares: "No will in writing,

concerning any real estate, shall be repealed, nor shall any devise or directions
therein be altered, otherwise than by some other will or codicil in writing, or other
writing declaring the same, executed and proved in the manner hereinbefore provided. .
57 Ibid., § 272, specifies: "No will in writing, concerning any personal estate, shall
be repealed, nor shall any bequest or direction therein be altered, otherwise than as
hereinbefore provided in the case of real estate, except by a nuncupative will . . ."
8s2 Dall. 286, 1 L. Ed. 384, 1 Am. Dec. 288 (Pa., 1792). Four individual wills
had been made but only three, dated 1775, 1777 and 1779 respectively were important. The 1777 will had been destroyed when the 1779 will was made and its
contents could not be proven. It was equally doubtful if the 1779 will had a clause
of revocation or was inconsistent with the one made in 1775, but the court said
that, whatever it contained, it was ambulatory so any clause therein could not take
effect until the will did, and it never did because it was destroyed. The court added
that even if it be held that the revocation took effect immediately the cancellation
operated to revive the prior will which had been revoked but not destroyed.
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death so that, if destroyed before then, an earlier will left uncancelled had to be admitted to probate. That view did not survive
for long as the court soon began to talk about the necessity for
revival after it had once been determined that the earlier will
had been revoked, from which point it was led into a consideration
of what would produce a revocation and at what point of time.
Presence of an express clause in the later will would clearly evidence an intention to revoke in a fashion compatible with statutory
requirements 5 9 but, although there was much dicta spoken, it was
not until 1930, in the case of In re Ford's Estate,6 ° that the court
squarely decided that such express revocation operated immediately upon execution. Of course, the revocatory will had to be a
valid one, so if it was obtained by undue influence then, according
to Rudy v. Ulrick,61 it failed to produce a revocation either as a
will or as a separate "other writing." It is not necessary, however, that the subsequent revocatory will provide an effective
scheme of distribution if it is otherwise validly executed. Thus,
in Price v. Maxwell,62 an earlier will made in 1841 was followed
by another executed in 1856, containing a clause of revocation,
giving the estate to charity but which devise failed because the
testator did not live for a sufficient period of time after making
59 See Boudinot v. Bradford, 2 Dall. 266, 1 L. Ed. 376 (Pa., 1796) ; Havard v.
Davis, 2 Binn. 406 (Pa., 1810) ; Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. St. 23 (1857); Rudy v.
Ulrich, 69 Pa. 177 (1871) ; In re Ford's Estate, 301 Pa. St. 183, 151 A. 789 (1930),
noted in 26 Ill. L. Rev. 352; In re Shetter's Estate, 303 Pa. St. 193, 154 A. 288
(1931), noted in 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 467; In re Will of Stephenson, 19 Phila. 41
(Pa., 1888) ; and McCartan's Estate, 58 Pitts. L. J. 364 (Pa.. 1910), in all of which
cases the subsequent wills contained express clauses, so the courts involved felt
impelled to take up questions of revival.
60 301 Pa. St. 183, 151 A. 789 (1930), noted in 26 Ill. L. Rev. 352.
61 69 Pa. 177 (1871).
A will dated in 1865 was offered for probate but contest
thereto was addressed to the fact that a subsequent will, made in 1869, contained
a revoking clause. Probate of the latter will had already been denied because it
had been obtained through undue influence. It was held error for the trial judge
to instruct the jury that the second will might be treated as void in part but valid
in other respects. The court also intimated that if a testator revokes one will and
sets down another scheme of distribution, that fact shows he does not intend to die
intestate so that he could never have intended the revoking clause to operate if the
new scheme of distribution fails.
See also In re Melville's Estate, 245 Pa. St. 318, 91 A.
62 28 Pa. St. 23 (1857).
679 (1914), where a codicil purported to abrogate the residuary clause of the
earlier will and instead gave the balance of the estate to charity, but was inoperative because made within thirty days of testator's death. Held: the residue passed
as intestate estate, the revocatory language of the codicil operating immediately
upon execution.
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the second will. The court held, in the light of a statute directing
that a void devise to charity should go to residuary legatee or to
the heirs at law, that the inoperative devise could not be distributed under the first will as that document had been totally
revoked.
It is often a difficult task to establish that a subsequent will
containing a clause of revocation did, at least at one time, exist,
particularly if it has been destroyed. The Pennsylvania statute
does not state that the subsequent will, codicil or other writing
must be offered and accepted for probate, but there is intimation
in the case of In re Harrison's Estate,68 that such must be the
case. The subsequent will there concerned had presumably been
destroyed and only one witness offered to testify as to its contents, that witness being the contestant herself. The court held
that her testimony alone was insufficient to establish the same as
a will so could find no revocation. It was then argued that the
document could serve as some "other writing" declaring the
revocation, but the court pointed out that the statute not only
required that the same would have to be duly executed but would
also have to be "proved in the manner hereinbefore provided,"
to-wit: by the testimony of two witnesses and that, for this pur6 4
pose, the revocatory "other writing" would have to be produced.
That decision was implemented shortly thereafter by the case of
In re Koehler's Estate" where the revoking will could not be found
and the court refused to accept oral testimony as to its contents,
even to rebut probate of the earlier will, on the ground that a will
could not be revoked by oral testimony. It would seem that there
is a vast difference between attempting to revoke an existing will
by oral declarations, clearly forbidden by statute, and using oral
testimony to establish that there had been, at one time, a written
63 316 Pa. St. 15, 173 A. 407 (1934), noted in 29 Ill. L. Rev. 1092. Compare with
dissent by Moschzisker, C. J., in the case of In re Ford's Estate, 301 Pa. St. 183,
151 A. 789 (1930), noted in 26 Ill. L. Rev. 352.
64 But see dissent by Linn, J., 316 Pa. St. 15 at 21, 173 A. 407 at 410, to the
effect that, since a lost will may be established by parol evidence, it would be
illogical to hold that a lost revoking instrument could not be.
65316 Pa. St. 321, 175 A. 424 (1934).
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revocation thereof. Other states have hekl oral proof as to the
latter to be sufficient,6 but the explanation may rest in the fact
that the revocation statutes there found merely require due execution of the revocatory instrument and say nothing as to whether
it must be "proved in the manner hereinbefore provided," as is
the case in Pennsylvania. Whatever the rationale, the method
there imposed obviates the possibility of perjured testimony being
offered to nullify a will which still remains in sound physical
6 7
existence at the time of testator 's death.
To this point, the Pennsylvania cases discussed involved the
problem of express revocation. While the statute does not mention the possibility of implied revocation, two cases have passed
on the question and have produced the result that if inconsistency
is shown to exist the earlier will is immediately nullified. The nisi
prius court concerned in Stauffer v. Burkholder, s finding that the
later will made an entirely different disposition of the estate and
that a codicil thereto also substituted a different executor for the
one originally named, merely held that a republication of the
earlier will was necessary to revive it. In the case of In re Burtt's
Estate,69 however, the court expressly declared that it could see no
reason for any difference between the operation of an express
revocatory will and one that is merely inconsistent, both being
ways by which the testator may evidence his intention to
revoke, so that, in either instance proper revival of the earlier
will would be necessary if the same was to renew its effect. Even
so, it has been recognized that the later inconsistent will may be
made to depend upon the happening of designated future events
and, being so, any revocation to be produced by reason of the
inconsistency must await the outcome of the contingency. Thus,
66 See, for example, In re Johnston's Estate, 188 Cal. 336, 206 P. 628 (1922), and
In re Wear's Will, 131 App. Div. 875, 116 N. Y. S. 304 (1909), and the statutes of
those states.
67 But see Appeal of Deaves, 140 Pa. 242, 21 A. 395 (1891), where efforts to
establish a lost will were defeated on the ground that the testator, during his lifetime, was aware that the will had been lost and under the circumstances it was
assumed that he intended to revoke it.
68 2 Lac. L. Rev. 105 (Pa., 1885).
69 35 Pa. St. 217, 44 A. (2d) 670 (1945).
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in the case of Hanmilton's Estate,7 0 a will dated in 1871 was followed by another made in January, 1873, to which was affixed a
codicil to the effect that the earlier Will should be testator's last
will if he should die before March 1, 1873, otherwise the second
will was to become operative. As testator died prior to the designated date, the later inconsistent will never became effective, hence
possessed no revocatory effect. 1'
As soon as the Pennsylvania courts admitted that a will could
be revoked, they were immediately beset by problems of revival
and forced to choose whether to apply a presumption in favor of
revival, based on the survival of the earlier will and the destruction of the revocatory one, or to seek elsewhere for evidence of
an intention to revive. In the first of such cases, that of Boudinot
v. Bradford,72 the court chose to endorse the former of these views
although they found the presumption rebutted by declarations
73
made by the testator to the effect that he wished to die intestate.
Since then, at least two cases justify revival solely on the score of
preservation of the revoked will and destruction of the revocatory
one, 74 although in other cases there has been extraneous evidence
of an intention one way or the other. In the case of In re Will of
Stephenson, 5 for example, testator's original will favored his
wife but he had drawn up another to get some peace from the
importunities of his relatives. The second will expressly revoked
the first, but testator refused to destroy the first and, a few days
70 74

Pa. St. 69 (1873).

The court also said the same view would have been taken even if the second
will had contained an express clause.
72 2 Dali. 266, 1 L. Ed. 376 (Pa., 1796).
71

73 It was objected that to permit evidence of oral declarations would be to allow
the use of parol evidence to revoke a will. The court held the declarations admissible to show absence of intent to revive that which had already been expressly
revoked.
74 See the case of McCartan's Estate, 58 Pitts. L. J. 364 (Pa., 1910), where the
revoking will had been physically destroyed but the fragments thereof had been
preserved in the same envelope as the earlier will and, when pieced together, disclosed the presence of an express clause, and the case of Wulff's Estate, 26 Pa.
Dist. Rep. 144 (1916), where the court said: "The cases hold that the revocation of
a later will of itself revives and restores an earlier one preserved by the testator,
and leaves it with the same effect as if the latter had never existed..
75 19 Phila. 41 (Pa., 1888).
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later, he sent for the second, tore it up, handed the first will to
his wife, at that time saying: "Sarah... I want you to keep the
first will." It was held to have been adequately revived. 76 On
the other hand, contemporaneous oral declarations by testator
made at the time of the destruction of the revoking will have been
received to show that there was no intention to revive the former
will. Thus, in the case of Manning's Estate,77 testatrix possessed
two wills of inconsistent character, one dated in 1905 and the other
in 1909. On the day prior to her death, her husband testified, she
handed him the first of these wills and said that it was her will.
The maid testified that, at an hour subsequent thereto, the testatrix
handed the second of the wills to her with directions to burn the
same, saying she was going to make a new will. It was contended
that the statements to the husband republished the first will, but
the court held that the alleged republication made before the
destruction of the revoking instrument was ineffective 78 and that
the statements made to the servant at the moment of the destruction of the revoking will negatived any thought of revival. 79 If
oral statements are to possess any effect, according to Flintham v.
0 they must be spoken contemporaneously
Bradford,8
with the
transaction of cancelling the revocatory will, for it is at that
moment the presumption of revival operates to restore life. If,
therefore, the will is revived because the contrary is not indicated,
oral declarations made at a subsequent time indicative of a purpose not to revive can have no legal effect since their only operation would be to revoke an existing will and this cannot be done
76 See also In re Kerchner's Estate, 41 Pa. Super. 112 (1909), where the revocatory will was burned, the testatrix then saying: "The other last will shall count."
The court said these statements amounted to a republishing of the will and that
oral republication was sufficient. The language tends to cast discredit on the earlier
view that no republication would be necessary and revival could be inferred from
the mere fact that the older will had been preserved.
77

46 Pa. Super. 607 (1911).

The court also seemed to be of the opinion that republication would have to
take place in the presence of two witnesses. It is the only Pennsylvania case so
intimating.
79 Accord: In re Ford's Estate, 301 Pa. St. 183, 151 A. 789 (1930), noted in 26
Ill. L. Rev. 352.
so 10 Pa. 82 (1848).
78
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by parol.8s Although Pennsylvania has no revival statute, these
decisions may have some bearing upon the meaning which should
be given to statutory language indicating that it should appear
.'bythe terms of such revocation that it was his intention to revive
and give effect to his first will." They should, at least, possess
persuasive authority on the point.
Revival may, of course, be produced by other methods, and
two other Pennsylvania cases are significant for that reason. In
the case of In re Shetter's Estate8 2 the testator had made a will
in 1917 but there was oral testimony that he had followed it with
another, made in 1923, containing an express clause of revocation.
Along with the 1917 will was a codicil executed in 1924, made at
the time of the destruction of the second will, purporting to republish the earlier will, but it was witnessed by interested persons.
The claim was made that inasmuch as the codicil was attested in
a defective manner it could not serve to republish and revive the
former will but the court held to the contrary, saying that as the
original will was validly executed the republication was sufficient
despite the defect. The decision can be supported by applying
the presumption that the mere destruction of the revocatory will
was enough to revive the earlier one and the codicil merely served
as confirmatory evidence of intention to revive of no less weight
than would be possessed by a contemporaneous oral declaration
of the testator. Its validity would be shaken, however, if Pennsylvania had a revival statute requiring re-execution. In the other
case, that of Havard v. Davis,s3 the testator made two wills, one
in August and the other in September of 1806. The second contained an express clause of revocation. Thereafter, the testator
made oral statements to the effect that he wanted the August will
81 See also the case of Holmes' Estate, 240 Pa. St. 537, 87 A. 778 (1913), where
contest of a will made in 1908 was based on the ground that a will dated in 1888
had been republished by oral statements to the effect that testator did not like the
second will and wanted the first to become effective. There was no act of cancelling
the 1908 will at the time the statement was made, if made at all. The court declined to rule on the sufficiency of the republication for lack of satisfactory proof
that the parol declaration was ever made.
82 303 Pa. St. 193, 154 A. 288 (1931), noted in 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 467.
83 2 Binn. 406 (Pa., 1810).
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to stand as his last will and it was claimed that, by so doing, he
had republished the first will and thereby revoked the second
because of the inconsistency between them. The statute then, as
now, required that a will could not be revoked except by some
other writing adequately executed. If the first will was revived,
it met all statutory tests. The court held that the first will could
be republished by parol declarations and, even though it had been
lost in the meantime, it could be established by secondary evidence
as to its contents. Upon such proof, it would be admitted to
probate for it then would show that it had been "executed and
proved" in the manner made necessary by statute. This rather
curious boot-strap process of nullifying a written will by mere
parol evidence would have been prevented if the obvious legislative
intention that a will should be revoked by some later writing had
been observed. It is true that the word "later" does not appear
either in the original Statute of Frauds or any of its American
counterparts, but in terms of cause and effect those statutes should
be so construed. Such would be the operation if a codicil were
used to revive the earlier will for the codicil has the peculiar merit
of making the will of which it is a part speak anew as of the date
of its execution, i.e. posterior to the revocatory will which it seeks
to nullify. The same thing would also be true if a later "other
writing" were used. But to produce the result obtained in this
case in the anomalous fashion there found possible suggests the
importance of careful revision of statutory language to safeguard
against the dangers of parol evidence.
The Rhode Island statute on revocation follows the general
purport of the Statute of Frauds 4 but says nothing about revival.
Any seeming deficiency is overcome, however, so long as the deci5
sion in Bates v. Hackig8
stands for the holding therein places
84 R. I. Gen. Laws 1938, Ch. 566, § 17, states: "No will or codicil or any part
thereof shall be revoked otherwise than . . . by another will or codicil executed in
manner hereinbefore required, or by some writing declaring an intention to revoke
the same and executed in the manner in which a will is hereinbefore required to be
executed . . "
8528 R. I. 523 (1907), affirmed in 29 R. I. 1, 68 A. 622, 125 Am. St. Rep. 759,
14 L. . A. (N. S.) 937 (1908).
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that state squarely behind common-law principles in every respect.
The testator there had made four different wills but only the last
two were of importance. The latest one had contained an express
clause of revocation but had afterwards been physically destroyed.
The third will, which remained in existence, was offered for probate but the trial court instructed the jury that, as it had been
revoked, it was necessary to find an intention to revive before it
could be probated. That instruction was held to be erroneous
because all wills were to be regarded as ambulatory and could
possess no significance merely from the fact of execution. Necessarily, then, the revoking will had to survive the testator before it
could operate and, as it had not, the earlier will had never been
revoked so any discussion of revival was purely beside the point.
On rehearing, the court deplored the confusion produced elsewhere
by attempting to distinguish between wills containing express
clauses and those which produce revocation by implication. Where
that distinction is observed, said the court, it is because the express
clause is felt to be something separate from the will in which it is
contained and capable of operating at a different time, but such
a thought was deemed illogical because the clause depends on the
execution and attestation of the will itself to give it any validity
and, if lifted from the will, would not comply with statutory requirements essential to its existence even as some "other writing." The argument was weakened somewhat by the admission,
albeit in the form of dictum, that if a separate writing had been
used it would have operated immediately upon execution. Any
discussion of revival problems must, then, await the time when
some testator does use a separate writing, which he subsequently
destroys, but retains the original will intact. The court will then
have to establish its own standards concerning methods to be
pursued to revive the revoked will or else retreat in the face of its
own dictum.
South Carolina also presents the picture of being a state which
has consistently followed the common law pattern under a statute
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which merely specifies the methods permissible for revocation. 6
In a very early case, that of Legare v. Ashe,8 7 a mother had made
one will in favor of her daughter but, having acquired additional
property, she applied to her counsel to draft a second will also
favoring the child. This will was duly executed. Still not content,
she had counsel draw a third will making even better provision
for the daughter and this was properly attended to. Upon the
testatrix's death, only the first and second wills could be found.
It was supposed that the third will had been left at the lawyer's
office, but after full search he could not find it. There was no
reason to believe that the testatrix had cancelled the will but
rather strong evidence that she was satisfied with its contents and
had every intention that it should be carried out. Upon oral
evidence given by the lawyer and two of his students who had
witnessed the third will, the jury found in favor of its proponents
as a lost will and declared that it contained provisions revoking
the earlier ones. A decree was later entered according to the
verdict, the last uncancelled expression of testamentary intention
being held to control. Similarly, in Taylor v. Taylor,s8 although
testator's first will had been followed by a later one revoking it,
but which second will had been intentionally destroyed, the court
allowed probate of the first will on the ground that the revocatory
will possessed only an ambulatory effect and lost its significance
by its destruction. That decision was followed and applied over
one hundred years later when the question next arose in the case
of Kollock v. Willians,8 9 and there was no evidence of any desire
to change from common law rules. Other problems have not yet
developed in that state, hence it is impossible to do more than
hazard a guess as to their probable solution but the tenacity dis86 S. C. Code 1942, Vol. 4, Ch. 175, § 8921, declares: "No will or testament, in
writing, of any real or personal property or any clause thereof, shall be revocable
but by some other will or codicil in writing, or other writing declaring the same,
attested and subscribed by three witnesses as aforesaid, or by destroying . ..

87 1 S. C. L. (1 Bay) 464 (1795).
88 2 Nott & McCord 482 (S. C., 1820).
89 131 S. C. 352, 127 S. E. 444 (1925).
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played in adhering to common law concepts may indicate that
there is little likelihood of ecclesiastical views finding acceptance.
The statute law of South Dakota, in common with several
adjoining states, speaks as to revocation,9 ° revocation by implication, 9 ' and also as to revival. 92 One decision, incidentally the only
one, elaborating on the statute is to be found in the case of In re
Bell's Estate. 8 There, a husband propounded a will, made in his
favor in 1892, but was met with a contest by a nephew who claimed
that a later will, containing an express clause of revocation, had
been made giving only one-half of the estate to the husband and
the other half to the nephew and niece equally. That will could
not be found but oral evidence was received as to its contents
and due execution. There was no effort made to probate it as a
lost will, but on the strength of the testimony the 1892 will was
rejected. It was urged, on appeal, that the evidence of the witnesses was uncertain as to the date of the alleged revoking will,
that it had in fact been made earlier than the one in 1892, and
the proof of its contents was insufficient so a new trial should be
awarded. The holding was, however, affirmed on the ground that
the proof did not warrant a new trial. There was no discussion of
the legal problems involved so the case might stand for the view
that a revocatory will operates instantly upon execution 94 , or at
90 S. Dak. Code 1939, Vol. 3, Tit. 56, Ch. 56.02, § 56.0217, recites: "Except in the
cases in this chapter mentioned, no written will, nor any part thereof, can be
revoked or altered, otherwise than: (1) By a written will or other writing of the
testator, declaring such revocation or alteration, and executed with the same
formalities with which a will should be executed by such testator . . ."
91 Ibid., § 56.0221, specifies: "A prior will is not revoked by a subsequent will
unless the latter contains an express revocation, or provisions wholly inconsistent
with the terms of the former will, but in other cases the prior will remains effectual
so far as consistent with the provisions of the subsequent will."
92 Ibid., § 56.0222, declares: "If after making a will, the testator duly makes and
executes a subsequent will, the destruction, canceling or revocation of the latter
does not revive the former unless it appears by the terms of such revocation that
it was his intention to revive the former will, or unless after such destruction,
canceling, or revocation he duly republishes the prior will."
93 13 S. Dak. 475, 83 N. W. 566 (1900).
94 That presumption is strengthened by the language of the statute quoted above
at note 91, which, by obverse reasoning, would indicate that a prior will is revoked
if the subsequent will does contain an express revocation. The conclusion is further strengthened by Section 56.0222 forbidding revival merely by reason of the
destruction of the subsequent will. That statute would be unnecessary if commonlaw principles controlled.
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least, that it need not be probated to serve as a nullifying instrument. What the action would have been if the second will had
been shown to have been intentionally destroyed, or what would
have been necessary to show a revival of the earlier will, were
questions which were properly left unanswered since not before
the court. They are matters, however, which can well serve to
plague litigants in that state.
It has already been noted that the Tennessee statute on revocation is unusual for, on the surface, it forbids the revocation
or alteration of a written will merely by a subsequent nuncupative
will unless the same is duly validated, 95 and says nothing about
other possible methods or about the revival of revoked wills. It
has been decided, however, that other methods do exist as, for example, the mistaken destruction of another document under the
belief it is the will intended to be revoked, 96 by writing a signed
memorandum on the will that it is " Inull and void," 97 or by making
alterations in a testament concerning personalty which does not
come within statutory comprehension. 9 Mere parol declarations
that the testator does not desire the will to stand have, on the other
hand, been treated as insufficient in view of the solemnity required
for the execution of a will devising land.9 9 If inconsistency is to be
relied on, there must be ample evidence of that fact, according to
95 Williams Tenn. Code Ann. 1934, Vol. 5, Tit. 3, Ch. 1, § 8097, states:
"No written will shall be revoked or altered by a subsequent nuncupative will, except the
same be in the lifetime of the testator reduced to writing and read over to him and
approved; and unless the same be proved to have been so done by the oaths of two
witnesses at least, who shall be such as are admissible In trials at common law."
See Woodward v. Woodward, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed) 49 (1857), to the effect that a
nuncupative will which does not measure up to the statute cannot serve to revoke
a written will.
96 Smiley v. Gambill, 39 Tenn. (2 Head) 163 (1858).
97 Billington v. Jones, 108 Tenn. 234, 66 S. W. 1127, 56 L. R. A. 654
(1901).
Testator there had made a written will but, on the importunities of his wife who
thought it unduly favored certain of the children, he appended the signed memorandum. It was held that the fact that he had preserved the document intact for
sixteen years did not obviate the revocation by cancellation.
98 Greer and Wife v. Mc'Crackin, 7 Tenn. (Peck) 301, 14 Am.- Dec. 755 (1824).

99 Allen v. Huff, 9 Tenn. (1 Yerg.) 404 (1830). The court expressed Itself as believing that an instrument of equal dignity would be required if the will was not
subjected to physical destruction. See also Grimes v. Nashville Trtist Co., 176 Tenn.
366, 141 S. W. (2d) 890 (1940), to the effect that declarations of an intent to die
intestate, but not manifested by acts recognized by law, are insufficient.
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Hickey v. Beeler,1 for if the alleged second will has presumably
been destroyed and there is inadequate evidence as to its contents
the first will must stand as being unrevoked. In such a case, oral
declarations by the maker indicating a desire to have the property
distributed in a different manner than that indicated by the earlier
will must be deemed inadmissible.
Revocation being possible, Tennessee courts have been forced
to consider problems as to revival. In McClure v. McClure,2 although the main question was one of undue influence, the court
also passed on certain instructions which had been given to the
jury by the trial court. It approved one declaring that a will is
revoked by a subsequent will whether the latter expressly so states
or is merely inconsistent with the earlier will. It also at least
tacitly approved another to the effect that destruction of the revoking will operated to revive the earlier will, by indicating that
destroying one and retaining the other presumably amounted to
a "republication" thereof. It did find error in refusing to instruct that the jury should consider evidence tending to disclose
that, at the time of the destruction of the second will, testator intended to make a third one, as revival was said to depend "upon
the facts and circumstances of each particular case." Doubt may
have been cast on that decision by the more recent holding of the
Tennessee Court of Appeals in the case of Ewell v. Rucker,$ which
makes no reference to the McClure case and deals with the problem as though it were one of first impression. In that case, testator
made three wills, dated 1927, 1938 and 1943 respectively. The
second expressly revoked the first, and the third apparently revoked the second but this fact is not made clear. The will of 1927
remained in the custody of testator's sister-in-law until the time
of his death when it was offered for probate. The second and
third wills were last seen in testator's possession, so presumably
1 180 Tenn. 31, 171 S. W. (2d) 277 (1943).
86 Tenn. 173, 6 S. W. 44 (1887). But see Lunn v. Ealy, 176 Tenn. 374, 141 S. W.
(2d) 893 (1940), as to the effect of subsequent oral declarations tending to disclose
the absence of intention to revive.
3 28 Tenn. App. 156, 187 S. W. (2d) 644 (1945).
2
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had been destroyed. It was claimed that the first will was thereby,
ipso facto, revived. The court, after commenting upon the confusion existing in the rules as to revival, determined to follow
ecclesiastical rules which admit of no presumption either way but
make revival depend on the testator's intention. In that regard,
the court emphasized the fact that the testator had been advised
by his attorney, whether correctly or not, that if he destroyed the
second and third wills "his property would go just as if he died
intestate." For that reason, it said: "It is unreasonable to conclude that his mind reverted to the plan of the 1927 will. . . An intention to revive must be established." ' 4 It is possible that the
case merely illustrates the sort of "facts and circumstances" referred to in McClure case as being pertinent on the issue of revival,
but the emphatic refusal to accept any presumption on the subject
leaves the Tennessee testator in a quandry.
While the Texas statute on revocation is substantially similar
to those in other states, 5 and lacks any provision on revival, it
does contain an unusual clause to the effect that the court, before
admitting a will to probate, must be satisfied that the same "has
not been revoked by the testator,"6 the significance of which will
shortly be made apparent. Revocation may be accomplished
through a subsequent will expressly so declaring 7 or by a codicil
designed to have the same effect, but if the latter method is used
the language should be clear and unambiguousA Non-statutory
methods, however, will be insufficient according to Ragland v.
Wagener 9 where an Oklahoma testator's will was accepted for
4 28 Tenn. App. 156 at 165, 187 S. W. (2d)

644 at 648.

5 Vernon Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann., Vol. 22, Tit. 129, Art. 8285, recites: "No will in
writing, made in conformity with the preceding articles, nor any clause thereof or
devise therein shall be revoked, except by a subsequent will, codicil or declaration
in writing, executed with like formalities .. ."
6 Ibid., Vol. 9, Tit. 54, Ch. 5, Art. 3348, reads: "Before admitting a will to probate, it must be proved to the satisfaction of the court ... (5) that such will has
not been revoked by the testator."
7 lawes v. Nicholas, 72 Tex. 481, 10 S. W. 558, 2 L. R. A. 863 (1889).
8 See Warnken v. Warnken, 104 S. W. (2d) 935 (Tex. Civ. App., 1937) ; Laborde
v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 101 S. W. (2d) 389 (Tex. Civ. App., 1937).
9 142 Tex. 651, 180 S. W. (2d) 435, 152 A. L. R. 1232 (1944), reversing 179 S. W.
(2d) 380 (Tex. Civ. App., 1944).
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ancilliary administration in Texas because certain of the land was
located there. A devise of such land was questioned because the
will expressed a purpose to execute a deed during testator's lifetime and to place the same in a safety deposit box for delivery to
the devisee upon his death, but pointed out that if this was not
done the devise should stand revoked. The deed was never executed, so the devisee petitioned the court to nullify the proviso
on the devise as being an improper attempt to create a new method
of revoking a will or some part thereof. All the courts involved
agree that this could not be done, the statute precluding any but
the methods named, but the highest court reversed a decree which
had annulled the proviso on the ground that the will disclosed only
a conditional, rather than an absolute, intention to devise in the
first place and the condition not being satisfied the entire devise
failed.
Progressing to the question of revival, in the first case in
point, that of Hawes v. Nicholas,10 the court concluded that a will
expressly revoking all former wills operated immediately to produce that revocation and that the mere act of destroying the revoking instrument would not serve to revive the earlier will,.
Thereafter, in the case of Dougherty v. Holscheider," the court
applied the same rule to a holographic instrument, inconsistent
with an earlier formal will, which was made contingent upon the
happening of an event which did not take place. There the holographic will was made the day prior to the time the testator submitted to an operation and upon the understanding that it should
serve to express his wishes if anything untoward should happen.
In fact, he lived for two years more. Even though the holographic
instrument was ineffective as a will, the court refused to observe
distinctions drawn elsewhere between wills designed to produce
an express revocation and those which might accomplish that result because of inconsistency; the former operating immediately
and the latter only upon testator's death. As an express clause
10 72 Tex. 481, 10 S. W. 558, 2 L. R. A. 863 (1899).
11 40 Tex. Civ. App. 31, 88 S. W. 1113 (1905).
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clearly shows evident intention to revoke and the court felt that
a change in the scheme of distribution discloses the same mental
condition, it asserted there was no basis for any distinction. That
being so, the court said "a republication of the former will would
be necessary to give it vitality, no matter whether the later will
was destroyed or became inoperative. "12
The case of Brackenridge v. Roberts & McIntyre,1 3 however,
seems to suggest that revival is never possible in Texas. A will
made in 1913 was there offered for probate but was contested on
the ground that a later instrument contained a revoking clause.
That instrument had not been preserved and nothing was known
as to its contents except for the presence of the clause of revocation. The upper court declared that if the jury found not only
that the instrument had been executed but also that it was executed
either with testamentary intention or as evidence of a designed
purpose to revoke the earlier will then the latter was necessarily
and immediately revoked for to hold otherwise would virtually
abrogate the statute on revocation. 1 4 Continuing further, the court
indicated that destruction of the revocatory instrument would not
revive the earlier will and that, because of a peculiar provision in
the Texas statute which implies that a will once revoked may not
be admitted to probate, 15 any application of revival concepts would
be ruled out of question. If this case means what it says, any discussion of re-execution or republication as methods of revival to
be found in earlier cases is worthless and only a complete redrafting of the earlier will with its attendant new signing and new
attestation would be essential to preserve the earlier testamentary
scheme. Requirements of that character would be indeed revolu40 Tex. Civ. App. 31 at 38-9, 88 S. W. 1113 at 1117.
13114 Tex. 418, 267 S. W. 244 (1924), reh. den. 270 S. W. 1001 (1925).
12

14 That argument presupposes that when the statute says that a will "shall be
revoked" by the making of a subsequent will it means "immediately revoked." The
word "immediately" is lacking, however, and there is no support to be gained from
a revival provision which might strengthen that interpretation for Texas has none.
The statement is consistent with earlier precedents, so it is probably now too late
to expect that the court will change its mind on the question of the time when
revocation, either express or implied, takes place.
15 See note 6, ante.
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tionary, would eliminate all of the confusion produced by the many
conflicting views of revival, but the statute hardly seems to be
worded with that purpose in mind and is more nearly declaratory
of well understood principles, to-wit: that a revoked will which
has never been revived is a nullity unworthy of probate. If the
statute said that, as a condition to probate, it should appear that
the will "had never, at any time, been revoked," one could agree
with the views expressed, but it is doubtful if the statute should,
or was even intended to, apply to a will which had, at one time,
been revoked but had, in some appropriate fashion, been revived.
Absence of judicial decisions in the state of Utah on this subject may indicate that the statutory provisions adopted by that
state, dealing with revocation, 6 revocation by implication, 17 and
revival,' 8 are so clear that there is no room for doubt as to the
meaning thereof. It is more likely, however, that the opportunity
to provide interpretation has not yet arisen inasmuch as the provisions are identical with those found in other states, California
will suffice as an example, and provisions of that character have
not escaped judicial consideration elsewhere.
Although the Vermont statute specifies the means to be followed in order to revoke a will, 19 the case of In re Noye's Will2"
amply illustrates the difficulty which may lie in the path of a contestant who asserts that the will being offered for probate has
16 Utah Code Ann. 1943, Vol. 5, Tit. 101, Ch. 1, § 101-1-19, declares: "Except in
the cases in this chapter mentioned, no written will, nor any part thereof, can be
revoked or altered otherwise than: (1) By a written will, or other writing of the
testator declaring such revocation or alteration executed with the same formalities
with which a will should be executed by such testator . . ."
17 Ibid., § 101-1-22, states: "A prior will is not revoked by a subsequent will, unless the latter contains an express revocation or provisions wholly inconsistent with
the terms of the former will; but in other cases the prior will remains effectual so
far as consistent with the provisions of the subsequent will."
is Ibid., § 101-1-23, specifies: "If after making a will the testator duly makes and
executes a second will, the revocation of such second will does not revive the first
will, unless it appears by the terms of such revocation that it was the intention to
revive and give effect to the first will, or unless after such revocation the first will
is duly republished."
19 Vt. Pub. Laws 1933, Tit. 12, Ch. 117, §2756, declares: "A will shall not be
revoked, except by implication of law, otherwise than by some will, codicil or other
writing, executed as provided in case of wills . ..
20 61 Vt. 14, 17 A. 743 (1888).
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been nullified by a later will. The contestant there, seeking to
prevent probate of a will made in 1881, offered to prove, by a
single witness who claimed that he saw a later will dated in 1885,
that the later instrument contained an express clause of revocation.
The witness was unable to tell the names of the attesting witnesses
thereto and was also vague on the point of the general contents
thereof. It was held that it would be necessary, in order to establish revocation, to adduce the same type of evidence as would be
necessary in a proceeding to prove an ordinary will, and that contestant's case was lacking in that respect. When the revocation
takes the form of a codicil which can be produced then, according
to the case of Holley v. Larrabee,2 1 the case is much simpler especially if the codicil is express on the point. In that case, the testator
had made a will bequeathing the life use of all his property to his
wife with remainder in his lands to his son but remainder in his
personal effects to his daughters equally. Five years later he
added a codicil expressly revoking the devise of the remainder in
the land to the son but substituting, in lieu thereof, a provision
under which he gave the land "and such part of the personal
estate as may remain" to the son if he outlived the testator's wife,
but if not, then one-half to the wife in fee and one-half to the son's
heirs. The wife died before the testator and the son took possession of all the personal effects upon the testator's death. The
executor sued in trespass, but the trial court held for the defendant
and that decision was affirmed on the ground that the lack of an
express revocation of the provisions relating to personalty did not
prevent the codicil from operating as an implied one.
The issue of revival is still somewhat clouded in that state.
In Warner v. Warner'sEstate,2 2 the testator, who had been a practicing lawyer, made a will in 1857 in favor of his wife. About two
years later he appended a memorandum at the foot of the will
which stated: "This will is hereby cancelled and annulled." Although that statement was not signed, there also appeared, on the
21 28 Vt. 274 (1856).
22 37 Vt. 356 (1864).
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back of the paper after it was folded, the words "Cancelled and
is null and void," followed by testator's signature. There was
evidence that, about two days prior to testator 's death, he told his
wife that she would find his will, made out for her benefit, in a
trunk where he kept his papers. Shortly after testator's death,
the wife examined the trunk, found the document marked as aforesaid, and offered it for probate. Denial of probate was affirmed
on the ground that the memoranda amounted to a cancellation and
that the sayings of the testator shortly before his death did not
amount to a sufficient republication. In that regard, the court said:
"When thus revoked, it would seem quite incongruous that the
instrument could be restored to its original vitality and force by
mere words, without any further act done upon, or with reference
to, such instrument. 23 When the court was called upon to decide
the case of In re Gould's Will,2 4 it adverted to the preceding case
and found it inapplicable to a situation wherein the testator, having one will, made another which was inconsistent with the first
although not expressly declaring a revocation, but thereafter
destroyed the same. At that time he told his son, who had possession of the first will, to "not let any one get it away from you. I
want it to go exactly as it says." Probate of the first will, under
these circumstances, was upheld after the court reviewed the rules
generally applicable to revival and concluded that the one which
made the question depend on testator's intention at the time he
destroyed the revocatory instrument was the most reasonable one.
The apparent inconsistency may lie in the fact that the first case
could be regarded as one in which the written memoranda, in effect,
destroyed the first will so there was nothing left to be revived,
either by oral statements or anything else. If, on the other hand,
since the writing did not touch the words of the will or obliterate
it in any respect, the memoranda only amounted to a revocatory
"other writing" permitted by statute, then the essential difference
between the two cases lies in the fact that in the former the revocatory act remained in existence at the time of the testator's
23 37 Vt. 356 at 367-8.

24 72 Vt. 316, 47 A. 1082 (1900).
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death while in the latter it was itself destroyed in his lifetime. The
unwillingness to accept oral declarations in the one case, but to
treat them as sufficient in the other is, to say the least, noteworthy.
The inference to be gleaned, however, would seem to be that a
sufficient revoking act produces an immediate nullification of the
earlier will in Vermont and that ecclesiastical principles will control on the issue of revival.
Long prior to the present Virginia statute, which deals with
both revocation 2 5 and revival,20 it was necessary, in Bates v. Holman,2 7 for the court to consider whether a signed memorandum
declaring the intended revocation would be sufficient for that purpose. The testator there, having one will, made a second which
was merely inconsistent with the first. After the signature to the
second will, he wrote: "I revoke all other wills heretofore made
by me," and again signed his name. Some time thereafter he cut
the signature from the second will but left the revoking clause
with its signature intact. The majority of the court held that the
destruction of the second will did not destroy the clause of revocation as it was a separate and effective paper. Without question
an express clause in a will there operates immediately and without
regard to the ultimate fate of that instrument 28 even though the
statute does not expressly so stipulate. There is dictum in Clark
v. Hugo29 to the effect that a later inconsistent will should also
25 Va. Code 1942, Ch. 212, § 5233, recites: "No will or codicil, or any part thereof,
shall be revoked, unless . .. by a subsequent will or codicil, or by some writing
declaring an intention to revoke the same, and executed in the manner in which a
will is required to be executed . . ."
26 Ibid., § 5234, declares: "No will or codicil, or any part thereof, which shall be
in any manner revoked, shall, after being revoked, be revived otherwise than by
the re-execution thereof, or by a codicil executed in manner hereinbefore required,
and then only to the extent to which an intention to revive is shown." Virginia is
one of six states requiring re-execution. See 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW RnVIw 211,
notes 91 and 92.
27 13 Va. (3 H. & M.) 502 (1809).
A dissenting opinion stressed the thought that
the clause in question was really part of the second will and fell with it. Later
decisions would indicate that even if it was so regarded it still would have accomplished its purpose.
28 See Rudisill's Ex'r v. Rodes and Wife, 71 Va. (29 Gratt.) 147 (1877).
29 130 Va. 99, 107 S. E. 730 (1921). The court actually decided that the second
and inconsistent will had been executed when the testator lacked the requisite
testamentary intent, so no revocation occurred.
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operate to produce the same result, but if the several wills or
codicils present only partial inconsistency then, according to
Gordon v. Whitlock,30 the several instruments should be probated
together. Mere oral declarations by the testator that he would
die intestate, even when made after his will had been stolen, were
deemed insufficient to revoke in the case of Hylton v. Hylton,31 and
that result is supported by the present statute.
Three Virginia cases bear out the statutory mandate that a
revoked will shall not be revived otherwise than by the re-execution thereof or by some proper codicil. Oral declarations by the
testator are not, and even prior to the statute were not, admissible
to show a republication of the revoked will.32 Similarly, destruction of the revoking will alone will not suffice. 3 But the case of
Gooch v. Gooch 34 has some interesting implications. The testator
there concerned had children born to him after he had made a will
in favor of his wife, which fact, pursuant to statute, nullified his
will. The widow claimed that the will had been revived by reason
of the fact that the testator, after the birth of his children and as
part of the ceremony of initiation into the Masonic order, had
written on a form provided by the lodge secretary the statement:
"My will is made in favor of my wife... duly signed and filed."
The trial court held this to be a sufficient codicil and admitted the
will. Such action was affirmed, even though the court admitted
the memorandum was not a good holographic codicil since it was
partly in print, on the ground that it disclosed testator's intention, at that time, to have the will serve as expressing his testa3092 Va. 723, 24 S. E. 342 (1896). The testator there possessed a large estate
and had prepared a very carefully drawn will. He later made a holographic will
having reference to only a few matters, dealing with a small part of the estate,
and containing no revocatory clause. Three brief codicils were also made. All the
papers were taken together as constituting his will. Stress had been placed on the
fact that the holographic instrument started out with the words: "My will is as
follows." It was claimed that these words were indicative of an intention to revoke
the earlier will. The court said that these words, standing alone, were not entitled
to the weight attached to them.
3142 Va. (1 Gratt.) 161 (1844).
32 Bates v. Holman, 13 Va. (3 H. & M.) 502 (1809).
33 Rudisill's Ex'r v. Rodes and Wife, 71 Va. (29 Gratt.) 147 (1877).
34 134 Va. 21, 113 S. E. 873 (1922).
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mentary purposes and it did not have to be a sufficient dispositive
instrument. Other re-execution or republication was held to be
unnecessary.
If the Washington revocation statute means what it says,
there is only one method available in that state, to-wit: the making
of a subsequent will in writing.35 Whether that will must expressly
declare the revocation or not, or whether a revoking codicil would
serve, are unsolved mysteries. The state also possesses a revival
provision,"6 typical of those found on the west coast, but it also has
received no interpretation although it is pregnant with doubt as to
the nature of the "terms of such revocation" which will serve to
display the testator 's "intention to revive," just as is the case as
to the true nature of the ceremony of republication specified as an
alternative method of revival. Only one point seems clear and
that is that if revival takes place it must be with respect to the
entire first will for partial revival is not mentioned. These are
problems about which much has been said elsewhere but not in the
decisions of the courts of that state.
Revocation is possible, in West Virginia, by either a subsequent will, a codicil, or by some other written declaration,3 7 but
revival can only be accomplished by a re-execution of the will or
by a suitable codicil, and then only to the extent that intention to
Illustrative of the problems connected with
revive is shown. 3
revocation is the case of Kearns v. Roush. 9 The facts therein dis35 Remington Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. 1932, Vol. 3, Tit. 10, Ch. 3, § 1398, states:
"No will in writing, except in cases hereinafter mentioned, nor any part thereof,
shall be revoked except by a subsequent will in writing . . ."
36 Ibid., § 1405, specifies: "If, after making any will, the testator shall duly make
and execute a second will, the destruction, cancellation, or revocation of such
second will shall not revive the first will unless it appears by the terms of such
revocation that it was his intention to revive and give effect to the first will, or
unless he shall duly republish his first will."
37 W. Va. Code Ann. 1943, Ch. 41, § 4045, specifies: "No will or codicil, or any
part thereof, shall be revoked, unless . . . by a subsequent will or codicil, or by
some writing declaring an intention to revoke the same, and executed in the manner
in which a will is required to be executed ...."
38 Ibid., § 4046, provides: "No will or codicil, or any part thereof, which shall be
in any manner revoked, shall, after being revoked, be revived otherwise than by the
reexecution thereof, or by a codicil executed in the manner hereinbefore required,
and then only to the extent to which an intention to revive the same is shown."
39 106 W. Va.

663, 146 S. E. 729 (1929).
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close that in 1914 testator made a holographic will disposing of his
entire estate and appointing executors. Some time later he drew
up another which commenced with the words, "This is my last
will, which I write now." It was undated, contained no express
clause of revocation, but did purport to make a totally inconsistent
disposition of the estate. Internal and external circumstances
fixed the making of this instrument sometime subsequent to the
1914 will. A day or so before testator's death he asked the housekeeper to find "his will," but she overlooked the second document
which was later found folded up in a ledger on the desk. The first
instrument was located the day after testator died. Both these
wills were admitted to probate, but on appeal by the legatees under
the second it was held that the first will should be eliminated and
the executor therein named be removed. The court said that the
making of the second will, absent an express clause of revocation,
had not produced an immediate revocation of the earlier will, nor
had the holographic reference to a "last will" done so, but that
the total inconsistency between the two made that result necessary
and the inconsistency was "total" enough even though the second
failed to nominate an executor. The mere fact that the first will
had been preserved was said to possess no significance.
40
The other West Virginia case, that of Guland v. Gutland,
sheds light on the revival provision. The will there concerned,
made in favor of testator's wife, had been executed prior to the
birth of issue. Thereafter two children were born, but shortly
before testator's death he executed a duly attested codicil which
read: "I hereby certify that I have heretofore made a will disposing of all of my estate, which will has never been revoked by
me." The testator's widow sued to remove an alleged cloud on the
title to the land growing out of the fact that, by local law, a will
made prior to birth of issue opens up to limit any devise or bequest to take effect only if the after-born child dies unmarried and
without issue. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the bill on
the ground that the codicil did not amount to a republication or
40 81 W. Va. 487, 94 S. E. 943 (1918).
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remaking of the will since there was no reference to the afterborn children therein. The higher court acknowledged that there
was a distinction between republication of an existing will and
revival of a revoked will, particularly since the revoked will must
be re-executed or the codicil must show an intention to revive it,
but reversed the decision because the instant will had not been
revoked even if it had been materially altered by making absolute
devises into conditional ones. The codicil was regarded as a
sufficient republication for, while the language was not apt, the
form of the expression was not deemed important. The emphasis
on the need for a suitable declaration of an intention to revive if
the earlier will is actually revoked should not escape attention.
Amplification on a Wisconsin statute dealing with revocation
has been provided by one important decision rendered in
that state. The case of In re Noon's Wil 42 involved a testator
whose first will and codicil were found in a package which he had
placed in the hands of the county judge shortly before his death.
There was evidence that a second will had been executed which
contained a clause of revocation, but it could not be found. That
fact established, the court said: "The addition of the revocatory
words is a mode of immediate cancellation of the former will, and
'4
renders it totally inoperative as a testamentary instrument. 3
It then proceeded to the question of revival. In that regard it
said:
The first will having become legally dead by revocation, we
can see no way in which it could be revitalized except by some
act which the law recognizes as being equivalent to execution
under the statute. A codicil or subsequent writing adopting
the former will, duly executed, or a re-execution of the old will
only 4 '

41 Wis. Stats. 1945, Ch. 238, § 238.14, declares:
"No will nor any part thereof
shall be revoked unless by . . . some other will or codicil in writing, executed as
prescribed in this chapter, or by some other writing, signed, attested and subscribed
in the manner provided in this chapter for the execution of a will . . ." The section
concludes with the statement that "the power to make a will implies the power to
revoke the same." Legislation so specific is rarely found, but the idea has been
tacitly accepted everywhere.
42 115 Wis. 299, 91 N. W. 670, 95 Am. St. Rep. 944 (1902).
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with the required formalities, would undoubtedly revive it.
Any act short of that would lead to confusion... We believe
the better and safer rule to be to require that a will once
revoked, to be revived, must either be re-executed or adopted
44
by some subsequent writing executed as the statute requires.
Obviously, therefore, the mere destruction of the second will had
not accomplished a revival, hence the decedent died intestate.
What the result would have been had the second will presented
only a problem of inconsistency is an unsettled question. In the
case of Estate of Laege4 5 there is language which seems to recognize inconsistency as a permissible form of revocation, but the
case actually duplicates the situation in the Noon case and attains
the same result so anything said on the point lacks the authority
necessary to a binding precedent.
The Wyoming statute, silent on revival, authorizes revocation either by will or by codicil. 46 Reliance was placed on that
statute, in Pardee v. Kuster,4 7 to clear up a tangled situation. The
testator had made a will giving his entire estate to his son. It
was claimed that the next day he signed an instrument in the form
of a deed conveying a parcel of land to the plaintiff therein, the
instrument reciting: "This instrument is to be in full force and
effect from and after my death." The deed was never delivered
and was never thereafter seen. Two more days later, testator made
a codicil in which he referred to his will and ratified it in all respects except that he provided that if the son died within two years
after his death the entire estate should go to testator's halfbrother. After the will and the codicil had been admitted to probate, plaintiff sued to establish the deed as a lost or fraudulently
destroyed codicil to the will. Relief was denied when the court,
assuming for the purpose that the deed was a codicil, held that it
44

115 Wis. 299 at 303, 91 N. W. 670 at 671.

45 180 Wis. 32, 192 N. W. 373 (1923).
46 Wyo. Comp. Stats. Ann. 1945, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, § 6-306, states:
"No will or any
part thereof shall be revoked unless . . . by some other will or codicil in writing,
signed, attested and subscribed in the manner provided by law for the execution of
a will . . ."
47 15 Wyo. 368, 89 P. 572 (1907).
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had been nullified, if not expressly at least by the inconsistency,
because of the formal codicil which had been made. There is no
statute nor any decision in Wyoming touching on revival, so these
matters yet remain to be determined.

SUMMARY

This survey of judicial decisions dealing with revocation and
revival of wills, even when taken state by state, discloses an almost kaleidoscopic pattern of confusing factual situations and
legal determinations from which one could draw a parallel case
to fit almost every set of circumstances which human ingenuity or
carelessness could produce or' to bolster up an argument on either
side of some particular problem. Such being the case, there might
be some worth in arranging these decisions, both pro and con, in
much the same order as the wide variety of possible problems are
likely to develop out of a given set of circumstances.
Start with a testator who has made one valid will which remains intact at the time of his death, or if not capable of production, may be established as a lost will, 48 so probate thereof is likely
to be attempted. Add the fact that he has made a subsequent
formal will, validly executed, 49 by which he expressly declares the
revocation of the earlier will but which revocatory will no longer
48 See Page, The Law of Wills, 2d Ed., Vol. 1, § 632 et seq.

49 The second will necessarily fails to produce a revocation if it is made [1] by a
testator who lacks testamentary capacity: Sewall v. Robbins, 139 Mass. 164, 29
N. E. 650 (1885), Clark v. Hugo, 130 Va. 99, 107 S. E. 730 (1921); [2] is made
because of an undue influence: O'Brion, Appellant, 120 Me. 434, 115 A. 169 (1921).
Laughton v. Atkins, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 535 (1822), Rudy v. Ulrick, 69 Pa. 177
(1871) : [3] is inadequately witnessed: Thompson, Appellant, 116 Me. 473, 102 A.
303 (1917), Leard v. Askew, 28 Okla. 300, 114 P. 251, Ann. Cas. 1912D 234 (1911) ;
[4] is witnessed by incompetent persons: Moore v. Rowlett, 269 Ill. 88, 109 N. E.
682 (1915) ; or [5] fails to comply with statutory requirements for valid execution:
Holingshead v. Sturgis, 21 La. Ann. 450 (1869), Woodward v. Woodward, 37 Tenn.
(5 Sneed) 49 (1857). But as to necessity for prior judicial approval of revocatory
wills signed by Indian wards, see Phillips v. Smith, 186 Okla. 636, 100 P. (2d) 249
(1940). The burden of proof to establish that the alleged revocatory will was
validly executed rests on the contestant: In re Sloan-Rutledge's Will. 210 Iowa
1256, 232 N. W. 674 (1930), In re Rinker's Estate, 158 Kas. 406, 147 P. (2d) 740
(1944).
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remains in existence5" so that its only present value might be to
support contest on the idea that the earlier will has been revoked
and ought not be admitted to probate. Assuming that the contestant of the earlier will can sustain the burden of proof of these
facts,5 1 the question immediately presented is whether or not the
second will produced an instant revocation by reason of its execution 52 or failed in its purpose because it did not survive the testator
50 Evidence tended to show a deliberate destruction in James v. Marvin, 3 Conn.
576 (1821) ; Whitehill v. Halbing, 98 Conn. 21. 118 A. 454. 28 A. L. R. 895 (1922);
Blackett v. Ziegler, 153 Iowa 344, 133 N. W. 901, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 291 (1911)
Linginfelter v. Linginfelter, 3 Ky. (1 Hardin) 127 (1807) ; Succession of Dambly,
191 La. 500, 186 So. 7 (1938) ; Scott v. Fink, 45 Mich. 241, 7 N. W. 799 (1881)
Danley v. Jefferson, 150 Mich. 590, 114 N. W. 470, 121 Am. St. Rep. 640 (1908);
Bohanon v. Walcot, 2 Miss. (1 How.) 336, 29 Am. Dec. 631 (1836): Randall v.
Beatty, 31 N. J. Eq. (4 Stew.) 643 (1879). In the case of In re Cunningham, 38
Minn. 169, 36 N. W. 269 (1888), the revoking will was destroyed by the testator
during a period of mental incompetency. The presumption of destruction was relied
on in In re Johnston's Estate, 188 Cal. 336, 206 P. 628 (1922) ; Stetson v. Stetson,
200 Ill. 601, 66 N. E. 262, 61 L. R. A. 258 (1903) ; In re Davis' Estate, 134 N. J. Eq.
393, 35 A. (2d) 880 (1944).
51 Contestant did so succeed in In re Ford's Will, 135 Misc. 630, 239 N. Y. S. 252
(1930) ; Puckett v. Brittain, 152 Okla. 184, 3 P. (2d) 876 (1931) ; Legare v. Ashe.
1 S. C. L. (1 Bay) 464 (1795) ; In re Bell's Estate. 13 S. Dak. 475, 83 N. W. 566
(1900). But this record of success is outweighed by the cases in which contestant
failed to establish that a revoking will ever existed: In re Thompson's Estate, 185
Cal. 763, 198 P. 795 (1921) ; Minor v. Guthrie, 9 Ky. L. R. 113, 4 S. W. 179 (1887) ;
Lord's Appeal, 106 Me. 51, 75 A. 286 (1909) ; Aldrich v. Aldrich, 215 Mass. 164,
102 N. E. 487, Ann. Cas. 1914C 906 (1913); Connery v. Connery, 175 Mich. 544,
141 N. W. 615 (1913) ; Dingman v. Dingman, 199 Mich. 384, 165 N. W. 712 (1917) ;
Vining v. Hall, 40 Miss. 83 (1866) ; Williams v. Miles, 87 Neb. 455, 127 N. W.
904 (1910) ; Nelson v. McGiffert, 3 Barb. Ch. 158 (N. Y. 1848) ; In re Wear's
Will, 131 App. Div. 875. 116 N. Y. S. 304 (1909) ; In re Palmer's Will, 122 Misc.
177, 20.3 N. Y. S. 487 (1923): In re Cunnion's Will, 201 N. Y. 123, 94 N. E. 648
(1911) ; In re Harrison's Estate, 316 Pa. St. 15, 173 A. 407 (1934) ; In re Koehler's
Estate, 316 Pa. St. 321, 175 A. 424 (1934) ; In re Noyes' Will, 61 Vt. 14, 17 A. 473
(1889).
52 Immediate revocation was held to have occurred in Lones v. Lones, 108 Cal.
688, 41 P. 771 (1895) ; James v. Marvin, 3 Conn. 576 (1821) ; Barksdale v. Hopkins,
23 Ga. 332 (1857) ; Burns v. Travis, 117 Ind. 44, 18 N. E. 45 (1888) ; Blackett v.
Ziegler, 153 Iowa 344, 133 N. W. 901, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 291 (1911) ; In re
Cameron's Estate, 215 Iowa 63, 241 N. W. 458 (1932); Singleton v. Singleton, 269
Ky. 330, 107 S. W. (2d) 273 (1937); Succession of Boudreau, 10 La. Ann. 709
(1855) ; Succession of Dambly, 191 La. 500, 186 So. 7 (1938) ; Colvin v. Warford,
20 Md. 357 (1863) ; Wallis v. Wallis, 114 Mass. 510 (1874) ; Pickens v. Davis, 134
Mass. 252, 45 Am. Rep. 322 (1883) ; Scott v. Fink, 45 Mich. 241, 7 N. W. 799 (1881) ;
Stevens v. Hope, 52 Mich. 65, 17 N. W. 698 (1883) ; Danley v. Jefferson, 150 Mich.
590, 114 N. W. 470, 121 Am. St. Rep. 640 (1908) ; In re Cunningham, 38 Minn. 169,
36 N. W. 269 (1888) : Bohanon v. Walcot, 2 Miss. (1 How.) 336, 29 Am. Dec. 631
(1836) ; Hairston v. Hairston, 30 Miss. 276 (1885) ; In re Moore's Estate, 72 N. J.
Eq. 371, 65 A. 447 (1907) ; In re Davis' Estate, 134 N. J. Eq. 393, 35 A. (2d) 880
(1944) ; In re Ford's Will, 135 Misc. 630, 239 N. Y. S. 252 (1930) ; In re Stickney's
Will, 161 N. Y. 42, 55 N. E. 396, 76 Am. St. Rep. 246 (1899), affirming 52 N. Y. S.
929 (1898) ; Love v. Johnston, 34 N. C. 355 (1850), but see Marsh v. Marsh, 48 N. C.
(3 Jones L.) 77, 64 Am. Dec. 598 (1855) ; Pauly v. Crooks, 41 Ohio App. 1, 179
N. E. 364 (1931), semble; Phillips v. Smith, 186 Okla. 636, 100 P. (2d) 249 (1940) ;
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to become a probatable document, so may be declared to possess
53
only an ambulatory character.
Substitute, in lieu thereof, the fact that the subsequent formal
will lacked an express clause of revocation but was totally 54 or
partly inconsistent 55 and has also remained in existence, so as to
In re Ford's Estate, 301 Pa. St. 183, 151 A. 789 (1930) ; In re Bell's Estate, 13 S.
Dak. 475, 83 N. W. 566 (1900); McClure v. McClure, 86 Tenn. 173, 6 S. W. 44
(1887); Hawes v. Nicholas, 72 Tex. 481, 10 S. W. 558, 2 L. R. A. 863 (1899);
Brackenridge v. Roberts & McIntyre, 114 Tex. 418, 267 S. W. 244 (1924), reh. den.
270 S. W. 1001 (1925) ; In re Noon's Will, 115 Wis. 299, 91 N. W. 670, 95 Am. St.
Rep. 944 (1902). Express revocation was limited, in Rabe v. McAllister, 177 Md.
97, 8 A. (2d) 922 (1939), to the will expressly referred to in the subsequent will
and was not carried over to other existing earlier wills.
53 Revocatory wills have been treated as possessing only a common-law ambulatory effect in Whitehill v. Halbing, 98 Conn. 21, 118 A. 454, 28 A. L. R. 895 (1922),
noted in 32 Yale L. J. 70; Shaefer v. Voyle, 88 Fla. 170, 102 So. 7 (1925), but since
changed by statute; Stetson v. Stetson, 200 Ill. 601, 66 N. E. 262, 61 L. R. A. 258
(1903); Crooker v. McArdle, 332 Ill. 27, 163 N. E. 384 (1928); Linginfelter v.
Linginfelter, 3 Ky. (1 Hardin) 127 (1807) ; Succession of Dambly, 191 La. 500,
186 So. 7 (1938), noted in 1 La. L. Rev. 464; Lawson v. Morrison, 2 Dall. 286,
1 L. Ed. 384, 1 Am. Dec. 288 (Pa., 1792), but see contra In re Ford's Estate, 301
Pa. St. 183, 151 A. 789 (1930) ; Bates v. Hacking, 28 R. I. 523 (1907), affirmed in
29 R. I. 1, 68 A. 622, 125 Am. St. Rep. 759, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 937 (1908); Taylor
v. Taylor, 2 Nott & McCord 482 (S. C., 1820); Kollock v. Williams, 131 S. C. 352,
127 S. E. 444 (1925). By contrast with the cases listed in the preceding note, these
decisions represent a minority view. The decision in In re Engle's Estate, 129 Ore.
77, 276 P. 270 (1929), must be read in the light of the qualification that the purported revocation there attempted violated the terms of an agreement to devise in
return for lifetime support. It is not a general determination as to the ambulatory
character of a revoking will.
54 Total inconsistency has been held sufficient to produce revocation in Allen v.
Bromberg, 147 Ala. 317, 41 So. 771 (1906) ; In re Iburg's Estate, 196 Cal. 333, 238
P. 74 (1925) ; Lively v. Harwell, 29 Ga. 513 (1859), affirmed in 30 Ga. 315, 76 Am.
Dec. 649 (1860) ; Lasier v. Wright, 304 Ill. 130, 136 N. E. 545 (1922) : Kern v. Kern,
154 Ind. 29, 55 N. E. 1004 (1900) ; Succession of Bowles, 3 Rob. 31 (La., 1842) ;
Gardner v. McNeal, 117 Md. 27, 82 A. 288, Ann. Cas. 1914A 119 (1911) ; Hairston v.
Hairston, 30 Miss. 276 (1885): Beaumont v. Keim, 50 Mo. 28 (1872); Neibling v.
Methodist Orphans' Home Ass'n, 315 Mo. 578, 286 S. W. 58 (1926); In re Drake,
15 N. J. Misc. 484, 192 A. 428 (1937) ; Simmons v. Simmons, 26 Barb. 68 (N. Y.,
1857) ; In re Bourassa's Estate, 171 Okla. 64, 41 P. (2d) 851 (1935) ; In re Burtt's
Estate, 353 Pa. St. 217, 44 A. (2d) 670 (1945) ; McClure v. McClure, 86 Tenn. 173,
6 S. W. 44 (1887), approving an instruction to that effect; Dougherty v. Holscheider, 40 Tex. Civ. App. 31, 88 S. W. 1113 (1905), despite fact will was contingent on events which never occurred; In re Gould's Will, 72 Vt. 316, 47 A. 1082
(1900) ; Kearns v. Roush, 106 W. Va. 663, 146 S. E. 729 (1929) ; Estate of Laege,
180 Wis. 32, 192 N. W. 373 (1923), dictum only. In the case of Hamilton's Estate,
74 Pa. St. 69 (1873), the operation of the inconsistent will was made to depend on
testator's living for specified period and never took effect but, by inference, it would
have produced a revocation if it had become effective. Contra: Peck's Appeal, 50
Conn. 562 (1883) ; Rabe v. McAllister, 177 Md. 97, 8 A. (2d) 922 (1939) ; Cheever
v. North, 106 Mich. 390, 64 N. W. 455, 58 Am. St. Rep. 499, 37 L. R. A. 561 (1895),
approving instruction to that effect. There is dicta in Blackett v. Ziegler, 153 Iowa
344, 133 N. W. 901, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 291 (1911), indicating that an inconsistent
will would possess only ambulatory effect In that state.
55 Partial inconsistency does not, and logically ought not, produce revocation of
the entire earlier will, hence acts more in the nature of a codicil: Clarke v.
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present the probem of whether or not both wills should be probated leaving reconciliation to be worked out later, 56 or has itself
been subsequently destroyed so can have worth, if at all, solely as
a means of sustaining the claim of revocation.5 7 If not, then
change "subsequent formal will" to "duly executed codicil, ' ' s
one declaring for revocation5 9 or substituting different provisions
for those in the original will,60 which either still exists in probatable condition 6 ' or has been destroyed 62 so as to again generate
Ransom, 50 Cal. 594 (1875) ; Estate of Schnoor, 4 Cal. (2d) 590, 51 P. (2d) 424
(1935) ; Succession of Lefort, 139 La. 51, 71 So. 215, Ann. Cas. 1917E 769 (1916);
Marston v. Marston, 17 N. H. 503 (1845) ; In re Venable's Will, 127 N. C. 344, 37
S. E. 465 (1900).
56 Probate of both wills was granted in Clarke v. Ransom, 50 Cal. 594 (1875) ; In
re Wolfe's Will, 185 N. C. 563, 117 S. E. 804 (1923), where actually there was
neither total nor partial inconsistency; and in Gordon v. Whitlock, 92 Va. 723,
24 S. E. 342 (1896) ; in all of which cases total inconsistency was lacking. Probate
of the earlier will has been denied when the later will, still in existence, discloses
a total inconsistency: Austin v. Fiedler, 40 Ark. 144 (1882) ; Lasier v. Wright, 304
Ill. 130, 136 N. E. 545 (1922) ; Neibling v. Methodist Orphans' Home Ass'n, 315 Mo.
578, 286 S. W. 58 (1926) ; In re Drake, 15 N. J. Misc. 484, 192 A. 428 (1937).
57 In all of the cases cited in note 54, ante, except for Peck's Appeal, 50 Conn.
562 (1883), probate of the earlier will was denied whether the subsequent will
survived or not. The exception noted turned on the fact that the subsequent will
was regarded as possessing only an ambulatory character. Declarations by the
testator, either as to the fact of the erstwhile existence of the subsequent will or
its contents, have not been regarded as sufficient: Giles v. Giles, 204 Mass. 383,
90 N. E. 595 (1910) ; Hickey v. Beeler, 180 Tenn. 31, 171 S. W. (2d) 277 (1943).
But see Lane v. Hill, 68 N. H. 275, 44 A. 393, 73 Am. St. Rep. 591 (1900).
58 The alleged codicil in the case of In re Will of Charlotte Murray, 20 Ohio N. P.
(N. S.) 305 (1917), was not witnessed. It was, however, regarded as acceptable for
purpose of revival even though insufficient to produce a revocation.
59 Such a codicil produced revocation in Slaughter's Adm'r v. Wyman, 228 Ky.
226, 14 S. W. (2d) 777 (1929) ; In re Scott's Will, 88 Minn. 386, 93 N. W. 109
(1903) ; and Holley v. Larrabee, 28 Vt. 274 (1856). The express language of revocation in a codicil should be clear and unambiguous according to Laborde v. First
State Bank & Trust Co., 101 S. W. (2d) 389 (Tex. Civ. App., 1937). There is
dictum in In re Diament's Estate, 84 N. J. Eq. 135, 92 A. 952 (1915), affirmed in
88 N. J. Eq. 552, 103 A. 199 (1918), to the effect that an express codicil on the
subject must remain in existence to produce a revocation.
60 At least partial revocation was thereby produced in In re Toomey's Estate, 96
Mont. 489, 31 P. (2d) 729 (1934) ; Osburn v. Rochester T. & S. Dep. Co., 209 N. Y.
54, 102 N. E. 571, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 983 (1913) ; In re Campbell's Will, 170 N. Y.
84, 62 N. E. 1070 (1902) ; and Pardee v. Kuster, 15 Wyo. 368, 89 P. 572 (1907).
61 The codicils survived and were produced in the following cases, thereby accomplishing total or partial revocation: Slaughter's Adm'r v. Wyman, 228 Ky. 226,
14 S. W. (2d) 777 (1929); In re Toomey's Estate, 96 Mont. 489, 31 P. (2d) 729
(1934); In re Campbell's Will, 170 N. Y. 84, 62 N. E. 1070 (1902); Holley v.
Larrabee, 28 Vt. 274 (1856) ; Pardee v. Kuster, 15 Wyo. 368, 89 P. 572 (1907). In
the case of In re Scott's Will, 88 Minn. 386, 93 N. W. 109 (1903), the revocatory
language in the surviving codicil was treated as effective even though its substituted dispositive provisions failed.
62 Erstwhile codicils had been destroyed in the cases of In re Diament's Estate,
84 N. J. Eq. 135, 92 A. 952 (1915), affirmed in 88 N. J. Eq. 552. 103 A. 199 (1918) ;
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the question of revocation.6 3 Make one further change, this time
substituting some anomalous non-testamentary writing duly ex65
ecuted by the testator6 4 which expressly declares for revocation
or does so by implication 66 thereby again producing the fundamental problem as to whether revocation has occurred at all.
Before determining that revocation has or has not occurred,
however, do not overlook the possibility that any of the aforementioned documents, while validly executed, may fail for some
other internal 7 or external reason 8 and, being inoperative, may
Matter of Simpson, 56 How. Prac. 125 (N. Y., 1878): Osburn v. Rochester T. & S.
Dep. Co., 209 N. Y. 54, 102 N. E. 571, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 983 (1913) ; and In re
Kathan's Will, 141 N. Y. S. 705 (1913).
63 The attempted revocation failed with the destruction of the codicil involved in
In re Diament's Estate, 84 N. J. Eq. 135, 92 A. 952 (1915), and Matter of Simpson.
56 How. Prac. 125 (N. Y.. 1878). The latter case turns on the construction to be
given to a statute authorizing revocation by a "subsequent will" but silent as to
whether a codicil can serve. But see Osburn v. Rochester T. & S. Dep. Co., 209
N. Y. 54, 102 N. E. 571, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 983 (1913).
64 Defective execution existed in Barnewall v. Murrell, 108 Ala. 366, 18 So. 831
(1895) Board of National Missions, etc. v. Sherry, 372 Ill. 272, 23 N. E. (2d) 730
(1939) ; In re Rinker's Estate, 158 Kas. 406, 147 P. (2d) 740 (1944) : Holingshead
v. Sturgis, 21 La. Ann. 450 (1869) ; Brown v. Thorndike, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 388
(1834) ; and in In re Aker's Will, 74 App. Div. 461, 77 N. Y. S. 643 (1902), affirmed
in 173 N. Y. 620, 66 N. E. 1103 (1903), so the non-testamentary writing was" regarded, in each instance, as being ineffective for purpose of revocation. In Witter
v. Mott, 2 Conn. 67 (1816), however, no particular formalities were considered
necessary.
65 Validly executed non-testamentary writings which were express on the point
were given operative effect in Grotts v. Casburn, 295 Ill. 286, 129 N. E. 137 (1920) :
In re Moore's Estate, 72 N. J. Eq. 371, 65 A. 447 (1907), where found in a will;
Chestnut v. Capey, 45 Okla. 754, 146 P. 589 (1915) ; Billington v. Jones, 108 Tenn.
234, 66 S. W. 1127, 56 L. R. A. 654 (1901) ; Warner v. Warner's Estate, 37 Vt. 356
(1864) ; and Bates v. Holman, 13 Va. (3 H. & M.) 502 (1809).
66 In Derr v. Derr, 123 Kas. 681, 256 P. 800 (1927), the court deemed the words
"I wish my first will to be in effect this date" indicative of an intention to revoke
the subsequent will. But see Newboles v. Newboles, 169 Ark. 282, 273 S. W. 1026
(1925), where it was held that the statement "This is to certify that I have this
day decided not to will my land to my son" was insufficient to revoke as it did not
refer to a particular will nor expressly purport to revoke it.
67 See Twilley v. Durkee, 72 Colo. 444, 211 P. 668 (1923), where the document
was valid as a will but insufficiently executed as a revocatory instrument. Compare
with Succession of Boudreau, 10 La. Ann. 709 (1855) ; Dudley v. Gates. 124 Mich.
440, 83 N. W. 97 (1900) ; and In re Scott's Will, 88 Minn. 386, 93 N. W. 109 (1903),
where revocation was upheld although the instrument failed as a testamentary
disposition.
68 Inability of the devisee to take under the subsequent will had not prevented
revocation, according to Hairston v. Hairston, 30 Miss. 276 (1885) ; Price v.
Maxwell, 28 Pa. St. 23 (1857) ; and In re Melvilles Estate, 245 Pa. 318. 91 A. 679
(1914). But see Security Company v. Snow, 70 Conn. 288, 39 A. 153 (1898), where
a trust in the subsequent will failed because the trustee died and the court held
that the wide discretionary powers conferred could not be exercised by any other
person; as a consequence, the codicil fell leaving the original will to stand.
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lead back to the prime question. Nor, for that matter, pass idly
over the chance that oral declarations may have been made by the
testator bearing on the question of revocation 9 or the possibility
that he may have developed his own, albeit unusual, methods for
revoking his earlier will. 70 By then, however, it should be possible
to decide whether the original will has survived unscathed. If it
has not, it may then become necessary to delve into the mysteries
of revival.
One facing the question of revival will probably first notice
that the most significant issue will develop around the fact that the
revocatory document is no longer in existence from which may
arise a question whether a presumption of any kind can be drawn
from the bare fact of its destruction. Although there are some
cases indicating the existence of at least a prima facie presumption
of intention to.revive to be drawn from the fact of preservation of
71
the earlier will and the destruction of the revocatory instrument,

09 Prior to any statute, oral statements showing purpose to revoke were considered sufficient in Card v. Grinnan, 5 Conn. 164 (1821). Oral declarations such as to
die intestate and the like were ineffective in Succession of Hill, 47 La. Ann. 329,
16 So. 819 (1895) : Bird v. Bird, 165 Md. 349, 168 A. 855 (1933) ; Giles's Heirs v.
Giles's Ex'rs, Conf. Rep. 174, 1 N. C. 290 (1801) ; Devisees of McCune v. House and
Litch, 8 Ohio 144 (1837) : Allen v. Huff, 9 Tenn. (1 Yerg.) 404 (1830) ; Grimes v.
Nashville Trust Co., 176 Tenn. 366, 141 S. W. (2d) 890 (1940) : Hylton v. Hylton,
42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 161 (1844).
70 Revocation was produced. in Walton v. Walton. 7 Johns. Ch. 258 (N. Y., 1823),
by a contract to sell the devised lands even though that contract was subsequently
rescinded. In Appeal of Deaves, 140 Pa. St. 242, 21 A. 395 (1891), it was held that
testator's inaction, after he learned that his will was lost, amounted to a revocation
thereof. The making of a property settlement at divorce is not enough, Succession
of Cunningham, 142 La. 701. 77 So. 506 (1918), nor is a conveyance of the devised
property to the devisee, Caine v. Barnwell, 120 Miss. 209, 82 So. 65 (1919). See
also Ragland v. Wagener, 142 Tex. 651, 180 S. W. (2d) 435, 152 A. L. R. 1232
(1944), where the devise was purportedly made contingent on the fact that testator
prepare and leave on deposit a deed of conveyance to the land to be delivered after
his death.
71 A presumption in favor of revival was applied in Colvin v. Warford, 20 Md. 357
(1863) ; Rabe v. McAllister, 177 Md. 97, 8 A. (2d) 922 (1939) ; Randall v. Beatty,
31 N. J. Eq. (4 Stew.) 643 (1879), where the court said the fact that testatrix
"kept the will is the most cogent evidence of her intention that it should be
revived"; McCartan's Estate. 58 Pitts. L. J. 364 (Pa., 1910) ; Wullf's Estate, 26 Pa.
Dist. Rep. 144 (1916) ; and McClure v. McClure, 86 Tenn. 173, 6 S. W. 44 (1887),
where the court said that preservation of -the earlier will upon destruction of the
revoking one was evidence of an "intent to republish" the same. But see Ewell v.
Rucker, 28 Tenn. App. 156, 187 S. W. (2d) 644 (1945). In Boudinot v. Bradford,
2 Dall. 266, 1 L. Ed. 375 (Pa., 1796), the court would have applied such a presumption but for the fact that certain contemporaneous statements by the testator disclosed a desire to die intestate. There is dictum to support such a presumption in
Estate of Schnoor, 4 Cal. (2d) 590, 51 P. (2d) 424 (1935) ; Stetson v. Stetson, 200

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

most of the cases on the point declare either that there is no basis
for any presumption 72 or that the presumption is rather to the
contrary, 73 particularly so where there is a statute regulating the
74
manner of revival.
Such being the case, one must seek further for evidence of
revival. In that regard, oral declarations made at the moment of
the destruction of the revocatory instrument may 75 or may not be
Iii. 601, 66 N. E. 262, 61 L. R. A. 258 (1903) ; and Succession of Moore, 196 So. 79
(La. App., 1940), but in each of these last instances the court actually decided
that the original will had never been revoked.
72 There is no presumption either way according to James v. Marvin, 3 Conn. 576
(1821), and Scott v. Fink, 45 Mich. 241, 7 N. W. 799 (1881).
73 See Blackett v. Ziegler, 153 Iowa 344, 133 N. W. 901, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 291
(1911), where the court indicated that to permit automatic revival would be dangerous as the testator might not have destroyed the first will merely because he
might have forgotten about it; In re Farley's Estate, - Iowa -, 24 N. W. (2d)
453 (1946) ; Pickens v. Davis, 134 Mass. 252, 45 Am. Rep. 322 (1883); Bohanon v.
Walcot, 2 Miss. (1 How.) 336, 29 Am. Dec. 631 (1836) ; Lane v. Hill, 68 N. H. 275,
44 A. 393, 73 Am. St. Rep. 591 (1900); Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 94 N. W.
705, 62 L. R. A. 383 (1903), reh. den. 68 Neb. 463, 96 N. W. 151 (1903); In re
Davis' Estate, 134 N. J. Eq. 393, 35 A. (2d) 880 (1944) ; In re Moore's Estate, 72
N. J. Eq. 371, 65 A. 447 (1907) ; Ewell v. Rucker, 28 Tenn. App. 156, 187 S. W. (2d)
644 (1945) ; Hawes v. Nicholas, 72 Tex. 481, 10 S. W. 558, 2 L. R. A. 863 (1899) ;
In re Gould's Will, 72 Vt. 316, 47 A. 1082 (1900) ; and In re Noon's Will, 115 Wis.
299, 91 N. W. 670, 95 Am. St. Rep. 944 (1902).
74 Support for views expressed in the following cases rests primarily on statutes
regulating the manner by which revival may be accomplished: Allen v. Bromberg,
147 Ala. 317, 41 So. 771 (1906) ; Lones v. Lones, 108 Cal. 688, 41 P. 771 (1895) ;
Estate of Bassett, 196 Cal. 576, 238 P. 666 (1925) : Lively v. Harwell, 29 Ga. 513
(1859), affirmed in 30 Ga. 315, 76 Am. Dec. 649 (1860) ; Kern v. Kern, 154 Ind. 29,
55 N. E. 1004 (1900); Singleton v. Singleton, 269 Ky. 330, 107 S. W. (2d) 273
(1937) ; Beaumont v. Keim, 50 Mo. 28 (1872) : In re Hedge's Will, 136 Misc. 230,
242 N. Y. S. 415 (1930) ; In re Wear's Will, 131 App. Div. 875, 116 N. Y. S. 304
(1909) ; In re Barne's Will, 70 App. Div. 523, 75 N. Y. S. 373 (1902) ; Ludlam v.
Otis, 15 Hun. 410 (N. Y., 1878); Rudisill's Ex'r v. Rodes and Wife, 71 Va. (29
Gratt.) 147 (1877). The same attitude has been evidenced where the revoking
instrument was merely a codicil producing only a partial change: Osburn v.
Rochester T. & S. Dep. Co., 209 N. Y. 54, 102 N. E. 571, 35 Ann. Cas. 1915A 101,
46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 983 (1913).
75 In Blackett v. Ziegler, 153 Iowa 344, 133 N. W. 901, 37 L, R. A. (N. S.) 291
(1911), the court said that "permissible parol testimony" might suffice. Simultaneous oral declarations were received in Pickens v. Davis, 134 Mass. 252, 45 Am. Rep.
322 (1883) ; In re Tibbett's Estate, 153 Minn. 53, 189 N. W. 401 (1922) ; Marsh v.
Marsh, 48 N. C. (3 Jones L.) 77, 64 Am. Dec. 598 (1855) ; In re Will of Stephenson,
19 Phila. 41 (Pa., 1888) ; and In re Gould's Will, 72 Vt. 316, 47 A. 1082 (1900),
but as there is no statute regulating revival in any of these jurisdictions the holdings throw no light on the meaning of the phrase "by the terms of such revocation"
commonly found in revival statutes. See 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 213. In
Danley v. Jefferson, 150 Mich. 590, 114 N. W. 470, 121 Am. St. Rep. 640 (1908), the
oral statements were said to amount to a "republication" of the original will.
Anterior statements were received in Williams v. Williams, 142 Mass. 515. 8 N. E.
424 (1886).
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sufficient. 76 Posterior oral declarations will usually be of little

value, 77 particularly where the statute requires that revival take
the form of a re-execution of the original will. 78 Written evidence
of such intention to revive may suffice whether found in the form
79
of a codicil or not.

By far the most prevalent form of revival, however, seems to
be that of "republishing" the original will, but there is no uniformity on what constitutes an adequate republication. In some
instances mere oral statements indicating a desire to have the
earlier will serve as the "last" will have been regarded as enough
of a republication to satisfy legal requirements.8 " There is in76 The declarations made in Bohanon v. Walcot, 2 Miss. (1 How.) 336, 29 Am.
Dec. 631 (1836), were of a conditional nature, hence insufficient. Those received in
In re Ford's Estate, 301 Pa. 183, 151 A. 789 (1930), and Manning's Estate, 46 Pa.
Super. 607 (1911), were regarded as acceptable as they negatived intent to revive.
Declarations involved in In re Stickney's Will, 161 N. Y. 42, 55 N. E. 396, 76 Am.
St. Rep. 246 (1899), and In re Kuntz's Will, 163 App. Div. 125, 148 N. Y. S. 382
(1914), were rejected because of the peculiar construction there placed on a
revival statute. The holding in Collins v. Collins, 110 Ohio St. 105, 143 N. E. 561,
38 A. L. R. 230 (1924), likewise rejecting oral declarations because not in conformity with the court's Interpretation of a revival statute, Is based upon the New
York cases last mentioned.
77 Barker v. Bell, 46 Ala. 216 (1871), where the original will and the revoking
will had both been destroyed, and Warner v. Warner's Estate, 37 Vt. 356 (1864).
If the posterior declarations are insufficient to revive, they are likewise insufficient
to prevent revival according to Flintham v. Bradford, 10 Pa. 82 (1849.). See also
Holmes' Estate, 240 Pa. St. 537, 87 A. 778 (1913). There Is dictum in Giles's Heirs
v. Giles's Ex'rs, Conf. Rep. 174, 1 N. C. 290 (1801), to the effect that if the will
had been revoked it could not have been revived "by any subsequent declaration
by parol."
78 Rudisill's Ex'r v. Rodes and Wife, 71 Va. (29 Gratt.) 147 (1877).
79 In Grotts v. Casburn, 295 Ill. 286, 129 N. E. 137 (1920), and In re Cameron's
Estate, 215 Iowa 63, 241 N. W. 458 (1932), the writings designed to nullify the
revoking wills and restore the original ones were treated as duly executed and
attested codicils, hence sufficient to revive, although totally lacking in dispositive
features. The writing in Blackett v. Ziegler, 153 Iowa 344, 133 N. W. 901, 37
L. R. A. (N. S.) 291 (1911), took the form of a codicil designating a new executor
to act without bond but made no reference to either will nor was attached to
either of them. It was, however, helped out by oral declarations. The signed and
attested memorandum in Derr v. Derr, 123 Kas. 681, 256 P. 800 (1927), merely
declared: "I wish my first will to be in effect this date." It was held sufficient
under a revival statute requiring republication in the presence of two or more
competent witnesses who should subscribe their names. A vague and unintelligible
writing will not satisfy according to Neibling v. Methodist Orphans' Home Ass'n,
315 Mo. 578, 286 S. W. 58 (1926). The New York revival statute has been Interpreted to require that the writing be not only signed but also validly attested: In
re O'Donovan's Will, 168 Misc. 362, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 456 (1938) ; In re McCaffrey's
Estate, 174 Misc. 162, 20 N. Y. S. (2d) 178 (1940).
so Danley v. Jefferson, 150 Mich. 590, 114 N. W. 470, 121 Am. St. Rep. 640, 13
Ann. Cas. 242 (1908). The case does not disclose that the witnesses to the oral
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timation that statements of that character ought to be made in the
presence of more than"one witness, 8 ' but only by way of dictum has
it ever been asserted that the "republication" witnesses need to
record that fact by attestation.8 2 The republication might be accomplished through the use of a valid codicil,8 3 but again such a
document has been regarded as being effective even though it be
inadequately attested. 4 Only where the statute requires, or has
been interpreted to require, the re-execution has there been any
insistence on that method of revival, yet a duly executed codicil
is enough for that purpose.8 5 If revival occurs at all, and there is
one case which would seem to indicate that it is never possible
under any set of circumstances, 8 1 the whole revoked instrument
has generally been revived. In only one instance has the court
found in favor of a partial reviva8 7 and there the result was
achieved more by applying principles of revocation than because
of any doctrines of revival even though the statute in question

statements were the same as those who had attested the original will. See also
In re Kerchner's Estate, 41 Pa. Super. 112 (1909) ; In re Will of Stephenson, 19
Phila. 41 (Pa., 1888) ; Havard v. Davis, 2 Binn. 406 (Pa., 1810).
8s Republication by oral statements in the presence of one of the attesting witnesses was held insufficient in In re Kuntz's Will, 163 App. Div. 125, 148 N. Y. S.
382 (1914). There is dictum in the case of Manning's Estate, 46 Pa. Super. 607
(1911), that an oral republication in the presence of one person, an interested one
at that, would not suffice.
82 Collins v. Collins, 110 Ohio St. 105, 143 N. E. 561, 38 A. L. R. 230 (1924).
-a Grotts v. Casburn, 295 Ill. 286, 129 N. E. 137 (1920) In re Cameron's Estate,
215 Iowa 63, 241 N. W. 458 (1932). The case of In re Engle's Estate, 129 Ore. 77,
276 P. 270 (1929), would indicate that the reviving codicil does not have to be
produced so long as it quondam existence can be established.
4 See In re Will of Charlotte Murray, 20 Ohio N. P. (N. S.) 305 (1917), where
the purported codicil was made by an incompetent person and was unwitnessed yet
the court said it was, "in a certain sense, a republication," and admitted the earlier
will to probate. But see contrary dictum in Collins v. Collins, 110 Ohio St. 105,
143 N. E. 561, 38 A. L. R. 230 (1924). The Pennsylvania case of In re Shetter's
Estate, 303 Pa. St. 193, 154 A. 288 (1931), holds that a codicil executed by the
testator will suffice even though attested by interested witnesses.
85 In re Campbell's Will, 170 N. Y. 84, 62 N. E. 1070 (1902) In re Knapp's Will,
23 N. Y. S. 282 (1893) ; Gooch v. Gooch, 134 Va. 21, 113 S. E. 873 (1922) ; Gulland
v. Gulland, 81 W. Va. 487, 94 S. E. 943 (1918). A mere re-signing of the original
will, even if accompanied by oral declarations made in the presence of witnesses,
is not enough according to Love v. Johnston, 34 N. C. 355 (1850).
86 Brackenridge v. Roberts & McIntyre, 114 Tex. 418, 267 S. W. 244 (1924), reh.
den. 270 S. W. 1001 (1925).
87 Spradlin v. Adams, 182 Ky. 716, 207 S. W. 471 (1919).
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made the scope of the revival depend on the extent to which an
intention to revive was shown to exist.
If one were to attempt to draw any generalization from this
array of confused and confusing statutory materials and judicial
decisions it would simply be to point out that, in many states, there
is more left to be determined than has been decided but there is
much that can be obviated by the drafting of adequate and comprehensive legislation on the subject.

SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1946-1947'
VIII. TORTS
The volume of tort cases doubtless has not diminished, but
there is little of novelty to report about. Two significant cases
deal with aspects of defamation not heretofore determined in this
state. In Spanel v. Pegler,1 the federal Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed a decision which had dismissed a complaint in libel. The
suit grew out of the publication of a syndicated column in which
the columnist had commented upon the fact that plaintiff, president of a corporation, had caused paid advertisements to be
published which were more in the nature of political arguments
indicative of plaintiff's inclination toward leftist tendencies, advertisements which were certainly never anti-communist in character. The court noted that, while Illinois law was controlling,
no decision of this state had yet determined whether or not it
was libelous per se to characterize a person as a communist or a
communist sympathizer even though that question had elsewhere
been answered in the affirmative. It therefore adopted such view
as the law to be applied in the case but left it to a jury to determine whether the article in question was susceptible of being
understood, by the average reader, to mean that plaintiff was
either a communist or a sympathizer. In the other case, that of
Latimer v. Chicago Daily News, 2 plaintiffs were duly licensed
attorneys who were engaged in defending certain persons charged
with sedition. The defendant published an article referring to
that trial in which appeared the statement that "the scum of political gangsterdom in this country are represented by as craven a
group of lawyers" as the writer thereof had ever seen. Plaintiffs
claimed that, as they were among the "group of lawyers" referred to, they had a right of action for libel. Defendant, on the
other hand, contended that as none of the plaintiffs were identified
* The first seven sections of this survey appeared in 26 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvxmw 1 et seq.
1 160 F. (2d) 619 (1947), noted in 14 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 697 and 22 N. Y. U.
L. Q. 514.
2 330 Ill. App. 295, 71 N. E. (2d) 553 (1947).
Leave to appeal has been denied.
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specifically no right of action accrued to any particular individual.
The Appellate Court affirmed a judgment dismissing the complaint
on the ground that where a derogatory remark is made about a
group no right of action accrues to any one member of the group
unless it can be said that the language used applies, with certainty, to all who compose the group. Again, Illinois precedents
were lacking but ample authority to sustain that view exists in
other jurisdictions.
Note has already been made of the soft-drink case of Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Chicago." The complaint
therein charged both a breach of warranty and also negligence in
permitting a dead mouse to remain in the bottle of soft drink
sold to and consumed by plaintiff. Negligence was found to exist
in permitting the dead mouse to remain in the bottle at the time
of cleaning and filling the same and in failing to discover the
defect on inspection. 4 A claim that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence was rejected on the ground that while plaintiff noticed an "awful" taste after consuming a portion of the
contents, the assurance of her sister, present at the time, that
"hers was all right" plus the right to assume the bottle was not
contaminated justified plaintiff in consuming the balance of the
contents up to the moment when she became aware of the foreign
substance. The absence of direct medical evidence that the injury
was proximately caused by defendant's negligence was excused
with the comment that the "causal connection" was clearly apparent and that it was "unnecessary for the jury to speculate or
conjecture" as to the basis for plaintiff's illness.
Mention was made last year of the Appellate Court decision
in Miller v. Miller,5 a case which did not involve any new point of
3 332 111. App. 117, 74 N. E. (2d) 162 (1947). A discussion of the warranty aspects
of the case appears ante under the topic of Sales.
4 The court commented upon the inadequacy of the inspection by noting that the
person charged with the task admitted that he had to perform a "tedious" operation at the rate of 264 bottles a minute, a speed which could hardly permit of a
careful Inspection for breaks, cracks and foreign substances.
5328 Ill. App. 171, 65 N. E. (2d) 597 (1946), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
RIEW 88-9.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

law but did present a novel factual situation with respect to the
guest statute-" The plaintiff there concerned had been injured
while riding in a trailer truck accompanying some livestock which
he had hired the defendant to carry, but a judgment in his favor
had been reversed. The Supreme Court took the case on certificate of importance and affirmed the judgment for defendant on
the ground that one may be a "guest," even though riding in a
trailer truck, providing no manner of payment, either in cash or
services, is made for the ride2
The right of an infant to sue for alienation of parental affections was upheld in Johnson v. Luhman8 as a proper extension of
existing doctrines. It is to be hoped that either the Supreme
Court will settle, once and for all, that question or else that the
legislature will concern itself with providing a sound and unquestionable basis for such actions.
A statutory change of significance has increased the maximum
possible recovery in wrongful death cases of $15,000, 9 but the
proviso in that statute concerning suits based on deaths "occuring outside of this state" was given interpretation in Carroll v.
Rogers0 so as to permit suit here if the actual process of dying
occurs in Illinois although the fatal injuries be inflicted elsewhere.
The converse of that situation was heretofore held not to deny
jurisdiction. 1

6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95%, § 58a.

7 Miller v. Miller, 395 Il. 273, 69 N. E. (2d) 878 (1946).
8330 Ill. App. 598, 71 N. B. (2d) 810 (1947), noted in 25 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvrnEw 260.
9 Laws 1947, p. 1094, H. B. 17; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 70, § 2.
10330 Ill. App. 114, 70 N. E. (2d) 218 (1946), noted in 25 CHroAo-KENT LAW
RJvIEw 338.
11 See Crane v. Chicago & Western R. R. Co., 233 Ill. 259, 84 N. E. 222 (1908).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
APPLICABILITY

OF

SUBSTITUTED

TO RESIDENT AUTOMOBILE

SERVICE

STATUTE

DRIVERS

Forward-looking steps were taken by every American jurisdiction,
after the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hess v. Pawlowski,' to subject the non-resident motorist to the jurisdiction of local
tribunals for wrongful acts committed by him while using local highways.
It now begins to appear, from decisions such as that of the Supreme Court
of Colorado in the case of Carlson v. District Court of the City and
County of Denver,2 that most state legislatures, when dealing with the
problem of the non-resident driver, overlooked the equally vexatious
problem of how to treat with the resident driver who leaves the state
after an accident but before jurisdiction can be acquired over him or his
property.
The case in question arose out of a collision in Colorado between
automobiles operated by one Fodor and one Carlson. Carlson's car bore
Illinois license plates at the time. Fodor filed suit in Colorado against
Carlson and undertook to secure jurisdiction by serving summons on
the Secretary of State of Colorado pursuant to a typical statute on the
subject.3 He alleged that Carlson was a non-resident at the time of the
accident, being then a resident of New York. Notice to Carlson was completed by sending him a registered article for which Fodor obtained
Carlson's signed receipt. Upon Fodor's affidavit as to these facts, a
continuance for the purpose of taking evidence and for the entry of a
default judgment was granted. Carlson then appeared specially and
moved to quash the service, offering an affidavit to the effect that he was
a resident of Colorado on the date of the accident and had remained
such until six months thereafter when he moved to New York to accept
the pastorate of a church. He explained the use of foreign license plates
by declaring that he had moved to Colorado from Illinois some five months

I274

U. S. 352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927).

2116 Colo. 330, 180 P. (2d) 525 (1947).
3 Colo. Stats. Ann. 1935, Ch. 16, §48, and 1937 Supp. §48(1), provides: "The
operation by a non-resident of a motor vehicle on a public highway in this state
shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such non-resident of the secretary
of state to be his or its true and lawful attorney, upon whom may be served all
lawful civil process in any action or proceedings against him or it, growing out
of any accident or collision in which such non-resident may be involved while
operating a motor vehicle on such public highway. .. "
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before the accident but had neglected to purchase local plates as his
work was such that he might be required to leave Colorado at any time.
Carlson's motion was denied and he was ordered to answer the complaint.
He then filed an original proceeding for a writ of prohibition in the
Colorado Supreme Court, which court held that he was not subject to
substituted service in the fashion indicated because the statute applied
only to drivers who were non-residents at the time the cause of action
arose. The writ of prohibition was, accordingly, granted.
The problem is not entirely a new one, but the decision serves to
re-emphasize a weakness to be found in the statutes of most states, including that of Illinois, 4 where a similar result would probably have to
be reached if and when the occasion arises. As these statutes relate to
non-resident drivers only, they leave injured persons without a local
remedy against those who, at the time the cause of action accrues, are
residents of the state in which the accident or collision occurs but who
subsequently abandon residence before jurisdiction is acquired and thereafter remain outside the state. The purpose supporting the constitutionality of such statutes as a proper exercise of the police power against
non-residents because necessary to provide for a speedy adjudication of
the rights of the parties5 is defeated where local wrongdoers are able to
remove themselves from the situs subsequent to the accident and thereby
defeat the acquisition of jurisdiction.
To illustrate the inadequacy of such statutes, reference may be made
not only to the instant case but also to decisions like that in Berger v.
Superior Court in and for Yuba County6 where the defendant, stationed
in California during the war years, was involved in a highway accident
one month before his discharge from service. He returned to his original
domicile after his discharge and substituted service was held improper,
prohibition being granted on the ground that he was not within the
purview of the California Vehicle Code. 7 Similar results have been obtained in Iowa,8 the District of Columbia, 9 and in North Dakota.' 0 A
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 95 , § 23, is practically identical with the Colorado
statute referred to in note 3, ante.
5 See Pawloski v. Hess, 253 Mass. 478, 149 N. E. 122 (1925), affirmed in 274 U. S.
352, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927).
679 Cal. App. (2d) 425, 179 P. (2d) 600 (1947).
7 Deering, Cal. Vehicle Code, § 404.
sWelsh v. Ruopp, 228 Iowa 70, 289 N. WV. 760 (1940).
9 In Wood v. White, 68 App. D. C. 341, 97 F. (2d) 646 (1938), the court held
that D. C. Code, Tit. 40, § 403, could not be extended to include residents who
become non-residents. See also Suit v. Shailer, 18 F. Supp. 568 (1937), where it
was held that Md. Ann. Code 1939, Art. 56, § 167, did not apply to non-residents
who temporarily reside in Maryland for more than three months in any one year.
10 Northwestern Mortgage & Security Co. v. Noel Const. Co., 71 N. D. 256, 300
N. W. 28 (1941).
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decision in the last-mentioned jurisdiction furnishes an extreme demonstration of the inefficacy of the general type of statute for there the defendant became involved in a collision in North Dakota, his domicile for
thirty years, while driving to Washington to establish a new domicile.
Service on him through the local commissioner of insurance was held
invalid as defendant was treated as still being a resident at the time of the
collision. 1 The evident obstruction to justice in such cases lies not in the
construction given to the statutes by the courts but rather with the lawmaking bodies who have failed to perceive one danger while correcting
another.
A small number of jurisdictions, aware of these shortcomings, have
enacted legislation which seems to solve the problem. They have enlarged the scope of their statutes so as to permit substituted service upon
one who, whether resident or not, uses the highways of the state and
thereby appoints some suitable public official as his true and lawful attorney for purpose of service with respect to all claims growing out of the
use of the highway. In Ohio, for example, the injured person's remedy
is protected by a statute which specifically includes resident drivers who
become non-residents after the accident. 12 The Pennsylvania provision's
is much like that in Ohio, but the one in Montana has been made applicable to "any person who operates a vehicle on a public way."4 Perhaps the most comprehensive statute was one possessed by New York
which not only applied to residents who subsequently became non-residents but declared that absence for thirty days, whether intended to be
5
temporary or permanent, was sufficient to justify substituted service.1
11

See note 10, ante.

12 Page Ohio Gen. Code Ann., Vol. 4-A, § 6308-5, provides: "This act shall be
construed to extend the right of service of process upon non-residents and upon
residents who subsequently become non-residents or who conceal their whereabouts.
."
The statute was held constitutional In Hendershot v. Ferkel, 144 Ohio St.
112, 56 N. E. (2d) 205 (1944), where defendant, residing in Ohio at the time of
and for one and one-half years after the accident, subsequently moved to California. Service on the Secretary of State of Ohio was held sufficient to confer
jurisdiction.
i3 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann. 1931, App. to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 2077,
provides that the rules relating to non-resident defendants shall apply to "actions
as to which the laws of this Commonwealth authorize service of process upon a
non-resident or a resident who becomes a non-resident or who conceals his whereabouts." See also McCall v. Gates, 354 Pa. St. 158, 47 A. (2d) 211 (1946).
14Mont. Rev. Code 1936, App. Vol. 1, § 1760.13. Held constitutional and applicable in State ex rel. Thompson v. District Court of Fourth Judicial Dist., 108
Mont. 362, 91 P. (2d) 422 (1939), a suit against a Montana resident who left the
state two weeks after the accident.
1' Thompson's Cons. Laws N. Y. 1939, Vehicle & Traffic Law, § 52a, declares:
"The operation by a resident of a motor vehicle on a public highway in this state
. . . shall, in all cases where such resident shall have removed from this state,
prior to the service of legal process upon him . . . and shall have been absent
therefrom for thirty days continuously, be deemed equivalent to an appointment
by such resident of the Secretary of State to be his true and lawful attorney.
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The few cases which have arisen thereunder clearly disclose the beneficial
effects of so complete and adequate a law. 6
While none of these last-mentioned statutes have faced constitutional
tests before the United States Supreme Court as yet, there would seem to
be as much justification for upholding such measures when applied to
residents who later become non-residents as there is for enforcing the
same against those who are non-residents at the time of the accident.
If a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the state may not
cancel authority given for service on an agent merely by surrendering its
license, at least as to acts done while there,'1 7 there seems little reason
to treat the resident who withdraws from the state in any different light.
Granted that differences exist between artificial persons and human beings
and that to apply such a rule to every transaction within the state might
transcend constitutional limitations on due process, still the recognition
already accorded to the proposition that, in the public interest, the state
"may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote
care on the part of all, residents and non-residents alike, who use the
highways, '"18 should warrant different treatment in highway accident
cases. Admittedly such a statute, being in derogation of the common law,
would have to be construed strictly, 9 but that fact does not militate against
its constitutionality. Moreover, from the standpoint of equal protection
of the laws, it should pass muster for it puts the resident who stays at
home, the foreigner who temporarily comes within the state, and the resident who flees therefrom, in the same sphere, i.e. each being made amenable
within the state for acts done while there.
As no conceivable constitutional objection exists, it would seem not only
proper but advisable for most state legislatures to re-examine their
vehicle codes in order to cover a marked deficiency in existing statutes.
J. C. GREGORY
*

is

. ."

N. Y. Laws 1941, Ch. 248, added the provision:

intended to be temporary or permanent."

"Whether such absence

For some unexplained reason, the

N. Y. legislature, at the time it added such amendment, also repealed the major

provision.
16 McNally v. Howard, 45 N. Y. S. (2d) 7 (1943) ; Reed v. Lombardi, 181 Misc.
805, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 382 (1943); Marano v. Finn, 155 Misc. 793, 281 N. Y. S.
440 (1935).
17 In general, see Fletcher, Cyc. Corp., Perm. Ed., Vol. 18, § 8762.
18Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 at 355, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 at 1094
(1927).
19 See, for example, Brauer Machine & Supply Co. v. Parkhill Truck Co., 383
Il. 569, 50 N. E. (2d) 836 (1943), confining the application of the Illinois statute
to accidents occurring on the highway. Further limitations may be observed in
Rose v. Gisi, 139 Neb. 593, 298 N. W. 333 (1941); Balter v. Webner, 175 Misc.
184, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 918 (1940); Haughey v. Mineola Garage, 174 Misc. 332, 20
N. Y. S. (2d) 857 (1940) ; Hendershot v. Ferkel, 144 Ohio St. 112, 56 N. E. (2d)
205 (1944) ; Williams v. Meredith, 326 Pa. St. 570, 192 A. 924 (1937).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
JUDGMENT-RENDITION,

FORM AND REQUISITES IN GENERAL-WHETHER

MORE THAN ONE JUDGMENT MAY BE RENDERED IN THE SAME CASE AGAINST

legal effect of a
verdict purporting to apportion damages between joint tort-feasors was
considered by the Appellate Court of Illinois for the First District in the
recent case of Stoewsand v. Checker Taxi Company.1 The plaintiff there
sued a taxicab company and a municipality for bodily injuries sustained
when the cab in which she was a passenger struck a hole in a city street.
The trial court submitted several customary optional forms of verdict to
the jury and the parties stipulated that, upon return of a sealed verdict,
the jurors were to be permitted to separate and polling of the jury was
waived. When court reconvened, the sealed envelope containing the verdict was opened and therein was found two separate verdicts by which
the jury declared each defendant to be guilty and assessed the plaintiff's
SEVERAL DEFENDANTS SUED AS JOINT ToRT-FrSoRS-The

damages at the same figure, to-wit: $10,000.00. The envelope also contained a single joint verdict finding both defendants guilty and assessing

damages at $20,000.00, but this form was not signed. Separate judgments
were entered on the first two verdicts in favor of plaintiff and against
each defendant. The taxicab company filed notice of appeal from the
judgment so entered and the city joined therein. Pending the appeal,
plaintiff settled with the taxicab company and executed a covenant not
to sue it, but the city nevertheless continued with its appeal. The judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial when the
reviewing court sustained appellant's contention that Section 50 of the
Illinois Civil Practice Act 2 had not in any way modified the common-law
rule that there can be no apportionment of damages between joint tort-

feasors 2
That rule has been so widely adopted and so rarely challenged in this
country that it has become almost axiomatic.4 Plaintiff, admitting the
1331 Ill. App. 192, 73 N. E. (2d) 4 (1947).
2 Ii.
Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 174.
a Humason v. Michigan Central R. Co., 259 Il. 462, 102 N. E. 793 (1913);
Pecararo v. Halberg, 246 Ill. 95, 92 N. E. 600 (1910).
4 See Southwest Gas & Electric Co. v. Godfrey, 178 Ark. 103, 10 S. W. (2d) 894
(1928) ; Kerrison v. Unger, 135 Cal. App. 607, 27 P. (2d) 927 (1934) ; Jiannetti v.
National Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn., 277 Mass. 434, 178 N. E. 640 (1931);
Begin v. Liederbach Bus Co., 167 Minn. 84, 208 N. W. 546 (1926) ; Neal v. Curtis
& Co., 328 Mo. 389, 41 S. W. (2d) 543 (1931) ; Melosh v. Public Service Ry. Co.,
4 N. J. Misc. 361, 132 A. 666 (1926) ; Klepper v. Seymour House Corp. of Ogdenburg, 246 N. Y. 85, 158 N. E. 29, 62 A. L. R. 955 (1927), reversing 218 App. Div.
686, 218 N. Y. S. 476 (1926); Cain v. Quannab Light & Ice Co., 131 Okla. 25,
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general existence of such a rule, argued that the pertinent section of the
Civil Practice Act had modified the common-law rule since it permitted
the entry of separate judgments in the same case. In that connection,
plaintiff 'relied on Shaw v. Courtney. In that case, the plaintiff had filed
a two-count complaint charging assault and battery and also unlawful
imprisonment against several defendants. The testimony showed that
all of the defendants were not guilty of all of the same wrongful acts.
The jury returned separate verdicts as to the several defendants and
separate judgments for varying amounts were entered thereon. The
Appellate Court reversed these judgments, believing that the verdicts on
which they were based were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that the Appellate
Court decision, whether treated as one involving purely a question of
fact or a mixed question of fact and law, was binding on it." It did,
however, admonish that this "opinion should not be considered as giving
sanction to or disapproval of any of the questions of law considered" 'I
by the Appellate Court. It may be inferred that, if the Illinois Supreme
Court had the question of apportionment of damages between joint tortfeasors properly before it, the court would have reversed as it had done
on prior occasions before the adoption of the Civil Practice Act
That
case cannot, therefore, be considered as valid authority for the proposition that Section 50 of the Civil Practice Act has modified or relaxed the
common-law rule in this respect.
The provision in question was adopted, without substantial modification, from a New Jersey statute which in turn had borrowed from an
English provision.'
In each of these jurisdictions, subsequent to the
adoption of the reformed procedure, cases have held that no change has
been made in the common-law rule regarding the nature of the liability
of joint tort-feasors. 1° While the language of Section 50 of the Illinois
267 P. 641 (1928) ;Gill v. Selling, 126 Ore. 584, 270 P. 411, 58 A. L. R. 1556 (1928) ;
McShea v. McKenna, 95 Pa. Super. 338 (1930); Gonsalves v. Baptiste, 133 A.
(R. I.) 439 (1926); Mooney v. McCarthy, 107 Vt. 425, 181 A. 117 (1935); New
River and Pocahontas Consol. Coal Co. v. Eary, 115 W. Va. 46, 174 S.E. 573 (1934).
5317 Ill. App. 422, 46 N. E. (2d) 170 (1943), affirmed in .385 Ill. 559, 53 N. E.
(2d) 432 (1944). But see criticism thereof in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvimw
249.
6111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, §§ 199(2) and 216(3) (b).
7385 Ill. 559 at 565. 53 N. E. (2d) 432 at 435.
s See cases cited in note 3, ante.
9111. Civ. Prac. Act Anno. (Foundation Press, Chicago, 1933), p. 122.
loTricoli v. Centalanza, 100 N. J. Law 231, 126 A. 214 (1924) ; Walder v.
Manahan, 21 N. J. Misc. 1, 29 A. (2d) 395 (1942); Owens v. Cerullo, 9 N. J. Misc.
77Q, 155 A. 759 (1931). The English case of Greenlands, Ltd. v. Wilmshurst,
[1913] 3 K. B. 507, particularly p. 530, is especially applicable although it was
reversed on other grounds: [1916] 2 A. C. 15.
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act authorizes the use of separate verdicts and expressly indicates that
"more than one judgment may be rendered in the same cause,'"' it
would seem clear that such language is intended to be limited to cases
wherein the plaintiff is pursuing independent claims against several defendants but has joined them in one action for convenience of proof, in
which case the use of separate verdicts 12 and of separate judgments is as
much an aid to convenience as is the right to order a severance or a consolidation.'" Decisions from other jurisdictions with apparently contrary
holdings' 4 turn on the fact that in each of them certain of the joined
defendants were found to be subject to liability for punitive damages,
hence it was regarded as proper to take separate verdicts against them
for the purpose of ascertaining the amount of such additional penalty. 5
The pleadings in Shaw v. Courtney," and also in the instant case,
reveal that the plaintiff was not pursuing independent causes of action
which had been joined for convenience of proof, but rather had elected to
treat the liability of the defendants as joint. The instant case, therefore, has the effect of overrling the earlier decision and correcting an
oversight therein. It might not have done so had the plaintiff therein
elected to sue the defendants separately, for the wrongs committed were
not clearly joint ones and the plaintiff might have sued either even though
the negligence of the one sued would not have produced damage without
the concurrence of the act of the other. 17 When plaintiff did join both,
the jury was obliged, if it felt thai both defendants were equally guilty,
to render one joint verdict against them so as not to prevent the plaintiff
from having execution against both, or either, for the full amount of
the damages awarded. 8 Inasmuch as separate verdicts were given, the
error could have been avoided had the trial court refused to accept the
11ll. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 110, § 174(1).
12 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 192(2).
1 Ibid., Ch. 110, § 175.

14 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Roth, 130 Ky. 759, 114 S. W. 264 (1908) ; Edquest v.
Tripp & Dragstedt, 93 Mont. 446, 19 P. (2d) 637 (1933); Latasa v. Aron, 109
N. Y. S. 744 (1908); McCurdy v. Hughes, 63 N. D. 435, 248 N. W. 512 (1933);
Mauk v. Brundage. 68 Ohio St. 89, 67 N. E. 152 (1903) ; Johnson v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 142 S. C. 125, 140 S. E. 443 (1927) ; Waggoner v. Wyatt, 42 Tex.
Civ. App. 75, 94 S. W. 1076 (1906).
15 The rule in Illinois Is illustrated by Becker v. Dupree, 75 Ill. 167 (1874).
16 See note 5, ante. The cases there relied on all Involved the apportionment of
punitive damages and came from jurisdictions which either expressly permit or
require the use of separate verdicts in such situations: see note 14, ante.
7 Northern Trust Co. v. Palmer, 171 Ill. 383, 49 N. E. 553 (1898) ; Consolidated
See also Cooley,
Ice Machine Co. v. Kelfer, 134 Ill. 481, 25 N. E. 799 (1890).
Torts, 4th Ed., Vol. 1, § 81 et seq.
18 Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Likes, 225 Ill. 249, 80 N. E. 136 (1907).

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

same and instructed the jury as to the proper performance of its duty. 9
Since the error was not corrected in the trial court, the decision in the
instant case achieves a salutary result by removing the uncertainty created
by the earlier decision and by restoring a rule supported by six centuries
of unbroken authority.
C. J.

PRATT

19 Such was no longer possible, of course, after the jury had been allowed to
separate pursuant to the stipulation: Brownell Machinery Co. v. Walworth, 193
Ill. App. 23 (1915), abst. opinion; Wickizer-McClure Co. v. Bermingham & Seaman
Co., 151 Il1. App. 540 (1909).
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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION-MTOTION
DEMURRER-EFFECT

Room

OF PRESENCE

TO QUASH OR DISMISS, AND

OF UNAUTHORIZED

PERSONS IN

GRAND

Accusnp.-In
People v. Minet,' the Court of Appeals of New York had occasion to consider the problem of whether a district attorney may call two or more
witnesses before the grand jury at the same time. The defendant therein
had been indicted for the rape of one Camille Harris, a female under the
JURY

DURING

INVESTIGATION

OF

1296 N. Y. 315, 73 N. E. (2d) 529 (1947).
167

CHARGE

AGAINST
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age of eighteen years. It appeared that when the victim was subpoenaed
to.appear before the grand jury she informed the district attorney that
The district attorney, with the
she was "somewhat afraid or nervous."
approbation of the grand jury, allowed the girl's older sister to enter the
grand jury room with her and they were both sworn as witnesses and
both testified. The district attorney conceded, however, that the sister
After
had "nothing of probative value to add to the People's case."
indictment found, defendant moved to set the same aside on the statutory
ground that an unauthorized person had been permitted to be present
in the grand jury room while the charge embraced in the indictment was
under consideration. 2 The trial judge ruled that the motion had no merit
and the defendant was subsequently tried and convicted. He prosecuted
an appeal to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, urging
error in refusing to entertain his motion to dismiss the indictment. That
court, in affirming the ruling, held that unless the defendant could show
actual prejudice to his substantial rights a mere departure from the pro2
cedure prescribed by the statute would not render the indictment invalid.
On further appeal, the highest court in New York reversed the judgment
and dismissed the indictment, holding that the presence of two witnesses in
the grand jury room at the same time was error and that the decision
should not be made to depend on whether or not the defendant was
actually prejudiced thereby. The court also stated that if prejudice to
the defendant was to be a material determinant it was up to the legislature to so provide.
The question of who may be admitted to the grand jury room and
the effect of the presence of unauthorized persons there while the jury
is investigating the charge against the accused is one which, from early
common law days,' has been a subject of controversy. The cases all seem
to agree that, as a general proposition, no person except the grand jurors
5
should be present while the grand jury is deliberating or voting, but
there is a decided difference of opinion as to the effect of the presence
of unauthorized persons while the charge is merely being investigated.
It is at this point that the question of prejudice to the defendant and
2 N. Y. Code of Crim. Pro.. § 315, provides in part: "... . The indictment must be
set aside by the court in which the defendant is arraigned, and upon his motion,
in either of the following cases . . . (2) When a person has been permitted to be
present during the session of the grand jury, while the charge embraced in the
"
Indictment was under consideration ..
3 People v. Minet, 271 App. Div. 345, 66 N. Y. S. (2d) 391 (1946).
4 See, for example, a discussion thereof in Earl of Shaftesbury's Trial, 8 How.
St. Tr. 759 at 771 (1681).
5 Gitchell v. People, 146 Ill. 175, 33 N. E. 757 (1893) ; State v. Wetvel, 75 W. Va.
7, 83 S. E. 68, 7 Ann. Cas. 1918A 1074 (1914); People v. Tru-Sport Pub. Co., 160
Misc. 628, 291 N. Y. S. 449 (1936).
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his substantial rights becomes important. One group of decisions indicate
that the mere presence of an unauthorized person is sufficient to render
an indictment found under such circumstances invalid.6 On the other
hand, it has also been held by an equally substantial number of courts,
including those of Illinois,7 that the presence of an unauthorized person
in the grand jury room during the investigatory stage is insufficient to
vitiate an indictment unless the accused can show that he was thereby
prejudiced." Upon such showing, of course, the indictment will be, and
6 Presence of the persons hereinafter indicated was sufficient to vitiate the indictments returned in United States v. Amazon Industrial Chemical Corp., 55 F.
(2d) 254 (1931); United States v. Heinze, 177 F. 770 (1910), expert accountant;
United States v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 163 F. 66 (1908), special assistant
to Attorney General; United States v. Rosenthal, 121 F. 862 (1903), same; United
States v. Edgerton, 80 F. 374 (1897), witness; United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 F.
765 (1883), examiner from Department of Justice; Husband v. Superior Court,
128 Cal. App. 444, 17 P. (2d) 764 (1933), auditor; People v. Brown, 81 Cal. App.
226, 253 P. 735 (1927) ; Hicks v. State, 97 Fla. 199, 120 So. 330 (1929), privately
retained counsel; Commonwealth v. Berry, 29 Ky. L. R. 234, 92 S. W. 936 (1906),
stenographer; Coblentz v. State, 164 Md. 558, 166 A. 45, 88 A. L. R. 886 (1933),
attorney who represented prosecuting witness in a civil case; In re Lebowitch,
235 Mass. 357, 126 N. E. 831 (1920), all witnesses present at same time; Commonwealth v. Harris, 231 Mass. 584, 121 N. E. 409 (1919), police officers and others;
State v. Bowman, 90 Me. 363, 38 A. 331, 60 Am. St. Rep. 266 (1897), stenographer;
State v. Ernster, 147 Minn. 81, 179 N. W. 640 (1920), committee from a former
grand jury; State v. Slocum, 111 Minn. 328, 126 N. W. 1096 (1919), attorney of
grand jury's choice; State v. Salmon, 216 Mo. 466, 115 S. W. 1106 (1909), stenographer and witness; State v. Johnson, 55 N. D. 437, 214 N. W. 39 (1927), assistant prosecutor; People v. Dorsey, 176 Misc. 932, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 637 (1941),
attorney general; People v. Tru-Sport Pub. Co., 160 Misc. 628, 291 N. Y. S. 449
(1936), same; Viers v. State, 10 Okla. Cr. 28, 134 P. 80 (1913), special assistant
county attorney; Hartgraves v. State, 5 Okla. Cr. 266, 114 P. 343, 33 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 568, Ann. Cas. 1912D 180 (1911), privately employed counsel conducting
examination; State v. Maben, 5 Okla. Cr. 581, 114 P. 1122 (1911), special counsel
for governor; Meyers v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 108 Utah 32, 156 P. (2d)
711 (1945) ; State v. Heaton, 21 Wash. 59, 56 P. 843 (1899), special counsel.
7People v. Hartenbower, 208 I1. App. 465 (1917), affirmed in 283 Il. 591. 119
N. E. 605 (1918), error dis. 248 U. S. 550, 39 S. Ct. 183, 63 L. Ed. 417 (1919);
People v. Munson, 319 Ill. 596, 150 N. E. 280 (1926) ; People v. Arnold, 248 11.
169, 93 N. E. 786 (1911) ; People v. Strauch, 153 Ill. App. 544 (1910), affirmed
In 247 Ill. 220, 93 N. E. 126 (1910) ; People v. Wiggins, 231 11. App. 467 (1923).
8 Presence of the persons hereinafter indicated was insufficient in Jones v. State,
150 Ala. 54, 43 So. 179 (1907), attorney present at request of judge; Kinnebrew v.
State, 132 Ala. 8, 31 So. 567 (1902), attorney under Invalid appointment; Richards
v. State, 108 Ark. 87, 157 S. W. 141, Ann. Cas. 1915B 231 (1913), stenographer;
Tiner v. State, 109 Ark. 138, 158 S. W. 1087 (1913), privately employed counsel;
Bennet v. State, 62 Ark. 516, 36 S. W. 947 (1896), substitute attorney for prosecutor; State v. Bates, 148 Ind. 610, 48 N. E. 2 (1897). stenographer; Courtney v.
State, 5 Ind. App. 356, 32 N. E. 335 (1892), stenographer; State v. Tyler, 122
Iowa 125. 97 N. W. 983 (1904). attorney; State v. Wood, 112 Iowa 484, 84 N. W.
503 (1900), father of witness; State v. Louviere, 165 La. 718, 115 So. 914 (1928),
stenographer; LeBarron v. State, 107 Miss. 663, 65 So. 648 (1914), two prosecuting
attorneys; State v. Bacon, 77 Miss. 366, 27 So. 563 (1900), mere strangers; State
v. Brewer, 180 N. C. 716, 104 S. E. 655 (1920), witness who was member of the
grand jury; State v. Bolitho, 103 N. J. Law 246, 136 A. 164 (1927), affirmed in
104 N. J. Law 446, 146 A. 927 (1927), interpreter; State v. Justus, 11 Ore. 178. 8
P. 337 (1883); Commonwealth v. Brownmiller, 141 Pa. Super. 107 14 A. (2) 807
(1940), special assistant district attorney and stenographer; Sadler v. State, 124
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ought to be quashed.'
The problem is also somewhat complicated where statutes exist forbidding the presence of unauthorized persons in the grand jury room
when a charge is "under consideration." The court in the instant case
interpreted that term to include the period of the taking of the testimony
as well as later stages of grand jury procedure.'0 In contrast, a somewhat similar Texas statute was construed in Johnson v. State" to be
limited to the act of discussing reasons for and against the finding of
an indictment rather than to the mere examination of witnesses. As
"consideration" and "deliberation"
are synonymous terms, it would
seem that the Texas interpretation is the more reasonable one. Inasmuch
as the "secrecy of proceedings by the grand jury is for the benefit of
the state and not of the defendant, '12 it is difficult to see why the
defendant should be allowed to complain of a mere technical violation
of secrecy in any but the deliberative stages unless he can show that he
was in some way prejudiced by such violation.
While Illinois and a number of jurisdictions which require proof
of prejudice do not have statutes like the one interpreted in the instant
case, it would seem that, even where such statutes exist, courts could
arrive at the same conclusion by a less dogmatic approach so as to
require more than a mere technical violation to render an indictment
invalid. Relief has been denied elsewhere, in cases very similar to the
instant one, where no statute exists and the defendant cannot show actual
prejudice. In People v. Arnold,1 3 for example, the defendant was accused
of rape. The prosecuting witness, aged 15, was somewhat timid and her
father was allowed to be present in the grand jury room while the girl
identified some clothing. The Illinois court, while recognizing the rule
that one witness should never be permitted to be present in the grand
Tenn. 50, 136 S. W. 430, 25 Ann. Cas. 1912D 976 (1911), grand jury officer; Johnson v. State. 131 Tex. Cr. 23, 95 S. W. (2d) 697 (1936) ; Tinker v. State, 95 Tex. Cr.
143, 253 S.W. 531 (1923), sheriff; Porter v. State, 72 Tex. Cr. 71, 160 S.W. 1194
(1913), bailiff acting as stenographer; State v. Brewster, 70 Vt. 341, 40 A. 1037,
42 L. R. A. 444 (1898), stenographer.
9 Prejudice was found in State v. Bower, 191 Iowa 713, 183 N. W. 322 (1911),
more than one witness; State v. Will, 97 Iowa 58, 65 N. W. 1010 (1896), judge
present; Sanders v. State, 198 Miss. 587, 22 So. (2d) 500 (1945), judge present;
Ierrington v. State, 98 Miss. 410, 53 So. 783 (1911), sheriff.
1o That interpretation had also been attained in People v. Tru-Sport Pub. Co.,
160 Misc. 628, 291 N. Y. S.449 (1936), where the court said "under consideration"
referred to the entire grand jury proceeding so as to include the period in which
evidence was received as well as other parts of the transaction of business.
11 131 Tex. Cr. 23, 95 S. W. (2d) 697 (1936).
12 State v. Wood, 112 Iowa 484 at 485, 84 N. W. 503 (1900).
1 248 Ill. 169, 93 N. E. 786 (1911).
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jury room during the examination of another, found that there was
practically no examination of the witnesses in the presence of each other
and, absent any showing of prejudice, refused to quash the indictment.
Similarly, in State v. Wood,'14 where the defendant was held for perjury,
the father of the prosecuting witness, she being "nervous and fearful,"
was allowed to accompany her into the grand jury room while she
testified. Only the girl testified but both father and daughter were
sworn as witnesses. The Iowa Supreme Court there concerned, upholding the indictment, declared that "the presence of one who was required
to go before the grand jury as a witness, while another was giving
testimony, is not sufficient ground for setting aside the indictment, where
no other showing of prejudice to defendant is made."' 15
It must be acknowledged that the holding in the instant case is
correct in the light of the two assumptions made by the New York court,
to-wit: (1) that the mere presence of unauthorized persons is deadly
error, and (2) that such rule applies to any stage of grand jury
procedure, but there is good reason to believe that such assumptions
were neither necessary nor reasonable, so the ultimate outcome of the
case is not to be commended.
J. W. PUGH
INSURANCF--PAYMENT
OR NOT

TION-WHETHER

OR DISCHARGE, CONTRIBUTION, AND
INSURER MAY RJICOVER AMOUNTS

INSURED WHEN SUBROGATION

SUBROGAPAID TO

HAS BEEN PREVENTED BY GENERAL RELEASE

a set of facts novel to this state, the
Appellate Court of Illinois for the First District has clarified the
insurer's right of subrogation by its decision in the recent case of Inter
Insurance Exchange of the Chicago Motor Club v. Andersen." In that
case, a car driven by the insured, one Andersen, was involved in a collision with a car driven by one Kuntz, in which accident Andersen
suffered both personal injury and damage to his automobile. Andersen
carried collision insurance with plaintiff, so he submitted an estimate of
the damage and plaintiff paid him the estimated amount less an amount
deductible under the policy. Kuntz, in the meantime had been arrested
for reckless driving. At a hearing on this charge, the judge recommended
that Kuntz settle with Andersen and this was done, Andersen signing
GWEN TO ToRT-FEAsoR-Under

14112 Iowa 484, 84 N. W. 503 (1900).

15 112 Iowa 484 at 486, 84 N. W. 503 at 504.
1331 Ill. App. 250, 73 N. E. (2d) 12 (1947). The court distinguished the instant
case from C. B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Emmons, 42 Ill. App. 138 (1891), by pointing
out that the issues were not identical.
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a release prepared by Kuntz's attorney. Andersen's insurer was aware
of the fact that he had collected in this manner, but was not aware of
the release. Kuntz, on the other hand, knew that the insurer had already
settled with Andersen for the property damage claim. The insurer thereafter instituted subrogation proceedings in Andersen's name but was
met by the defense of the release given as aforesaid. The insurer then
moved that it be substituted as plaintiff in the suit and that Andersen be
made an additional party defendant. Upon such amendment, the court
rendered judgment against both defendants for the amount paid on the
policy. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed as to Andersen but
reversed as to Kuntz. That conclusion was reached on the basis that,
in a case such as this, the insured rather than a stranger to the insurance
contract must be conscious of the duties arising out of his relationship
with the insurer and must, therefore, bear the onus of protecting the
rights of such insurer.2
In arriving at its decision that the release barred the insurer's right
of recovery against the wrongdoer the court adopted the reasoning of
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case of Illinois Automobile
Insurance Exchange v. Braun.3 That ruling is, however, definitely a
minority view for the general rule might be stated to be that if a
release is procured from the insured by the wrongdoer with the knowledge
that the insurer had already made a settlement with the insured, such
release is no bar to an action by the subrogee-insurer against the wrongdoer. 4 That rule applies with special force, as here, where the tort-feasor
has settled with the insured for less than the total amount of the loss.5
Some of the decisions supporting the majority view are based upon the
limited intent of the insured in giving the release,6 others on the doctrine
2 It might be noted that any recovery by way of subrogation represents an unexpected windfall to the insurer for premiums are usually calculated on an indemnity basis. If subrogation returns enter indirectly into the computation of
premium rates, they constitute a relatively inconsequential factor and are not
specifically included by name among the many factors considered. See Huebner,
Property Insurance, pp. 332-9.
3280 Pa. St. 550, 124 A. 691, 36 A. L. R. 1262 (1924).
4 James v. Emmco Ins. Co., 71 Ga. App. 196, 30 S. E. (2d) 361 (1944) ; American
Automobile Fire Ins. Co. v. Speiker, 97 Ind. App. 533, 187 N. E. 355 (1933) ; City
of New York Ins. Co. v. Tice, 159 Kan. 176, 152 P. (2d) 836, 157 A. L. R. 1233
(1944) ; Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Klomparens, 273 Mich. 493, 263 N. W. 724 (1935);
Powell & Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171 N. C. 290, 88 S. E. 426 (1916) ; Camden
Fire Ins. Ass'n. v. Prezioso. 93 N. J. Eq. 318, 116 A. 694 (19292); Hamilton Fire
Ins. Co. v. Greger, 246 N. Y. 162, 158 N. E. 60, 55 A. L. R. 921 (1927). See also
Joyce, The Law of Insurance, 2d Ed., Vol. 5, § 3544, p. 5888; Vance, Insurance,
§ 175; Richards, The Law of Insurance, 4th Ed. § 57, p. 87.
5 Fire Association v. Wells, 84 N. J. Eq. 484, 94 A. 619 (1915).
6 The insured in the instant case also attempted to prove that he intended only
a limited release, but the court found that the release was general and contained
no ambiguity, hence testimony tending to change its tenor was inadmissible under
the parol evidence rule.
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that divisible causes of action were involved,7 but some go to the length
of holding that the insured is without power to defeat the rights of the
insurer or insist that any such release is a fraud on the insurer's rights,
hence void. If, on the other hand, the tort-feasor obtains a full release
from the insured without notice of the insurer's claim to subrogation,
the insurer's claim is effectively barred."
The other aspect of the decision in the instant case required the
insured to return to the insurer the entire amount paid by it. Again the
court followed the Pennsylvania decision already referred to but which
expresses a minority view on this point also. Courts which require
reimbursement of the insurer generally limit the recovery against the
insured to an amount by which the sum received from the wrongdoer
plus that paid under the insurance policy exceeds the loss and the
Decisions
expenses incurred by the insured in realizing on the claim.'
of that character appear to be based upon the reasoning that the doctrine
of subrogation is founded on the principle that no one should be paid
twice for the same loss but that, as a necessary corollary, the insured
should be permitted to retain both the insurance money and the sums
recovered from the wrongdoer until he has been paid in full.
If that reasoning were applied to the instant case, and accepting
the insured's contention that the amounts received by him from whatever
source reimbursed him only for the actual property damage and personal
injuries sustained, it will be seen that he was not being unjustly enriched.
But those courts which allow the insured to retain all amounts received
up to the point where he has recovered only the amount of his loss plus
expenses also generally hold that the release given by the insured to the
tort-feasor is no bar to the subrogation claim. That fact has undoubtedly
influenced the tenor of the decisions on this point for those courts which
treat a release given by the insured to the tort-feasor as a bar to the
insurer's right to subrogation would logically hold that, in such cases,
7 A note on the severability of a cause
LAW REVIEw 183.
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8 Kidd v. Hillman, 14 Cal. App. (2d) 507, 58 P. (2d) 662 (1936) ; American Auto
Of course, if the insured
Ins. Co. v. Clark, 122 Kan. 445, 252 P. 215 (1927).
releases the tort-feasor before collecting under the policy, liability thereon is
destroyed: Farmer v. Union Ins. Co., 146 Miss. 600. 111 So. 584 (1927) ; Highlands v. Cumberland Valley Farmers' Mut. Ins. Co., 203 Pa. 134, 52 A. 130 (1902).
9 American Automobile Fire Ins. Co. v. Speiker, 97 Ind. App. 533, 187 N. E. 355
(1933) ; Shawnee Fire Ins. Co. v. Cosgrove, 85 Kan. 296, 116 P. 819 (1911)
Washtenaw Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Budd, 208 Mich. 483, 175 N. W. 231 (1919);
Camden Fire Ass'n. v. Prezioso, 93 N. J. Eq. 318, 116 A. 694 (1922) ; Hamilton
. 60, 55 A. L. R. 921 (1927);
Fire Ins. Co. v. Greger, 246 N. Y. 162,'158 N.
Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n. v. Missouri K. & T. R. Co., 175 S. W. 816 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1915). See also annotations in 36 A. L. R. 1268, 55 A. L. R. 926 and 140
A. L. R. 1246.
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the insurer may receive reimbursement from the insured. In either
event, the rights of the insurer are protected. Moreover, the cases
indicate a strong tendency to put the burden on the insured to show that
the amount received from the tort-feasor represents the satisfaction of
the uninsured claim, rather than the insured one. In the absence of
proof so showing, the recovery will be presumed to include the full
amount of the insured demand so the insurer may recover the full
amount paid on the policy.' 0 While it may be said that courts are not
in agreement on the exact nature of the insurer's right to subrogation,"
it is only when the insurer has waived its right that it will be denied
recovery from either the insured or the tort-feasor."
The Illinois court has determined that, as between the insured and
the tort-feasor, the entire burden of protecting the insurer's right of
subrogation rests with the insured. Such a doctrine, while perhaps
logical and certain, is not without possible injustice for it compels the
insured, who may have acted innocently but imprudently, to bear virtually all the loss while permitting the person responsible for the entire
damage to escape the material consequences of his fault. Unless the
rule is changed, an insured person who hereafter deals with the tortfeasor without the acquiescence of his insurer must remember that he
does so at his peril.
E. B. STROH
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BECOMES A TENANT FROM MONTH TO MONTH OR YEAR TO YEAR-The
Appellate Court of Illinois for the First District, in the recent case of
Heun v. Hanson,' had occasion to consider whether holding over upon
expiration of a term for less than one year would create a month-tomonth tenancy or would amount to a renewal for a like fractional period.
The suit was one to recover possession of an apartment occupied by the

defendant which had been leased to him for an eleven-month term to
expire on April 1st. Defendant remained in possession after the lease
1o Hayward v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 212 Minn. 500, 4 N. W. (2d)
316, 140 A. L. IR. 1236 (1942) ; Manley v. Montgomery Bus Co., 82 Pa. Super. 530
(1924).
11 A thorough analysis and criticism of the doctrine of subrogation in insurance
law may be found In Langmaid, "Some Recent Subrogation Problems in the
Law of Suretyship and Insurance," 47 Harv. L. Rev. 976, particularly p. 987.
12 Weaver v. N. J. Fidelity & Plate Glass Co., 56 Colo. 112, 136 P. 1180 (1913)
Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 181 Ga. 621, 183 S. E. 799 (1936) ; Leonard
v. Bottomley, 210 Wis. 411, 245 N. W. 849 (1933).
1331 Ill. App. 82, 72 N. E. (2d) 703 (1947).
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expired, paying the stipulated rental for the ensuing months until the
2
action was brought. Plaintiff, having secured federal authorization,
served statutory notice terminating the tenancy as of July 31st and
thereafter filed an action in forcible entry and detainer. Consistent with
current nisi prius doctrines, the trial court granted plaintiff a judgment
for possession on the theory that, because the tenancy provided for in
the original lease was for less than one year, the holding over after
termination constituted a month-to-month tenancy. That decision, on
appeal taken by the tenant, was reversed upon the ground that common
law doctrines on the subject had not been changed in this state so that
the holding over renewed the term for a like period of eleven months.
For answer to the problem, the court reached back to the earliest
reported Illinois case on the subject, that of Prickett v. Ritter.' Like
the case at hand, that case involved the character of a holdover term
with the landlord seeking to oust the tenant. The original tenancy there
involved, however, had been for one month. After a careful review of
the English and American authorities, the court in that case affirmed
the common law rule that where a tenant remains in possession after
expiration of the term, the landlord may elect to hold him for a like
period upon similar terms as the original lease.4 Although the original
lease was for one month, and consequently a month-to-month tenancy
arose by the holding over, the court did indicate that where the lease
is for any period less than a year the holding over would be construed
so as to create another term of the same length of time and upon the
same terms, both as to the amount of rent and the time of payment,
5
unless there was some act of either party to rebut such an implication.
6
That doctrine was reiterated in Clapp v. Noble, an action for rent upon
holding over after a term of one month, and has been honored at least
by repetition, although the more recent cases have involved year-to-year
tenancies. 7 The instant case is, therefore, the first which has specifically
dealt with the precise problem.
2See 50 U. S. C. A., app. § 901 et seq.

3 16 Ill. 96 (1854).
4 In general, see Tiffany, The Law of Real Property, 3d Ed., § 178.
Modern
English and Canadian developments are traced in Johnson, "Note on Overholding
Tenants," 24 Can. Bar Rev. 508 (1946).
5 See 16 Ill. 96 at 97.
684 Ill. 62 (1876).
7 In Clinton Wire Cloth Co. v. Gardner, 99 Ill. 151 (1881), the holding over there
concerned was after a five-year term so expressions as to less-than-year tenancies
are dicta. See also Weber v. Powers, 213 Ill. 370. 72 N. E. 1070 (1905), and Fredman v. Sutliff & Case Co., 330 Ill. App. 119, 70 N. E. (2d) 222 (1946). A similar
result to that in the instant case, on an eleven-month lease, was reached in
Smith v. Holt, 193 S. W. (2d) (Tenn. App.) 100 (1945), where the court said:
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Certain basic principles, common to all holdover tenancies, arc
important. "The old, or written, lease is not the contract of the parties
for the new term but is only evidence to establish the nature of the
implied contract resulting from the holding over of the tenant." 8 The
right of election, if the tenant remains in possession upon expiration of
the term, is solely the right of the landlord. 9 The tenant having held
over, his contrary intent to remain under different terms cannot rebut
the legal presumption, but that of the landlord can. 10 Power of attorney
in the original lease to confess judgment for rent due cannot be extended
for use during the holdover term.1 For that matter, an option given
therein to the tenant to extend the term for several different periods
will be deemed exercised, by the holding over, for the shortest period
possible.

12

The theory upon which the plaintiff based his case represents a
confusion of these basic principles and seems to stem from a minority
view which measures the renewal term by the rental period. 13 That
idea is expressed in the Illinois Appellate Court decision in Schiling v.
Klein,14 although that case seems clearly distinguishable from the general
rule on a factual basis. 15 The court there indicated that, as negotiations
for a new lease were inconsistent with an election to treat the tenant as
holding over on the old terms, his continued payment of rental on a
monthly basis created a tenancy from month to month. Much the same
rationale was followed in Stillo v. Pellettieri6 where the landlord served
notice to terminate upon a tenant under a yearly lease but the latter
held over and paid the same monthly rental. Again, in Sherriff v.
"In such cases of holding over, if the original tenancy was for a year or more,
the new or holdover tenancy is from year to year; if the original term was for less
than a year, as a month or a quarter, the new tenancy is presumably a periodic
tenancy measured by such a period."
8 See Weber v. Powers, 213 Ill. 370 at 381, 72 N. E. 1070 at 1073 (1905).
9 Keegan v. Kinnare, 123 Ill. 280, 14 N. E. 14 (1887).
10 Clinton Wire Cloth Co. v. Gardner, 99 Ill. 151 (1881).
11 Weber v. Powers, 213 Ill. 370, 72 N. E. 1070 (1905).
12 Anderson v. Dodsworth, 292 Ill. 335, 127 N. E. 43 (1920).
is In Elkins NatI. Bank v. Nefflen, 118 W. Va. 29 at 31, 188 S. E. 750 at 751
(1936), the court stated: "The controlling element In determining this question Is
the nature of the rent reserved or paid." See also annotation to this case in 108
A. L. R. 1464, listing decisions for California and Michigan.
1441 Ill. App. 209 (1891).
15 Prior to the expiration of a three-year term. the landlord and tenant commenced negotiations for a new lease which never did ripen Into an agreement. but
the tenant remained in possession and paid at the old monthly rate for some fifteen
additional months.
16 173 Ill. App. 104 (1912).
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Kromer, 7 where the landlord sued for rent after a claimed abandonment
of the premises, the original lease being for four months, the court
refused to follow the general rule because the landlord had definitely
stated the terms upon which he would permit the tenant to remain;
terms which were different from the original lease. These cases do not
contradict the holding in the instant case for they regard the landlord's
intention as being a controlling factor, 8 the election being solely his.
They may, however, easily mislead the unwary into believing that all
holdover tenancies for periods of less than a year become tenancies from
month to month. In reality, they become such because of a rebuttal of
the normal general presumption that the holding over is upon the terms
and for the duration of the original demise.' 9
W. 0. KROHN
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North Carolina

HAS

AFFIXED

TO

TERMINATED

Supreme

Court

issued a sharp commentary, in the case of Haywood v. Briggs,' on the
danger of erecting valuable improvements on land held under lease from
a life tenant. The facts there revealed that the intervenors leased two
adjoining lots from a life tenant and erected thereon two tobacco auction
warehouses covered by a single roof. These structures rested on concrete
foundations, were partly floored in concrete, and covered half a city
block. Recognizing the possible infirmities of their title, the intervenors,
as lessees, had required the life tenant to supply penal bonds approximating the value of the warehouses and conditioned upon the failure of
their estate by operation of law or through the death of the life tenant.
The lease provided, inter alia, that all improvements and fixtures placed
on the premises by the lessees should remain their property. It also
purported to grant the right of removal thereof within a reasonable time
after the termination of the lease whether that event occurred by
expiration of time or by act of law. For twenty years, under successive
232 Ill. App. 589, 149 N. E. 14 (1924).
is See Street R. R. Co. v. Morrison etc. Co., 160 Ill. 288, 43 N. E. 393 (1896),
where mere verbal notice by an agent of the landlord was regarded as sufficient
to rebut the presumption of holding over under like terms for a like period.
17

19 The notice given in the instant case was obviously deficient for, while in proper
form, it did not comply with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Cb. 80, § 6, in that it was not given
at the proper time with reference to the expiration of the holdover term. See
Weber v. Powers, 213 Ill. 370, 72 N. E. 1070 (1905); Ball v. Peck, 43 Ill. 482
(1867) ; Kaylor v. Smith, 229 Ill. App. 140 (1923).
1 227 N. C. 108, 41 S. E. (2d) 289 (1947).
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leases with the life tenant, the lessees enjoyed exclusive possession. At
no time did the remaindermen join with the life tenant in the leases.
On the death of the life tenant and while the lessees were still occupying
the premises an action was instituted by certain of the remaindermen for
partition of the property. The lessees, over objection, were permitted
to intervene in this proceeding and they filed pleadings alleging they
possessed the right to remove the two tobacco warehouses and other
fixtures. They sought permission from the court to remove the buildings
and the trial court granted that relief. On appeal by the remaindermen,
it was held that it was error to grant such permission inasmuch as the
lessees had lost all rights in the structures upon the death of the life
tenant, which fact had nullified the lease and all rights resting thereon.
The intervenors admitted the lack of privity between themselves and
the remaindermen, but based their claim upon general principles of law
relating to trade fixtures. They contended that, under the circumstances
of the case, the buildings erected by them came within the definition of
trade fixtures and, independent of any express agreement, the structures
were stamped with the character of personal property so were removable
at the lessees' option.' It was not denied that if the buildings were
trade fixtures the intervenors could remove them, if such removal could
be accomplished without injury to the freehold,' but this was clearly
not such a case for the structures were large, were based on deep concrete
footings, were still in active use twenty years after building, and possessed
an indefinite future useful life. Clearly, then, unless the buildings could
be considered as personalty between the parties, the structures would
4
ordinarily be regarded as permanent accessions to the freehold.
But the intervenors further argued that, irrespective of contract and
aside from whether or not the improvements were trade fixtures, they
were entitled to a reasonable period of time after the death of the life
tenant to surrender possession and to remove the buildings. In support
of this position they relied on the Iowa decision in Ray v. Young.5 In
that case, after citing the acknowledged majority rule that upon the
death of the life tenant the title to real property passes by operation
of law to the remaindermen unaffected by any leases or agreement the
2Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U. S. (2 Pet.) 137, 7 L. Ed. 374 (1829).
3 Olympia Lodge v. Keller, 142 Wash. 93, 252 P. 121, 52 A. L. R. 795 (1927);
Pennington v. Black, 261 Ky. 728, 88 S. W. (2d) 969 (1935); Schultz v. Seller
Motor Car Co., 243 Ky. 459, 48 S. W. (2d) 1068 (1932) ; Davidson v. Crump Mfg.
Co., 99 Mich. 501, 58 N. W. 475 (1894).
4 Belvin v. Raleigh Paper Co., 123 N. C. 138, 31 S. E. 655 (1898).
5 160 Iowa 613, 142 N. W. 393, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 947, Ann. Cas. 1915D 258
(1913).
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life tenant may have made in respect thereto,' the court nevertheless
said it was "disposed to follow the more equitable rule which allows the
lessee of a tenant for life a reasonable time after the death of his lessor
to surrender his possession and remove his property."'
A careful search of the decisions, however, reveals that the Iowa
holding stands alone in opposition to the substantial weight of authority
country-wide to the contrary.' The ruling therein would be understandable were it supported either by respectable authority or clear legalistic
reasoning, but this is not the case. The rule advanced is documented
to decisions which totally fail to support the position urged, 9 except for
some questionable dicta in the Ohio case of Haflick v. Stober,10 and
argues for some sort of equitable procedure in such situations to ameliorate what has been designated to be the "absolute legal right of
remaindermen."'
That argument has, however, been ignored in the
6 For a general discussion of these principles, see 36 C. J. S., Fixtures, § 31, p.
967; 22 Am. Jur., Fixtures, § 61; 6 A. L. R. 1506, and 2 Ann. Cas. 406.
7 160 Iowa 613 at 624, 142 N. W. 393 at 398.
The court referred to Stewart v.
Matheny, 66 Miss. 21, 5 So. 387, 14 Am. St. Rep. 538 (1889), and to Jones v.
Shufflin, 45 W. Va. 729, 31 S. E. 975, 72 Am. St. Rep. 848 (1898). Those cases,
however, advance the majority rule. The court also said: "The rule that 'the right
of a tenant for life to remove a trade fixture is not necessarily lost by the expiration of the term by the death of the life tenant, but he has a reasonable time
after the death of the life tenant to surrender possession and remove the fixtures,'
is supported by many cases." See 160 Iowa 613 at 622, 142 N. W. 393 at 397. A
careful review of the cited authorities, however, reveals that they concern themselves only with such improvements as would clearly constitute fixtures at law.
None of the cases support the position of the Iowa court in holding that a garage
and repair shop was a trade fixture solely because it was agreed to constitute
personalty as between the parties. The Iowa court correctly quoted the rule but
erred in concluding that it supported their decision on the facts presented by the
case.
8 No other case supporting the minority rule has been cited by secondary authorities either. See Tiffany, Real Property, 3d Ed., p. 247; 22 Am. Jur., Fixtures, § 61;
36 C. J. S., Fixtures, § 31; and annotations in 109 A. L. R. 1425, 6 A. L. R. 1515,
46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 947, 2 Ann. Cas. 406.
9 The general rule, set out by these cases, is that where fixtures are of such a
character that, in the absence of any contract on the subject, they would constitute
a permanent accession to the estate, a tenant for life cannot, by contract, so far
bind the remainderman as to authorize their removal by his lessee after termination
of the life estate. See Demby v. Parse, 53 Ark. 526, 14 S. W. 899 (1890) ; Raflick v.
Stober, 11 Ohio St. 482 (1860) ; White v. Arndt, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 91 (1836) ; Jones
v. Shuffiin, 45 W. Va. 729, 31 S. E. 975 (1898).
1o 11 Ohio St. 482 (1860). The court intimated that fixtures which the tenant is,
during the tenancy, entitled to remove as a matter of legal right without reference
to any contract on the subject, may be removed after the termination of the
tenancy by the death of the life tenant lessor. See 11 Ohio St. 482 at 485. It rejected this theory, however, as applied to improvements in the nature of permanent
accessions to the freehold, on the authority of White v. Arndt, 1 Whart. (Pa.) 91
(1836). The case is cited generally as supporting the majority rule.
11 Ray v. Young, 160 Iowa 613 at 616, 142 N. W. 393 at 394.
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state that suggested it 2 and has never been cited as a precedent until
the instant case where its doubtful authority was rejected.
There is no doubt that the life tenant and the lessees could agree
among themselves to treat the warehouses as personalty, but their private
agreement could not change the character of the property as far as the
remaindermen were concerned. 13 If a tenant for life of land makes a
lease for years and dies, the term for years is regarded as so utterly void
as not even to be capable of confirmation by the remaindermen. 1 While
fixtures and other personal property of the lessees of the life tenant not
annexed to the realty would not pass by operation of law to the remaindermen upon the termination of the preceding estate,' 5 the same result
does not obtain in respect to permanent accessions to the freehold.' 6
The lessee who contemplates such permanent improvements, then, must
face the risk of loss thereof in case the structures remain on the land
at the moment when the right of possession is destroyed by the death
of the life tenant or may expose himself to suit for injury to the reversion
if he removes them during the term and after the remainderman has
acquired rights therein by reason of the attachment to the freehold.
His only protection, if it may be called such, is to procure a bond like
17
that exacted in the instant case.
C. J. PRATT

MASTER AND SERVANT-SERVICES AND COMPENSATION-WHETHER OR
NOT EMPLOYEE IS ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFITS
FROM TERMINATION OF STRIKE TO TIME WHEN RECALLED TO WORK-The
12 See Saunders v. Sutlire Bros., 187 Iowa 300, 174 N. W. 267, 6 A. L. R. 1503
(1919), and Armstrong v. Rodemacher, 199 Iowa 928, 203 N. W. 23 (1925). See also
note in 20 Iowa L. Rev. 849.
13 Dobscheutz v. Holliday, 82 Il1. 371 (1876), cited with approval in United States
v. 19.86 Acres of Land, 141 F. (2d) 344 (1944). See also Horn v. Clark Hardware
Co., 54 Colo. 522, 131 P. 405 (1913) ; Bingaman v. Dahm, 307 Ill. App. 432, 30 N. E.
(2d) 509 (1940); Ottumwa Iron Works v. Muir, 126 Mo. App. 582, 105 S. W. 29
(1907) ; Crosby v. Wolbben, 149 App. Div. 337, 134 N. Y. S. 328 (1912).
14 Bogle v. North Carolina R. Co., 51 N. C. 419 (1859).
15 Van Ness v. Pacard, 27 U. S. (2 Pet.) 137, 7 L. Ed. 374 (1829).
16 Brown v. Ward, 221 N. C. 344, 20 S. E. (2d) 324 (1942), quoted with approval
in Pitt v. Speight, 222 N. C. 585, 24 S. E. (2d) 350 (1943).
17 The bond was so worded as to provide for a decreasing penalty, year by year,
as the structures depreciated in value. It was obviously drafted by persons cognizant
of the nature of the risk. Any inference that the North Carolina court, in the
instant case, would have been inclined to follow the doubtful ruling in Ray v.
Young, 160 Iowa 613, 142 N. W. 393 (1913), had the full force of the loss fallen on
the hapless intervenors is refuted by the fact that the court, from its language,
seemed to consider the presence or absence of such a bond worthy of no more than
passing comment.
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recent Maryland case of Saunders v. Maryland Unemployment Compensation Board' involved the right of an employee of a certain steel
company who had participated in a general strike against the employer
to unemployment compensation benefits from the time of the termination
of the strike up until he was called back to work, the interim period
being necessary to make his department ready for resumption of
operations. The unemployment compensation board denied benefits and
its action was approved by the nisi prius court. Upon appeal, claimant
contended that the statutory provision disqualifying an individual for
benefits during any stoppage of work caused by a labor dispute2 should
be interpreted as being limited to the actual period of the strike3 and
that, since no strike existed for the period for which he was claiming
benefits, he was not ineligible to receive the same. The judgment was,
however, affirmed when the court held that a work stoppage might well
continue after the labor dispute was ended but any loss of employment
attributable thereto was caused by the strike which had preceded it.
Only one other case can be found bearing directly on the point and
it was decided only a little more than a month prior to the case in
question. In the Indiana case of Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation v.
Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division,4 the same result
was reached but through a somewhat slightly different approach. The
facts were substantially the same and the problem grew up under a
similar "stoppage of work" provision but the claimants based their
contention upon the fact that the statutory disqualification from benefits
was followed by the words "Provided that this subsection shall not
apply if it is shown to the satisfaction of the board that: . . . He is;

not participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor
dispute which caused the stoppage of work .

.

...
"5

It

was argued

that, as the statute was couched in the present tense, it would have to
be read as if it said "he is not or was not participating" in order to
1- Md.-,53 A. (2d) 579 (1947).
2 Md. Code Ann. 1939, Vol. 2, Art. 95A, § 5(d), forbids the payment of benefits
"for any week with respect to which the Board finds that his unemployment is due
to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory,
establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed ...."
3The term "stoppage of work" has been considered to be synonymous with
"strike" in Walgreen Co. v. Murphy, 386 Ill.
32, 53 N. E. (2d) 390 (1944) ; Board
of Review v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation, 193 Okla. 36, 141 P. (2d) 69
(1943). But see contra: Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. Review Board, - Ind. App.
-, 72 N. E. (2d) 662 (1947); Lawrence Baking Co. v. Mich. Unemployment C.
Comm., 308 Mich. 198, 13 N. W. (2d) 260 (1944) ; Umpire's Dec. No. 4665 (England,
1926).
4Ind. App. -, 72 N. E. (2d) 662 (1947).
5See Burns' Ind. Ann. Stat. 1933, Vol. 10, 1945 Supp., § 52-1507(f) (3).
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eliminate the necessity for a coexistence of the stoppage and the labor
dispute. The Appellate Court of Indiana, nevertheless, denied benefits
and reversed the ruling of the administrative agency which had granted
the same. It pointed out that there are two types of statutes dealing with
disqualification for unemployment benefits. One type, such as that in
Wisconsin," provides for disqualification for benefits "for any week in
which such strike or other bona fide labor dispute is in active progress
in the establishment in which he is or was employed."
The other,
effective in Indiana, does not contain the requirement that the strike be
in "active progress" in order to disqualify a worker for benefits. If
the Indiana legislature had intended that the strike had to be in active
progress to disqualify, said the court, it would have enacted the "active
progress" type of statute. Similarly, if the legislature had intended
that the stoppage of work and the labor dispute had to be coexistent,
it could have made its intent clear by using suitable modifying language
in the section in question. Since it had not, the court was of the opinion
that benefits should properly be denied when the fact of unemployment
is caused by a work stoppage which is the aftermath of a labor dispute
in which the claimant has participated.
There are relatively few judicial decisions attempting to define the
term "stoppage of work" as found in unemployment compensation
statutes. The two cases noted are the only ones dealing with the aftereffects of labor disputes. Other cases have considered the application of
the term to workers' rights before the dispute has terminated. It has
most generally been interpreted as referring to a stoppage of operations
in the employing establishment rather than to the work of the individual
employee, not only in the few American decisions7 and the agency
rulings8 but also in the prevailing British interpretations of a statute
6 Wis.

Stats. 1945, Ch. 108, § 108.04(5) (a).

7 The phrase "stoppage of work" refers to the work and operations of the employer

establishment and not to the work of the individual employee: Lawrence Baking
Co. v. Mich. Unemployment C. Comm., 308 Mich. 198, 13 N. W. (2d) 260 (1944) ;
Magner v. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 2 N. W. (2d) 689 (1942) ; Deshler Broom Factory
v. Kinney, 140 Neb. 889, 2 N. W. (2d) 332 (1942) ; In re Steelman, 219 N. C. 306,
13 S. E. (2d) 544 (1941).
8 See

"Principles

Hughes, Attachment

Underlying

Labor-Dispute

to Unemployment

Comp.

Disqualification"
Program

by

Marsile

Letter No. 000

J.

(1946),

wherein it was said: "As a general rule, it is safe to say that all of the administrative agencies enforcing the 'stoppage of work' type of provision have followed the
general principle established by the British, namely that the term 'stoppage of

work' refers primarily to the employing establishment as distinguished from the
individual worker. ... ." See also Mich. Referee's Dec. AB-1585 (1939) ; N. D. App.
Trib., Appeal No. 6 (1939); N. J. Bd. Rev., Cases No. BR-12L, BR-15L and BR-65L

(1939).
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which has been the model for those adopted in this country.9 Such being
the case, the question next presented is when does a work stoppage
commence and when does it cease? Substantial curtailment seems to be
necessary to initiate the period' and there is indication that it continues
until there is a substantial resumption of operations,1 but just what
constitutes a "substantial" resumption of operations has12 been determined in a variety of ways according to the facts at hand.
These considerations are important for they may provide criteria for
determining rights after the labor dispute itself has ended. Jurisdictions
which see fit to adopt the view (dfthe instant case that a "work stoppage"
is not necessarily synonymous with a "strike" or "labor dispute" may
yet determine that a work stoppage has ceased during all or part of the
time for which benefits are being claimed because substantial operations
had been resumed at the employing establishment. It is true that, in
the Maryland case mentioned, the claimant's department was one of the
last to go back into operation after the strike had terminated, yet the
court did not disturb the finding of the board that the stoppage had not
ceased.' 3 So, too, in the Indiana case, there was a substantial curtailment
in production operations which existed throughout the entire time for
9 Analytic Guide to the Decisions of the Umpire (England, 1939), p. 10, states:
"It is not a disqualification that employment has been lost through a trade dispute
unless the dispute involves a stoppage of work, and a 'stoppage of work' refers
primarily not to the cessation of the workman's labour, but to a stoppage of the
work carried on in the factory, workshop or other premises at which the workman
is employed ......
See also British Umpires' Decisions, Nos. 609, 3809 and 4850
(England, 1926).
10 Stoppage of work has been interpreted to involve a substantial curtailment of
operations in Magner v. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 2 N. W. (2d) 689 (1942), and in
Deshler Broom Factory v. Kinney, 140 Neb. 889, 2 N. W. (2d) 332 (1942). It has
been implied to mean the same thing in Lawrence Baking Co. v. Mich. Unemployment C. Comm., 308 Mich. 198, 13 N. W. (2d) 260 (1944), and in In re Steelman,
219 N. C. 306, 13 S. E. (2d) 544 (1941).
11 The court in Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp. v. Review Board, -

Ind. App. -

at

-, 72 N. E. (2d) 662 at 667 (1947), said: "A stoppage of work ceases when operations are resumed on a normal basis." In British Umpires' Decision No. 4665 it
was said: "A stoppage is not necessarily limited by the duration of the dispute. If
the dispute is settled a stoppage due to that dispute ends when there is a general
resumption of work."
1u A 30% stoppage of operations was considered substantial in Magner v. Kinney.
141 Neb. 122, 2 N. W. (2d) 689 (1942). When 3334 out of 6300 employees returned
to work, a stoppage was deemed to have terminated in Ill. Dept. Labor., No.
41-DL-17 (1942). Where employment was only 36% to 54% of normal but production hours were 53% normal, it was held there was no stoppage in Ill. Dept. Labor,
No. 40-DI-9 (1940). The fact that seven out of fifty-five employees were on strike
was considered a "work stoppage" in N. J. Bd. Rev., BR-15L (1939). It should be
noted, however, that the two Illinois administrative rulings mentioned were promulgated before the decision in Walgreen Co. v. Murphy, 386 Ill. 32, 53 N. E. (2d) 390
(1944), wherein a strike was deemed synonymous with a stoppage of work.
1 See -

Md.

-

at -,

53 A. (2d) 579 at 580 and 585.
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which claimants were seeking benefits.14 But other jurisdictions may
differ as to what constitutes substantial curtailment or substantial
resumption of operations, thereby lengthening or shortening the period in
which benefits may accrue.
Illinois is placed in a peculiar position by the decision in Walgreen
Company v. Murphy, Director of Labor 15 where the court, asked to decide
the rights of employees to unemployment benefits before a strike had
ended, adopted the language of an Oklahoma case 16 which had treated
the term "work stoppage" as being synonymous with "strike."
The
holding therein, inferring that striking employees are ineligible for
benefits during the period of the strike regardless whether the employer's
operations have been either partly or substantially brought to an end,
raises an implication that the employee might claim benefits as soon as
the strike is terminated on the theory that it is the cessation of the
employee's work and not the employer's operations that is to be considered the governing criterion up until the termination of the strike.
If so, from the moment the strike terminates and the employee is ready
to return to work, he would no longer be disqualified by the "stoppage"
clause 17 and might assert a right to benefits.18
This review of the decisions to date indicates that any attempt to
determine the rights of employees to unemployment benefits under the
"stoppage" type of statute will ultimately be guided by the definition
and application given to the term "work stoppage." The rather slender
majority rule appears, at the present, to be that "work stoppage" applies
to the operations of the employer rather than those of the employee,
with each case to be decided on its own facts as to when the "work
stoppage" commences and ceases, but it is likely that other cases will
arise in the near future which may change the present balance of opinion.
W. H. GOSTLIN
14 - Ind. App. - at -, 72 N. E. (2d) 662 at 663.
15 386 Ill. 32, 53 N. E. (2d) 390 (1944).
16 Board of Review v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation, 193 Okla. 36, 141 P.
(2d) 69 (1943). That court said that the term "stoppage of work" refers to the

employee's activities and not the operations of the employer. The court in Saunders
v. Maryland Unemployment Comp. Bd., - Md. -, 53 A. (2d) 579 (1947), indicated
that the foregoing Oklahoma case has been considerably weakened by reason of an
amendment to the Oklahoma statute: Okla. Stats. 1941, Ch. 40, § 215(d), changing

the then existing "active progress" type of statute to the "stoppage" type. See also
"Principles Underlying Labor-Dispute Disqualification" by Marsile J. Hughes, At-

tachment to Unemployment Comp. Program Letter No. 000 (1946).
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 48, § 223(d), is substantially the same as the typical
"work stoppage" provision under discussion.
18 Further Interpretation of the Illinois provision, but not with respect to the
right to compensation after strike is over but before work is resumed, may be found
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TO RESTRAIN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF

TRADE-MARK OR TRADE-NAME--The turbulent mass of judicial authority
which keeps the troubled seas of unfair competition' at a slow boil may
perhaps be stabilized to some degree by a "middle of the road" decision

rendered by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in the recent
case of 265 Tremont Street, Incorporated v. Hamilburg.1 Plaintiff there
sought to enjoin the defendant from using the name of "Shubert" in
connection with the operation of a jewelry store and money-lending
business in Boston. All of the stock in the plaintiff corporation was
owned by the brothers Lee and Jacob J. Shubert, widely-known operators
of "Shubert" theaters in many cities throughout the United States
including one of the same name in the corporate premises. The defendant, one Zinn, had purchased the jewelry business in question, and the
right to use the trade-name of "Shubert Jewelry Co.," from one Jacob
Shubert, not connected with plaintiff, who had established the same in
one of the buildings owned by the Shubert interests. Upon failure to
obtain a renewal of the lease, defendant moved his store to a building
adjacent to the Shubert Theater and continued to use the trade name.
Injunction was denied by the trial court and that holding was affirmed
when the higher Massachusetts court concluded that there was nothing
about the "Shubert Jewelry Co." or the conduct of its business which
would lead the public reasonably to believe that it was owned, operated
or sponsored by the plaintiff corporation. it also pointed out that the
litigants were not rivals in competition and no confusion of identity or
2
likelihood of deception appeared probable.
The plaintiff had argued that the court should take cognizance of
a growing trend of judicial precedent allowing a remedy by injunction,
based on the unauthorized use of a trade-name even though actual
competition was lacking, 3 and reject earlier holdings.4 The court, while
in Fash v. Gordon, 398 Ill. 210, 75 N. E. (2d) 294 (1947), where the court held that
the motivation for the strike is unimportant and benefits may not be paid to striking employees for the period of the duration of the strike. See also Local Union
No. 11 v. Gordon, 396 Ill. 293, 71 N. E. (2d) 637 (1947), where the court held that
if the employees voluntarily abandoned work, even though for the purpose of
coercing payment of alleged past-due vacation pay, they were not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits.
1 -Mass. -, 73 N. E. (2d) 828 (1947).
2 The court did reverse that part of the decree which had denied injunction
against the erection of a sign which encroached on plaintiff's premises but affirmed
on the major issue here considered.
3 See, for example, Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 147 Misc. 679.
264 N. Y. S. 459 (1932), affirmed in 237 App. Div. 801, 260 N. Y. S. 821 (1932), and
in 262 N. Y. 482, 188 N. E. 30 (1933).
4 The prior rule in Massachusetts is illustrated by Loew's Boston Theatre Co. v.
Lowe, 248 Mass. 456, 143 N. E. 496, 36 A. L. R. 919 (1924).
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noting the existence of a new statute on the subject," found that neither
it nor the earlier cases required any different holding since "no likelihood of deception appearing, the plaintiff cannot prevail . . . even

though the absence of competition be treated as no objection.' '6 The
new statute referred to, whether applicable to the instant case or not,
clearly identifies Massachusetts with that growing body of authority
which allows a remedy for the unauthorized use of a trade-name even
though actual competition or trade rivalry between the parties is wholly
lacking, albeit it does make "likelihood of injury" a condition precedent
to injunctive relief.
Almost thirty years ago, the federal courts began to adopt the rule
that actual competition is not necessarily an essential element where
equitable relief is sought.7 Since then, they have followed that rule in
cases too numerous to cite.' The courts of Illinois have also gradually
accepted that trend, turning from the earlier rule that injunction would
be denied in the absence of a showing of palpable deception or actual
trade rivalry 9 until this state is now clearly identified with the so-called
"federal" rule by reason of the decision in the oft-cited case of Lady
Esther, Limited v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, Incorporated.10 Although
that decision has not been subjected to review by the Illinois Supreme
Court, there is dictum in the case of Investors Syndicate of America v.
Hughes" which would support the view that courts now place less
emphasis on competition and more on confusion.
The "palming-off"

doctrine, first step away from the harsh common-

5Mass. Gen. Laws (Ter. Ed.) 1933, Ch. 110, § 7a, added by Mass. Laws 1947, Ch.
307. That statute reads: "Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution
of the distinctive quality of a trade-name or trade-mark shall be ground for injunctive relief in cases of trade-mark infringement or unfair competition notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or of confusion as to the
source of goods or services."
6 - Mass. - at -, 73 N. E. (2d) 828 at 831. There is a possibility that the
court might have adopted some variation of the so-called "federal" rule if the
Massachusetts legislature had not made such a course unnecessary. Because of the
new statute;, the court refused to enter into any "abstract discussion of academic
principles."
7 Aunt

Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407, L. R. A. 1918C 1039 (1918).
a collection of such cases, see annotation in 148 A. L. R. 6 at 53; 52 Am.
Jur., Trade-marks, Trade-names and Trade Practices, §§ 97-9; Nims, Law of Unfair
Competition and Trade-Marks, 3d Ed., § 374.
9 Hughes v. West Pub. Co., 225 Ill. App. 58 (1922).
10 317 Il1. App. 451, 46 N. E. (2d) 165, 148 A. L. R.6 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGOKENT LAW REvmrw 74.
8 For

11 378 Il1. 413, 38 N. E. (2d) 754 (1942).
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law rule, was adopted in Illinois over a quarter of a century ago. 12 It
now constitutes one of the accepted standards for judging matters of
alleged unfair trade competition.1 3 It was not until many years later
that courts began to recognize that even though the goods, services or
business of the litigants were not in actual competition, so palming-off
was not possible, still the right to injunctive relief might be placed on
the ground that the infringer was unfairly enjoying an increase in his
own business unwittingly instituted and financed by the complaining
party, yet without any return to the latter on his investment ;14 the
infringer thus being unjustly enriched 15 or reaping an unearned profit.' 6
Adherence to the palming-off doctrine, however, does not prevent
the existence of other standards. As was said in the Lady Esther case,
the holding that "where there was direct competition between plaintiff
and defendant there must be a 'palming-off' to warrant relief, is far
from saying that courts will not grant injunctive relief where the
defendant's conduct is likely to cause confusion of the traders so that
the public believes, or is likely to believe, the goods are the goods of
the plaintiff, or that the plaintiff is in some way connected with, or is
a sponsor of, the defendant. In such situations, relief will be granted
although there is no competition.' 17 That view had gained adherents
not only in the federal system and in Illinois but also in six other states' 8
prior to the adoption of the statute above referred to by Massachusetts.
Other courts, while not openly espousing this modern trend, rely on
the modified principle expressed by Judge Dennison in Vogue Company
I2 Nestor Johnson Mfg. Co. v. Alfred Johnson Skate Co., 313 Iil. 106, 144 N. E. 787
(1924) ; DeLong Co. v. Hump Hairpin Co., 29 Il. 359, 130 N. E. 765 (1921).
13 Before that time, according to Olin v. Bate, 98 Ill. 53, 38 Am. Rep. 78 (1880),
the fact that the litigants were not in actual competition would be a controlling
issue.
14 Dodge Bros. v. East, 8 F. (2d) 872 (1925).
15 See Callman, "He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown; Unjust Enrichment
in the Law of Unfair Trade Competition," 55 Harv. L. Rev. 595 (1942).
16 Bond Stores v. Bond Stores, 104 F. (2d) 124 (1939).
17 371 Ill.
App. 451 at 455, 46 N. E. (2d) 165 at 167. For an historical discussion
of the "palming-off" doctrine, see annotation to the Lady Esther case in 148 A. L. R.
6 at 18, and Restatement of Torts, Vol. 3, Introductory Note to Ch. 35, p. 541.
18 Schwarz v. Schwarz, 93 Cal. App. 252, 269 P. 755 (1928) ; Yale & Towne Mfg.
Co. v. Rose, 120 Conn. 373, 181 A. 8 (1935); Churchill Downs Distilling Co. v.
Churchill Downs, 262 Ky. 567, 90 S.W. (2d) 1041 (1936) ; A. Weiskittel and Sons
Co. v. Harry C. Weiskittel Co.. 167 Md. 306, 173 A. 48 (1934); Tiffany & Co. v.
Tiffany Productions, Inc., 147 Misc. 679, 264 N. Y. S. 459 (1932), affirmed in 262
N. Y. 482, 188 N. E. 30 (1933) ; Long's Hat Stores Corp. v. Long's Clothes, 224 App.
Div. 497, 231 N. Y. S.107 (1928) ; Gotham Silk Hosiery Co. v. Reingold, 223 App.
Div. 260, 228 N. Y. S.9 (1928) ; H. Milgrim & Bros. v. Schlesinger, 168 Ore. 476,
123 P. (2d) 196 (1942).
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v. Thompson-Hudson Company 9 where he pointed out that: "It has
been emphasized also that the doctrine of unfair competition is nothing
but a convenient name for the doctrine that no one should be allowed
to sell his goods as those of another . .
While the doctrine is usually
invoked when there is actual competition between the parties .
there
is no fetish in the word 'competition.'
The invocation of equity rests
more vitally upon the unfairness." '2 Thus, it has been recognized that
a merchant may have a sufficient economic interest in the use of his
trade-mark or trade-name outside of the field of his own exploitation
to justify the interposition of equitable protection, 2 ' and that without
22
waiting for a demonstration of confusion from actual experience.
While the instant case establishes no new precedent, the new statute
which it serves to highlight is, in itself, worthy of comment. 23 It furnishes
another instance of the recognition which ought to be given to the rights
of those who build a valued asset in the form of a trade-name or trademark. It also delivers a blow to those who would trade on the good will
of such a name, for they now possess less reason than before to believe
that lack of actual competition should furnish a defense.
C. J. PRATT
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-REQUISITES AND VALIDITY OP CONTRACTWHETHER AN OPTION TO PURCHASE IN A LEASE WARRANTS SPEIFIc
PERFORMANCE WHEN No PRICE OR TERMS OP' SALE ARE STATED--The

question of whether a court of equity should grant specific performance
of a lease provision, which gave to the lessee the right to purchase the
demised premises, was the issue in the recent Massachusetts case of
Shayeb v. Holland." The assignee of the lessee there filed a bill to
compel specific performance of a clause in the lease which provided that
"the lessee at his option shall be entitled to the privilege of purchasing
the aforesaid land and buildings". The lease in no way specified the
purchase price or the conditions of sale. The bill alleged, among other
things, that under the authorization of the lease the lessee and his assignee
had spent large sums of money in improving the premises; money which
19300 F. 509 (1924), cert. den. 273 U. S. 706, 47 S. Ct. 98, 71 L. Ed. 850 (1926).
20 300 F. 509 at 512.
21 Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F. (2d) 972 (1928).
22 A. Weiskittel & Sons Co. v. Harry C. Weiskittel Co., 167 Md. 306. 173 A. 48
(1934).
23 For an application of that statute, see the more recent case of Jays v. Jay
Originals, Inc., - Mass. -, 75 N. E. (2d) 514 (1947).
1-

Mass. -,

73 N. E. (2d) 731 (1947).
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would be lost if specific performance should be denied. The lower court
sustained a demurrer and entered a final decree dismissing the bill,
apparently on the ground that the lease provision was too indefinite
and uncertain to support a decree of specific performance. On appeal,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed and ordered
specific performance on the ground that (1) the option was supported
by the underlying consideration of the lease, was a material term thereof,
and was a main inducement for its execution; (2) that in the absence
of express stipulations as to purchase price or conditions of sale, the
parties must be presumed to haye intended the price to be the fair
and reasonable value of the premises, payable in cash; and (3) the
contract had become mutual by the assignee's acceptance of the option,
so that the statute of frauds would not serve as a bar to specific
performance.
Although the general problems involved are not new, the case
represents an unusual and far-reaching view. The decided cases are in
general agreement that an option to purchase contained in a lease is
supported by the underlying consideration of the lease, and, when
accepted by the lessee or his assigns, becomes a mutual contract. 2 This
is held to be true whether the provision be an absolute option, a mere
privilege to purchase upon the occurrence of certain events, or one
Consequently, it is
requiring the performance of specified conditions.'
generally held that an option, like any other contract, in order to be
enforceable, must be definite and certain in its terms. 4 Any lack of
harmony in the cases exists as to the requisite degree of certainty needed
to justify specific performance.
In that regard, the instant case asserts the proposition that the
parties are presumed to have acted in good faith in executing the terms
of the lease; so that courts should, if reasonably possible, interpret a
contract in order to make a valid and enforceable undertaking rather
than one of no force and effect. The principal case again has much
2 Willard v. Tayloe, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 557, 19 L. Ed. 501 (1870) ; Macy v. Brown.
326 Ill. 556, 158 N. E. 216 (1927); Hayes v. O'Brien, 149 Ill. 403, 37 N. E. 73,
23 L. R. A. 555 (1894). See also Williston, Contracts, Rev. Ed., Vol. 5, § 1441.
3 R. I. Realty Co. v. Terrel, 254 N. Y. 121, 172 N. E. 262 (1930), discusses the
distinguishing elements. See also Tantum v. Keller, 95 N. J. Eq. 466, 123 A. 299
(1924), affirmed 96 N. J. Eq. 672, 126 A. 925 (1924).
4 Hayes v. O'Brien, 149 Ill. 403, 37 N. R. 73, 23 L. R. A. 555 (1894) ; Wolf v.
Lodge, 159 Iowa 162, 140 N. W. 429 (1913) ; Andreula v. Slovak Gymnastic Union
Sokol Assembly No. 223, 138 N. J. Eq. 257, 47 A. (2d) 878 (1946) ; Machesky v.
City of Milwaukee, 214 Wis. 411, 253 N. W. 169 (1934).
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support in the decisions of other jurisdictions 5 on this point, but despite
a desire to validate contracts whenever possible, courts are reluctant,
and generally refuse, to read terms and conditions into a contract for
which the parties themselves have neither expressly nor impliedly
stipulated.0
As there was no express stipulation concerning the purchase price,
justification for the instant decision must rest on the idea that there was
an implied understanding with regard thereto, or else the court would
be guilty of rewriting the contract before enforcing it. In support of
that conclusion, the court referred to decisions from other jurisdictions,
but it should be noted that most of the cases relied on are not in direct
point with the principal one. They involve such provisions as a
privilege to renew a lease, 7 a provision to increase the rent during the
period of the lease,' agreements involving public or quasi-public bodies,9
or executory contracts for specially made goods.1 ° The only case appearing to substantiate the view taken is that of Wilson v. Brown" wherein
the provision involved reserved to the lessors the right to sell the
property at any time, but directed that, in case of sale, preference to
purchase the property should be given to the lessees. The lessees there
filed a bill to compel the conveyance of the property, which had already
been transferred to a third party; and the lower court decreed that
upon payment by the lessees of a sum equal to the reasonable value of
the premises, the transferee was to convey the premises to the lessees by
warranty deed. That decision was affirmed, but there was no discussion
of the sufficiency of the option provision, the decision turning on a probable waiver of the preferential feature.
There appears to be no other case reaching the conclusion of the
one at hand. The case most favorable to the concerned view is that of
2
Morris v. Ballard,1
in which the court held that a lessor who lets a
tenant into possession, with an option in the lease to purchase the
5 One case will serve as an illustration: Morris v. Ballard, 56 App. D. C. 383,
16 F. (2d) 175, 49 A. L. R. 1461 (1926). For a more complete list, see John Norton
Pomeroy, A Treatise on the Specific Performance of Contracts (by John Norton
Pomeroy, Jr. & John C. Mann) (Banks & Co., Albany, N. Y., 1926), 3d Ed., § 145

et seq.

t Folsom v. Harr, 218 Ill. 369, 75 N. E. 987, 109 Am. St. Rep. 297 (1905) ; McClung
Drug Co. v. City Realty & Investment Co., 91 N. J. Eq. 216, 108 A. 767 (1919).
7 Hall v. Weatherford, 32 Ariz. 370, 259 P. 282, 56 A. L. R. 903 (1927).
S Bird v. Couchois, 214 Mich. 607, 183 N. W. 36 (1921).
9 Joy v. City of St. Louis, 138 U. S. 1, 11 S. Ct. 243, 34 L. Ed. 843 (1891); Slade
v. City of Lexington, 141 Ky. 214, 132 S. W. 404 (1910).
10 Hoadly v. M'Laine, 10 Bing. 482, 131 Eng. Rep. 982 (1834).
11 5 Cal. (2d) 425, 55 P. (2d) 485 (1936).
1256 App. D. C. 383, 16 F. (2d) 175, 49 A. L. R. 1461 (1926).
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demised premises at a stated price on terms to be agreed upon, cannot,
after the tenant has made extensive improvements on the faith of his
option, refuse to perform because he has not agreed to the terms, but
will be compelled to accept a tender of cash, less the valid incumbrances
then existing on the property, for failure to specify acceptable terms.
A similar attitude was taken in the earlier case of Swedish-American
National Bank v. Merz,"1 where the option provided that the specified
price was to be paid in such manner and form as should be agreeable
to the contracting parties, in the event of the exercise of the option. The
court granted specific performance on the ground that the law would
imply that the payment of the price should be made in a reasonable
time and in money since the contract on its face showed that the parties
had not agreed upon any other manner and form of such payment. In
the first of these cases the court recognized the necessity for a method
of payment but apparently applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel;
in the latter, the court advanced the belief that the terms of payment
were not a material part of the contract. In both cases, however, there
was a tender of the designated price; in the instant case there was
neither a specified price nor an actual tender of performance. While
there may be some justification for the results reached in these cases,
the need for certainty and freedom of contract necessitates a very strict
application of such principles. It is for this reason, therefore, that the
14
weight of authority is to the contrary.
Holdings with regard to analogous lease provisions may help to
evaluate the soundness of the instant case. Where the lessee is given
a privilege to buy the demised premises upon such terms and price as
any other person or purchaser might have offered to the lessor, the
basic case of Hayes v. O'Brien1 5 indicates that, when the price and
13179 N. Y. S. 600 (1919). Compare with Brandenburg & Marx, Inc. v. Heimberg,
34 N. Y. S. (2d) 935 (1942). For a good discussion of the point, see also Volk v.
Atlantic Acceptance & Realty Co., 139 N. J. Eq. 171, 50 A. (2d) 488 (1947).
14 See Bean v. Holmes, 236 S. W. 120 (Tex. Civ. App., 1922), rehear, den., 240
S. W. xv, wherein the court declared that an option in a lease providing that the
purchase price was to be paid in the manner agreed upon by the parties at the
time of the exercise of the option, was too indefinite and incomplete to warrant
either specific performance or an action for damages. See also Sander v. Schwab,
315 Ill. 623, 146 N. E. 509 (1925) ;Folsom v. Harr, 218 Ill.
369, 75 N. E. 987. 109 Am.
St. Rep. 297 (1905) ; Monahan v. Allen, 47 Mont. 75, 130 P. 768 (1913) ; Driebe v.
Fort Penn Realty Co., 331 Pa. 314, 200 A. 62, 117 A. L. R. 1091 (1938). The court
In the instant case cited Sander v. Schwab, 315 I1. 623, 146 N. E. 509 (1925) as
being contrary to the view it was taking.
15149 Ill.
403, 37 N. E. 73, 23 L. R. A. 555 (1894), followed in Scheidecker v.
Westgate, 164 Il1. App. 389 (1911). See also Slaughter v. Mallet Land & Cattle Co.,
72 C. C. A. 436, 141 F. 282 (1905), cert. den. 201 U. S.646, 26 S.Ct. 761, 50 L. Ed.
903 (1906).
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terms are determined according to that mode, the contract becomes as
perfect as if the details had been originally specified and is not so
indefinite and uncertain as to preclude specific performance. If, however,
the lessee is given merely a first chance" or a refusal" to purchase,
then most courts will hold the provision to be too indefinite and uncertain.
Another common provision permits the lessee to buy at a price to
be fixed by arbitration or appraisal. Although a few early cases held
that specific performance of the contract to sell would not be decreed
where the appraisers failed to agree upon the price,18 later decisions
have adopted a more liberal attitude; and it has been held that, where
appraisal or arbitration has failed, the court will decree specific performance at a fair and reasonable price 9 or at the market value less the
incumbrance of the lease. 20 Such a view is well justified as the price
attained represents one which would have been the ultimate result of a
successful appraisal or arbitration. But there would seem to be a substantial difference between provisions setting up machinery by which an
implied price can be determined and the instant one, silent on the
subject, so these analogies lend no support to the decision. It is also
a logical non sequitur to say that, because the parties have not negatived
an intention to sell and buy at a fair price, they must intend that a
21
reasonable price should control.
One other point remains for consideration, and that is the question
of compliance with the statute of frauds. That point has seldom been
16 Folsom v. Harr, 218 Ill. 369, 75 N. E. 987, 109 Am. St. Rep. 297 (1905), wherein
the court held that a term in the lease providing that should the lessor conclude to
sell, then the lessee should have first chance to buy, but stating no price nor method
of ascertaining it, was too uncertain and indefinite to be specifically enforced as an
agreement to convey to the lessee. The case is distinguished in Scheidecker v.
Westgate, 164 Ill. App. 389 (1911).
7 Fogg v. Price, 145 Mass. 513, 14 N. E. 741 (1888). The instant case attempted
to distinguish the holding therein on the ground that the clause in question negatived any intention to sell at the reasonable value, hence prevented any reading In
of an implied term.
is Milnes v. Gery, 14 Ves. .Tun. 400, 33 Eng. Rep. 574 (1807) ; Greason v. Keteltas,
17 N. Y. 491 (1858).
19 Coles v. Peck, 96 Ind. 333, 49 Am. Rep. 161 (1884).
2oWm. P. Rae Co. v. Courtney, 250 N. Y. 271, 165 N. E. 289 (1929).
See also
Bewick v. Mecham, 26 Cal. (2d) 92, 156 P. (2d) 757 (1945).
21 In the earlier case of Conos v. Sullivan, 250 Mass. 376 at 378, 145 N. E. 529 at
530 (1924), the court said: "The rights and obligations of the parties . . . cannot
be fully ascertained from its terms, and as specific performance can be decreed
only under a completed contract, it is immaterial that the valuation for the additional term may be determined by evidence. The case must be decided on the terms
of the lease."

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

an issue in the cases involving options to purchase, for the primary
concern has been one as to the certainty of the option. In the New
Jersey case of Cerrato v. Megaro,22 however, the court held that a provision giving to the lessee a first preference to purchase the premises,
but which lacked a stated or ascertained price, was an insufficient
memorandum to satisfy the statute. As that memorandum should contain on its face, or by reference to others, a clear description of the
property to be conveyed, together with the terms, if any, and the price
to be paid or other consideration, it is not surprising to find that this
essential information may not rest partly in writing and partly in
parol. 21 Yet the court in the instant case deemed the option sufficient.
It might be argued that as the plaintiff had been in possession and had
made extensive improvements in reliance upon the option, it would be
a fraud upon him to refuse specific performance, 24 but whenever that
principle has been invoked, the improvements were made by one in his
character as purchaser, not tenant, and then only where the oral agreement contained all the essential elements of a contract. There seems,
then, to be no evident reason why the option provision here concerned
should be exempt from these rules, so the decision may be said to be
one in which the court has taken an unprecedented step in two respects.
R. C. Km

2296 N. J. Eq. 722, 126 A. 531 (1924). Compare with Swedish-American National
Bank v. Merz, 179 N. Y. S. 600 (1919).
23 Sander v. Schwab, 315 Ill. 623, 146 N. E. 509 (1925). See also Marske v.
Willard, 169 Ill. 276, 48 N. E. 290 (1897).
24 Fierke v. Elgin City Banking Co., 359 Ill. 394, 194 N. E. 528 (1935).
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A Study
of Legal Administration and Procedure. Margaret Hastings. Ithaca,
New York: Cornell University Press, 1947, Pp. xviii, 302.

THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS IN FIFTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND:

It has been suggested that people are inclined to carry the tendency
toward specialization to extremes. As such a tendency generally appears
with maturing civilization, the western world has carried specialization to
1
the point where in fact it now tends to make us less civilized as individuals.
Overspecialization, wherever it arises at the expense of general perspective
in education, should be approached with caution. So, because Dr. Hasting's
study may appear at first sight to have usefulness only for antiquarians
and historical bibliographers and, therefore, a bit uncivilizing in its
specialization, there may be a natural concern about the place of this book
in the literature of the law.
The avowed objectives of the study are two. First, by collecting in one
volume information heretofore widely scattered and not easily manageable
by the ordinary student, the author sought to facilitate the use and interpretation of the original records of the central courts of common law during
the late Middle Ages. Secondly, by studying the workings of the most
active of these courts from its actual records, to-wit: the plea rolls and the
correspondence of the period, the author believed it possible to correct certain erroneous impressions contained in studies heretofore made based upon
the Yearbooks, ancient treatises and secondary sources. The author has
arranged the information gathered from her chosen sources into four
divisions. One deals with the business of the court, its records and a typical
day in court; a second describes its personnel, from the justices and the
sergeants down to the filacers and messengers; a third contains illustrations
of the use of the original writs, mesne process, pleadings, as well as the
trial, judgment and execution; the final part discusses hinderances upon
the administration of justice and undertakes to make an overall evaluation
of the work of the court during the period in question. Five appendices
contain valuable compilations of such mysteries as the schedule of fees to
be paid into court in the course of a law suit, a list of the return days for
the writs, and the identities of the various clerks and keepers of the writs
whose marks appear on the original plea rolls of the period. All of this
handily accomplishes Dr. Hasting's immediate purpose and should inspire
other similar projects designed to free students of social and legal history
from dependence upon theories reconstructed from secondary sources.
1 Hurst, "Legal History: A Research Program," 1942 Wis. L. Rev. 319-333.

BOOK REVIEWS

Studies such as this contain much that would be of great value in an
essential rewriting of Anglo-American legal history now waiting to be
undertaken. It is clear that our legal history should be rewritten with the
common law kept more firmly in mind than has been usual in the past.
There is need, for example, to explain how our present dichotomy of public
and private law is not entirely a product of sixteenth and seventeenth
century experiences without ancestral roots in the common law. There is
occasion to note how, prior to the seventeenth century, the King's Prerogative and Littleton's Tenures were but parts of the same ancient customary
common law functioning as the fundamental law of the land. Often overlooked is the fact that, even in the age of uncontested legislative supremacy,
the common law remained a reserve of experience from which statutory
law could be drawn. Too often this common source of all public and
private law is insufficiently understood or its lessons not applied with full
advantage to present day problems of interpretation. 2 Dr. Hasting's study,
dealing as it does with what Sir Matthew Hale once called the "golden age
of common law pleading," furnishes many valuable insights into the
litigious past of English society. It should prove of great value to anyone
undertaking a reexamination of the common law.
One thing more might be said, and that rather by way of notice than
criticism. It is inevitably a delicate matter to present a study dealing with
legal administration and procedure in a way that catches and holds the
reader's attention. One preparing a study of the type Dr. Hastings has
undertaken must write with a certain audience in mind. There are parts of
this book that will please and fascinate anyone who enjoys historical reading but it is principally a book for scholarly consumption. Many of its
points are elaborated and explained with far more detail than the casual
historian will care to follow as he fills out his knowledge of the subject.
The arrangement of that information, within each unit of the study, is
almost always such that the reader must resort to solid reading; he may not
scan. These, however, are inevitable characteristics of the style of presentation chosen by the author. Far from being a detraction, they should
enhance the value of the work to those who form the audience to which it
was addressed.
R. D. NETHERTO.

2

See, for example, comments by Charles H. Mcllwain on reviewing Knappen.

"Constitutional and Legal History of England," 10 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 97-8. See also

Boorstin, "Tradition and Method in Legal History," 54 Harv. L. Rev. 424-36, and
Pound, "New Possibilities of Old Materials of American Legal History," 40 W. Va.

L. Q. 205-11.
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